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ABSTRACT

The papers in this publication are, for the most part, coupled as a statement of position followed by a response. The subjects addressed cover a broad spectrum of educational philosophy. Topics chosen for presentation include: (1) basic reading instruction for hermeneutic understanding; (2) the teacher as a philospher; (3) the classroom as a marketplace for ideas; (4) should artists study philosophical aesthetics? (5) Soviet education and Glasnost; (6) the danger of the accountability movement; (7) ethical neutrality; (8) the philosophy of teaching; (9) education for all handicapped children; (10) the role of schools of education; (11) gender differences in thinking; and (12) curricular epistemology. (JD)

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PROCEEDINGS

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Teacher as Philosopher

PROCEEDINGS

of the

Thirty-third Annual Meeting

of the

South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society

University of South Carolina

at

Spartanburg

October 14-15, 1988

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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

The Basals -- 'Dominant But Dead' vs. Gadamer and Language for Hermeneutic Understanding

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"Our children need to learn to read. Teach them to read. Then give us the test score results to show that you have taught them." Secretary Bennett says that this simple demand for test score accountability is the linchpin of his campaign for educational reform. The culture is enamored of bottom line results. On what grounds can one question such a reasonable request?

There is a problem though. In the words of Ernest Boyer, "It very often leads us to measure what matters least"[1] and, I would add, leads us to damage what matters most. Teachers in their bones know that the damage is real, but they are frustrated in articulating their discontents. We need a variety of attempts to oppose it. I am making my try under the title "The Basals -- Dominant But Dead vs. Gadamer and Language for Hermeneutic Understanding." "Dominant but Dead" is a borrowing from Habermas.[2]

I am using "the basals" as a catchword for one version of Secretary Bennett's reform. First, because The Report Card on Basal Readers (1988) of the National Council of the Teachers of English calls "the basals" the paradigm of test-driven instruction in elementary education;[3] the basal readers became the model for the texts in all of the elementary subjects. My argument: The positivist technical approach to reading in the rationale of the basals contrasts with Hans-Georg Gadamer's concept of language as hermeneutic understanding. Confronting the issue in that way will help us see why the fixation on the basals as a version of test-driven accountability leads us "to measure what matters least, and to damage what matters most."

Before turning to Gadamer, I'll be commenting on "the basals." I regret that my brief reference to them as a model of the new reform tends to stereotyping. I acknowledge that many teachers make use of them intelligently as one avenue for teaching reading. The danger comes when test score pressures lead to their monopolizing teaching and learning. My argument is that the basals are not all wrong, but fundamentally wrong, in that their reductionist use violates, in Gadamer's terms, what we most essentially are as human beings.

(A) Basals -- "Dominant But Dead"

The word from the front is coming in. Teachers are beginning to rebel against pressures to reduce learning to a measurable production function. One of the most forceful instances is the newspaper of Milwaukee teachers, Rethinking Schools. The newspaper was launched several years ago as a response to a variety of teacher discontents. Central among them was the decision of the Board to implement an ambitious "curriculum and instruction management system" called Outcome Based Education.

A prominent feature is a reading instruction program at the grade school level tied closely to a program of testing based on the basal readers. In

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Rethinking Schools teachers report that: "The basal reading program is so boring, fragmented, and work-book oriented that many children learn to hate reading.... Few teachers can find the time to introduce whole books and more meaningful reading activities.... At the high school level ... the competency test has turned the English Curriculum into a narrow rote program of drilling students for a test that does not measure what is really important for students to learn."[4] To indicate that their criticisms are not unique Rethinking Schools reported at length on The National Council of English Teachers' Report Card on Basal Readers. The Report says that the use of basals is almost universal in American schools with far too many teachers following "the teacher's manual literally, seldom if ever exercising their own initiative and creativity in teaching reading."[5] "Dick and Jane" type basals have become the twentieth century archetype for a unified approach to the whole elementary curriculum with basal-type texts in science, social studies, arithmetic, health and art.

In a scathing indictment of basal pedagogy the Report sketches basic features which include:

(1) Reading is reduced to learning a word, a sound or a skill at a time. Learning is sequential with skills broken into components that can be controlled, explicitly taught, and then tested.

(2) The contrived language of texts is sequenced by a controlled vocabulary based on word lists leading to synthetic stories. There is more concern with controlling the sequence of sounds, words and skills than in providing authentic language in the text.[6] Thus: "We can go. I can go. Can you go? Help! Help! I can not go. I will help you. You can go. I will go, etc."[7] (But why bother?)

Following in this vein technician text writers transform traditional literature to fit their word lists. For example there is Gerald McDermot's original rendition of a famous Japanese folk tale:

> Tasuko was a lowly stonecutter. Each day the sound of his hammer and chisel rang out as he chipped away at the foot of the mountain. He heaved the blocks of stone that formed the great temples and palaces. He asked for nothing more than to work each day, and this pleased the spirit who lived in the mountains.

Harcourt's transformation of the beginning of this tale is as follows:

> Once there was a strong man. Each morning he went to the mountain. There he dug up stones. He broke them into pebbles with a large steel hammer. He carried them to the village where he sold them.[8]

With this as the fare teachers are given an array of workbooks, skill sheets, and test materials, designed to maintain children's "time on task."

With teachers made accountable in terms of test scores the school day is progressively narrowed to drill activities to produce "correct" answers to arbitrary test questions. (In the Holt Series the NCTF found that 63% to 95% of the questions required only one correct answer.)[9] Having reduced the reality of reading to selected skill components -- measuring of these components is then treated as the reality of reading itself. "So reading is not making sense of print anymore. It is doing well on the basal tests."[10]

Milwaukee teachers gearing up to resist found a quotation from Larry Cuban that described what was happening to them: "When the model curriculum standards are wired to the tests and texts, and then all are wired together to a larger accountability program (which means how you do on the tests is publicly disseminated) what you get is measurement driven instruction, a rational bureaucratic systems management approach to teaching.... The creative and imaginative part of teaching shrinks."[11]

(B) Genesis of the basals

Hermeneutic philosophy tells us that a basic tool of understanding is to understand events in terms of the histories behind them. Therefore, a brief detour is in order with the help of Allan Luke's "Making 'Dick and Jane': Historical Genesis of the Modern Basal Reader."[12]

We entered the twentieth century, of course, on the crest of the wave of industrialism, and a progressive faith in science and technology as the engine of progress. The schools, confronting this reality and the challenge of burgeoning numbers of immigrant children, had to respond. Happily national text book companies found that practitioners of the new educational psychology were ready to come to the rescue. As the McGuffey readers faded into history, mass production texts, with the imprimatur of science, were about to be created.

We pass over Allan Luke's reports on the evolution of the basals in the opening decades. By the Second World War the giants of educational psychology like Edward Thorndike, Arthur Gates and William Gray had created a new genre of school texts. Using scientific behaviorist theories of language development, graded texts were developed that were lexically, syntactically and semantically controlled. They were augmented by workbooks, skill sheets, junior dictionaries and administrator handbooks to provide expert-guided supervision. After World War II progressive refinements of "Dick and Jane" type reading series pointed toward a thoroughgoing scientific orientation for curriculum development, pedagogical techniques and assessment.

The systems approach to text making reflected a three-fold rationale: (1) the positivist conviction that all modern products and modes of human labor can be ordered on a linear scale of progress and development, (2) the accompanying conviction that the teaching of reading could be envisioned as a matter of employing technically precise quantifiable programming of instruction that would guarantee nearly universal success in literacy, (3) the belief that efficacy of teaching could be verified through the use of standardized tests. In the '80's the corollary was added that teachers could be made accountable for scores, and, in some cases, paid by results.[13] Behind the whole project was the positivist faith in Thorndike's famous dictum: "Whatever exists, exists in some amount. To measure it is simply to know its varying amounts."[14]

It is not surprising to find then that the logic of these convictions led in the 1980's to legislation in Texas which makes Texas teachers "subject to a $50 fine if they are caught teaching reading without an approved textbook" and to legislators in Florida passing a law making basal materials "the only legal means to provide reading instruction."[15]

As the movement gained momentum the authors of The Report Card on Basal Readers saw that its logic centered more and more on the issue of control.

> ... More than anything else the basals are built around control: they control reading; they control language; they control learners;

they control teachers. And this control becomes essential to the tight organization and sequence. Any relaxation of the control in any of these elements would appear to undermine the whole system. That's why publishers admonish teachers not to wander from the direction of the manuals; that's why administrators issue mandates requiring teachers to be faithful to the program."[16]

(C) The origins of rational control: Foucault

Before turning to critique via Gadamer, some comments from Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish throw light on the origins of this deep-seated need for rational control, and why its taken-for-grantedness makes it so difficult to criticize. The great truth we must constantly hold before ourselves, said Foucault, is the realization that the reason or rationality of the Enlightenment which gave us the liberties, also invented the disciplines.[17] Foucault was a critic of bureaucratic rationalization which, in turn, is related to the positivist science tradition with roots in the Enlightenment. Foucault showed that, from the seventeenth and eighteenth century onward, there was a virtual take-off in the increase of calculated power to control people in state apparatuses like the army, prisons, tax administration, etc.

We find the new controls, says Foucault, in the fashioning of the late seventeenth century Christian Brothers Schools for the poor. Jean Baptiste de la Salle, the founder, said, "How grave and dangerous is the task of teachers in the Christian Schools.... We must be concerned above all with the little things, the minute things in the lives of our students and their teachers. The little things lead to great results." Foucault adds, "The meticulousness of the regulations, the fussiness of inspections, the supervision of the smallest fragments of life and of the body will soon provide, in the context of the school, the barracks, the hospital or the workplace a technical rationality for the mystical calculus of the infinitesimal."[18]

Foucault noted that Jeremy Bentham's panopticon proposals for prisons or factories in the early 1800's embodied the technically thought out disciplines required for the modern era. Panopticon comes from the Greek words pan, everything, and opticon, a place of sight. Thus, a place of sight to see everything. Bentham elaborated panopticon plans for prisons, factories, and schools. The general idea included a basic circular building, with cells for individual subjects around the inside of the circumference. In the center, facing the cells, is an Inspector's Tower with windows looking down on the cells. The observatory room at the top was constructed with a line of sight so that the Inspector could see all, while being invisible to the inmates below. Thus, the basic principle was that "the persons to be inspected should always feel themselves as if under inspection."[19] The person to be supervised " ... is seen, but he does not see, he is the object of information, never a subject of communication."[20]

The guiding concept, says Foucault, is the ideal of the Perfect Gaze: the Gaze that can see everything constantly. It employs three instrumentalities for exercising power: (1) hierarchical surveillance — all of those intrusive Gazes from the central office, (2) normalizing judgment aimed at securing conformity to the norm, and (3) the examination. The gist of his argument is in his comments on the examination. In the examination, says Foucault, we can find a whole domain of knowledge and a whole type of power: (a) through techniques of the examination individuals are made visible — subject to "the gaze," and made into objects for measurement; (b) by documentation individuals and groups are encoded in written reports and files. They are organized into registers, classifications and cumulative systems; (c) by collecting documentary records, each individual is individualized as a case and becomes an object of knowledge and power connected with it.[21]

The examination is now pervasive in modern institutions, and is notably present, said Foucault, in the growth of larger, more systematized modern schools. The school has become, in fact, a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted examination, increasingly an arena for "a perpetual comparison of each and all that make it possible both to measure and judge...."[22] The extension of the panopticon rationale throughout the society coincided, Foucault says, with the rise of the human sciences. In line with the ideal of the Gaze, quantitative test scores and record keeping created the conditions for a technical matrix which changed discourse about policy issues into the lexicon of technocratic ideology. Thus teachers are taught to think of classrooms as management systems, and to talk about their teaching in terms of performance objectives, system components, sequencing of instruction, etc. Teachers may feel, "Who are we to question scientific expertise?" If the system breaks down and doesn't work the only answer of pan-opticon technicians is to do more of the same.

If Foucault, like Weber, helps us see the sources of rational control, Gadamer might help us understand the resistance to it. I want to report briefly on two aspects of his work: (1) His argument about how positivist techniques threaten what is distinctive about us as human beings, (2) His related ideas on the dialogic nature of language in achieving hermeneutic understanding.

(D) Gadamer on our nature as dialogical beings

I am persuaded by Bernstein's general argument in Beyond Objectivism and Relativism that Gadamer's whole effort was to see the nature of our being-in-the-world in a way which would be an alternative to the image of rational positivist science."[23]

In Truth and Method, for example, Gadamer holds that the right to converse -- to dialogue with texts and each other, in reaching for understanding about the world and ourselves — is the unique, distinctive characteristic of being human. For Gadamer understanding is more than epistemological. It is ontological in that we are "thrown into the world as beings constituted to understand and interpret: understanding is the original character of the being of human life itself."[24] Understanding underlies all human activity. Language is the medium in which we live.[25] Therefore, the way we use it and learn it affects who we are and who we may become, and what our society is and what it may become. For Gadamer the chief task of hermeneutic philosophy is to "correct the peculiar falsehood of modern consciousness," i.e., to defend practical reason against the domination of technology based on science — and to oppose the scientism of our age and the false idolatry of the expert which poses a threat to practical and political reason.[26]

Ernest Becker in The Structure of Evil caught the underlying issue between the two perspectives. He held that since the rise of science and the Enlightenment we have been confronted with two major images of humans: l'homme machine (humans as mechanism) and homo poeta (humans as meaning makers). The Newtonian image of the world as a physical mechanism moving according to mathematically regulated laws of force and motion, gave powerful support to tendencies to see humans as manipulable objects within the grand mechanical design. Julien Offray de la Mettrie caught the human counterpart with his phrase l'homme machine. The problem with that concept, according to Becker, is that it violates our deeper needs as homo poeta. We create structures of evil, Becker said, whenever we create institutions which deny persons the opportunity to stage the world so they can act in in creatively.[27]

From Gadamer's dialogical perspective language is the means through which we fulfill our essential task as homo poeta: to see the world and ourselves with new meaning or understanding, and with that understanding to transform the world and ourselves. To permit language teaching and learning to be reduced to a series of skills that can be technically crafted based on the rationale of behavioral science is to violate something basic about who we are.

It remains then to compare Gadamer's concept of the dialogical role of language to secure hermeneutic understanding, with the linear acquisition model we saw in the basals model. Gadamer does not treat directly the topic of teaching reading. A glimpse at several features of his way of thinking about language, however, points to differences with the rationale of the basals: (1) the quality of play in hermeneutic understanding, (2) the role of prejudice in dialogue, (3) the ethical dimension in the fusion of horizons for self-transformation and world building.

(E) Language as Hermeneutic Understanding

(1) Play in hermeneutic understanding

Gadamer wrote Truth and Method as his major effort to contrast the kind of truth available in hermeneutic understanding with the kind of truth available in the positivist science tradition. Since the basals obviously are out of the positivist tradition, the juxtaposition of the basals vs. Gadamer helps us see the differences that are at stake. In Gadamer's philosophic hermeneutics to understand implies the possibility of seeing connections, of drawing conclusions, of interpreting a "text,"[28] which may be a book, a work of art, another person, or a life event.

Gadamer notes that there is a similarity between playing games and reading a "text." In each there is a to and fro movement: in a game between the players and the game with its rules or actions, in reading between the readers and the context or structure of a text.[29] Reading a book or examining a painting has a quality of entry into a new domain as does playing a game. In both instances the participants are transported out of their lives into another reality with its special concerns. Entering a book is an event that poses a challenge in that we take the risk of exposing ourselves to the author's way of seeing which may challenge us to change our lives. The to and fro action requires a quality of participation. The play in a particular game or the interpreting of a text depends on the way the players bring themselves to it. Thus what is disclosed in a particular reading depends on what the readers open themselves to see — what they allow it to open about themselves. And the meaning of a book differs with different readings, or readings by different readers, just as a game may differ each time it is played. Through language games, in playing around with what is meant, we rise to an understanding of the world.[30]

Genuine understanding is an active affair that requires a personal appropriation of the meaning of the text in relation to one's own situation. Gadamer contrasts this with the situation when a student is asked to read out loud what she doesn't understand. Whenever one reads out loud what one does not understand -- "whether it be English, Chinese or German — it always winds up Chinese. Only when one understands what one is reading can one modulate and introduce a rhythm in such a way that what is meant really comes out."[31] And Gadamer adds, that "no text and no book speaks if it does not speak the language that reaches the other person."[32] Thus the story of the Japanese stonecutter might reach children when stated one way, but be a mere assemblage of words when stated another.

(2) The role of prejudice in dialogue

In talking about the to and fro quality in play we have also been talking about the play quality in genuine conversation or dialogue. Gadamer saw the dialogues of Socrates as illustrating the nature of a true conversation -- one in which each partner is concerned concretely with the subject at hand and with arriving at truth regarding it. This requires a willingness to start from Socrates' attitude of docta ignorantia — the willingness to admit that one does not know it all, and is open, therefore, to the possible truth in the views of another. Each participant must be taken seriously as an equal dialogue partner, equally capable of illuminating the subject matter.[33]

The heart of the hermeneutic reach for understanding is that it always involves a questioning of things. This includes the questioning of one's own foreknowledge or prejudgments that we always bring with us. When we are really trying to understand other persons or "texts," or events, we must learn the art of being responsive. We must participate or share in them, listen to them, open ourselves to what they are saying, and to the claims of truth they make upon us. We must always be prepared for them to tell us something new. This sensitivity to the possibility of newness, Gadamer says, involves neither "neutrality" nor the extinction of oneself. "The important thing is to be aware of one's bias so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against our own fore-meanings."[34] At the same time our own prejudices contribute to understanding as they become part of the dialogue with the new, so that there can be a testing of one's own truth claims with those of another.

(3) Fusion of horizons

What we can hope to achieve in the dynamic learning process of dialogical understanding is a "fusion of horizons" wherein our own horizon is enlarged and enriched. This process of learning from other lives and horizons is at the same time coming to an understanding of ourselves. Genuine conversation and undistorted communication makes possible both self-transformation and expansion of world horizons, or social transformation.[35]

Thus we come to a third theme in Gadamer that there is an inextricable connection of the theoretical and the practical. The type knowledge and truth that hermeneutics yields is practical knowledge and truth that can shape praxis. Hermeneutic philosophy, in Gadamer's view, is the heir to the older tradition of Aristotle's phronesis or practical philosophy to guide conduct.

Bernstein is right, however, in holding that Gadamer fails to think through the radical social implications of his philosophy. As Bernstein says, a powerful regulative ideal comes from thinking through what is required for a dialogic community based on mutual understanding and respect: "a communal life based on undistorted communication, dialogue, communal judgment, and rational persuasion."[36] If, in view of our daily contact with the media, this seems

Utopian, Gadamer himself does not think that we have yet arrived at that "cosmic night" in which science expands into a total technocracy.[37] There are still solidarities that constitute our social being and that provide a basis of hope for the revitalization of ethical praxis in our institutions. There is the capacity to resist and reconstruct.

(F) Teachers Reach for the Dialogical

I end by referring to some teachers who have resisted. In their alternatives to the basals one finds an intuitive reach for the centrality of dialogical understanding although there is no indication that they have heard of Gadamer.

First a report of a teacher-researcher skeptical about the "time on task" obsession of the instructional programs which leads early school learning to be so "cognitively anemic." In an article, "The Value of 'Time off Task': Young Children's Spontaneous Talk and Deliberate Text,"[38] she reported her observation of a teacher, motivated by Vygotsky, who attached value to providing 'time off task' i.e., informal peer talk to encourage higher level intellectual work among primary age children. Vygotsky held that intellectual reflection and imaginative world building can be consciously developed only after unconscious, spontaneous conversation about such worlds.

This teacher broke out of the work-book frame. She viewed children's peer conversation, as a natural outgrowth of their interest in each other and the work they were about. She encouraged children to converse as they created imaginary worlds with talk, pictures and written texts. The children who spoke different varieties of English and came from strikingly different home neighborhoods entered the imaginative world of their classmates. Their lively interactions included challenges of logic, appreciation of vivid images, sharing of feelings as they analyzed the stories of each other. Over time a wide range of peer dialogue crept into texts, story boundaries were expanded, and complexity of plots emerged. Children were learning to listen to each other's words and to their own and in the process were engaging in what Gadamer calls bildung[39] — self transformation and the extension of world horizons. As the teacher put it, "Little children do not need language broken up into drills and tests. Language and thought flourish in the rich imagery of children's invented worlds of fantasy and play and story telling, of books and music and poetry. In such a climate children can fearlessly offer their hearts and minds to the meaning of language and the purpose of reading."[40]

Next, a couple of brief examples from Rethinking Schools. Teachers in a Madison, Wisconsin elementary school reported their rejection of the belief that reading skills should be taught in fragments. They asked, "How many basal stories left an impact on you in your youth?" So they developed a "whole book" approach that closely integrates reading, writing, and language arts — a program using real books by authors "who write with the purpose of communicating in some depth about the human condition."[41] Children engage in activities to enrich their understanding of an author's work. For example, they blindfolded themselves in reading a story of a blind woman; they keep diaries as if they were one of the characters; they often correspond with the authors, including one from Holland who said his books had grown out of his experience as a war correspondent.

While convinced of the essential rightness of the whole book method, the Madison teachers accept the fact that many teachers are used to basals and don't want to change. These teachers should not be thrown into a "whole book" approach, which takes time and collective effort, until they want to try it. At the same time they questioned the claim that teachers can easily "enrich" the basals. Since so many skills and lessons have to be covered, and because the reading selections are so short, even for the best-intentioned teachers, such activities are usually peripheral, if not altogether omitted.

Finally a report from Rethinking Schools about a rural school district in Pajaro Valley, California, with a heavy majority of Spanish speaking farm and migrant workers.[42] To overcome the alienation of the children from their families, and to help parents increase their dignity and self-identity, a resort to dialogue between parents and children in reading and writing was developed. The children invited Spanish speaking parents to a meeting with Alma Ada, a Mexican author, who talked with them about why and how she came to write stories for children's books. Out of that has grown a program in which parents meet to dialogue about children's literature in Spanish, and more importantly to read and discuss stories and poems written by their children -- and by themselves. Their talk, following the work of Paulo Freire, includes description, critical analysis, and creative application to life situations.

Videotapes record the parents reading the stories. The children watch their parents on the TV screen and join the discussion. Out of these readings parents have come to spend time every evening with their children and with a book. They are taught at all times to encourage their children to reason and express themselves clearly, and to listen to the children with interest and affection. A book is now being compiled from the stories of the children.

(G) Conclusion

In listening to the debate between advocates of the dominant mode of the basals and their critics, we may hear it as a difference about teaching techniques. Gadamer's perspective reminds us, however, that the deeper issue is how children in a pluralist world will come to the use of language. Of course skill training (techné) is important, but the central role of language is as an instrument of phronesis -- understanding and practical/ethical judgment. Gadamer's concern is with "the peculiar falsehood of modernism" -- the domination of understanding and practical reason by technology based on science. When we turn schools into places of monologue where children are made to compete nervously for fragmented bits that score well on tests, we have perverted the educational enterprise before it starts. Those other teachers I described chose to bring their children to the use of language by making them members of dialogical communities. In doing that they demonstrated what Gadamer called "the noblest task" -- "decision making according to one's own responsibility instead of conceding that task to the experts."[43]

I wrote about Gadamer in the hope that his insights would help teachers understand why they need to resist.

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1. Ernest Boyer, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (May 29, 1988): 12.
2. Jurgen Habermas, "Modernity -- An Incomplete Project," in Hal Foster, ed., The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Post Modern Culture (Port Townsend, Washington: Bay Press, 1983), 6.
3. Kenneth S. Goodman et al., Report Card on Basal Readers (Katonak, New York: Richard C. Owen Publishers, Inc., 1988), III-V, 122-131.

4. Rethinking Schools 2:2 (December/January 1988): 1. (P.O. Box 93371, Milwaukee, Wi., 53202).
5. Goodman, Report Card on Basal Readers, 24.
6. Ibid., 70-72.
7. Ibid., 67.
8. Ibid., 87.
9. Ibid., 81.
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12. Allan Luke, "Making Dick and Jane: Historical Genesis of the Modern Basal Reader," Teachers College Record 89:1 (Fall 1987).
13. Ibid., 111.
14. Edward L. Thorndike, "Measurement in Education," Teachers College Record (November 1921), 371.
15. Goodman, Report Card on Basal Readers, 33-34.
16. Ibid., 125.
17. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 222.
18. Ibid., 140.
19. The Work of Jeremy Bentham (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), Vol. 4, 44.
20. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200.
21. Ibid., 184-194 et passim.
22. Ibid., 186.
23. Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 165, and 131-139, 155-165.
24. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1986), 230.
25. Ibid., 404-405.
26. See Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 150.
27. Ernest Becker, The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 214-215.
28. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 231.
29. Ibid., 94-5, and Chapter 2, "Play as the Ontological Explanation," 91-108.
30. Ibid., 446. See also Georgia Warnke, Gadamer (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987), 49-51.
31. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1986), 124.
32. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 58.
33. Ibid., 325-333.
34. Ibid., 238.
35. Ibid., 269-273.
36. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 228.
37. Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxv.
38. Anne Haas Dyson, "The Value of 'Time Off Task': Young Children's Spontaneous Talk and Deliberate Text," Harvard Educational Review 57:4 (November 1987): 396-420.
39. See Warnke, Gadamer, 228.
40. Rethinking Schools 2:4 (May/June 1988): 5.
41. Rethinking Schools 1:3 (May/June 1987): 3.
42. Ibid., 16-17.
43. See Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 159.

POSITIVISM, PRACTICAL WISDOM AND DIALOGUE

A RESPONSE TO ARTHUR WIRTH

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The theme of this conference is "Teacher as Philosopher." These words bring to the minds of many of us John Dewey's famous remark that "Philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education."[1] Education has a kinship with the philosophical act, recognized since Greece. Prof. Wirth in his rich and illuminating paper explores once again the depths of this kinship, inviting us as philosophers to engage in the kind of institutional critique that defines our task. I cannot in a brief comment do justice to the manifold dimensions of Prof. Wirth's paper and must be selective. I choose three dimensions of his analysis to comment on: (1) the historical condition of modernism, particularly as it relates to positivism; (2) the recovery of the classic ideal of practical wisdom, or phronesis; (3) the nature and value of dialogue.

(1) Positivism: Prof. Wirth cites with approval the historical method of much hermeneutic philosophy. To understand something is to understand its story. I am attracted to this line of analysis myself. One of the reasons there is so little understanding of the classical roots of American educational theory, is that we know so little about the history of thought. So let me begin with a few amplificatory remarks on Prof. Wirth's historical analysis.

A good deal of Prof. Wirth's strategy rests on his belief that the basal reader is essentially a positivist instrument, reflecting a dominant modern mechanistic view of human life and action. He sees American behaviorism as largely continuous with this positivism, although he focuses his attention on European critical responses to positivism, especially Gadamer's. Much of this historical analysis is persuasive. The embarrassments of dualistic metaphysics and the triumphs of modern physics led many to the belief that the full range of human life and activity could be exhaustively reduced to matter and motion, or at least to the methodologies that enjoyed such success in the natural sciences. John Stuart Mill explicitly invoked the success of modern science in his complaint of our great ignorance in moral philosophy. And Auguste Comte attempted the imposition of "scientific method" upon all human life, personal and institutional. In contrast with Comte, I would say, later positivism, including the Vienna Circle's, is child's play.[2]

The influence of all this on American thought and practice is not so clear to me. In spite of recent philosophical history I don't think there has ever been the kind of positivism in America that we find in France, England or Germany. Certainly in academic circles, when we think of positivism, we think of later linguistic or logical positivism, and even then, associate it with a largely exile academic population, Carnap, Feigl, Reichenbach. The prevailing idealism and pragmatism of American philosophy (now in process of recovery) grew out of a philosophical climate in which the dualism and reductionism of

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European thought had already been overcome. I see the broad history of American thought in the 19th century as owing more to the synthetic and integrative mood of German idealism (perhaps especially, it's worth noting, in St. Louis!). John Dewey is heir to much of this, of course. We should never forget his early writings, particularly his first book, on Leibniz, surely no mechanist, and a vigorous opponent of the same Descartes at whose feet much of our modern disaffection has reasonably been placed. I take behaviorism more as psychological method than as metaphysical critique, and, though it coheres with materialism and positivism, it takes its inspiration more from empiricist epistemology than from any reductionist world-view. The basals and the whole oppressive machinery of testing owes much to behaviorist psychology, but not so much I think to the positivism so much criticized by humanists such as Gadamer. Using Gadamer and Foucault may be to beat the basals with too heavy a cudgel. It is still the case that educational research is dominated by a naive behaviorist methodology, and perhaps it is overly sanguine of me, but I doubt that positivistic world-views ever have or ever will enjoy a dominant influence on the direction of American life. Insofar as the basals have their roots in such world-views, I see them as dead, yes, but only temporarily dominant.[3]

But, as Prof. Wirth notes early in his paper, a variety of attempts are needed to reduce the influence of the basal readers and the whole machinery of testing and measurement with which they are connected. And surely, Gadamer's version of humanism, reinforced by the profound critique of modernism found in Foucault, can be of service. In this project the recovery of the classic virtue of practical wisdom and the rhetoric of dialogue, can go a long way. Let me make one or two remarks about each.

(2)Practical Wisdom: Commentators on modern consciousness are quite right to point to a crisis in the concept of practical wisdom, what Aristotle called phronesis. The history of practical rationality in modern Europe is a fascinating but dreary one, and the efforts of philosophers like Gadamer, to point to the misunderstanding of practical reason as "the peculiar falsehood of modern consciousness," are to be applauded. We cannot explore the complexities of this history today. But it has two major aspects: (1) the term "prudence" (the Latin and vernacular term for phronesis) comes to stand for self-interest; (2) the work of practical reason becomes reducible without residue to theoretical science and technique, two qualities of mind from which it had been distinguished by Aristotle and his commentators.[4] We are heirs to this reductionism today. The social sciences are unthinkable without it. But how the rights of practical reason are to be recovered is none too clear. On the side of theory a renewed study of the sixth book of Aristotle's Ethics will certainly help, as well as of Thomas Aquinas's splendid treatise on prudence in the Summa theologiae. But even here Aristotle's sharp dichotomy of phronesis and sophia can support a new kind of dualism in intellectual life. Perhaps neo-classical efforts at integrating rhetoric and philosophy can help. Philosophy strikes many as a pointless speculative exercise. The civic humanistic project of enlarging the role of rhetoric and allied informal logical procedures may restore practical reason to its unique place in the list of intellectual excellences. I take it that many critical thinking programs so much in vogue these days are devoted to this effort, especially where they strive to focus on "real-life" problems. But philosophers have always been chary of philology. And an alliance of philosophy and rhetoric may breed new forms of sophistry and support a kind of anthropocentric humanism just a step removed from skepticism. On the side of practice I am not confident that practical wisdom can be institutionalized. Aristotle claimed that time and experience were necessary for growth in practical wisdom.[5] It is not clear that school is a place for such experience. Maybe schools are of necessity places of knowledge and skill. If they can be made into training grounds for practical wisdom, however, I am sure that only 'whole books' will do the job, along with renewed emphasis upon dialogue, to which third point I now turn.

(3) Dialogue: Perhaps the rights of phronesis can be restored by focusing on social discourse. Dialogue has since Plato been the proper rhetoric of philosophical discourse, and survives explicitly or implicitly in most great philosophical writing. It is interesting that Descartes, a mechanist in natural philosophy, was also attracted to the meditation form, the proper rhetoric of solipsism. But dialogue itself has not usually been so clearly understood or explained. The term has always meant conversation or colloquy, although its etymology does not bear such meaning. And it has customarily been contrasted with monological discourse, the essay, the lecture, the meditation. The open-ended, informal and playful aspects of dialogue have always been contrasted with systematic thinking and with the grave style. It seems important to contrast dialogue with "discussion." The free and anecdotal narrative, however important it may be in our conscious interactive lives, is not the orderly, progressive and constructive dialogue. Its freedom lacks a proper teleology. The dialogue seems midway between the anarchy of free discussion and the despotism of the monologue.[6] Order is necessary to the dialogue, but it is the order of autonomy, free but lawful. In this it resembles play, as Huizinga observes.[7] Dialogue is not debate, although it has its polemical or 'agonistic' dimension, again according to Huizinga. The aim of dialogue is not victory and the consolidation of power, but growth in wisdom, on the part of all participants. Dialogue has an implicit morality as well, a morality at least of respect for truth and for persons, if not of the deeper virtues of love, humility and faith stressed by Paolo Freire.[8] In either case it has a political dimension and intersects with a classic, non-individualistic reading of phronesis precisely at this point. Dialogue seems essential to "political wisdom," in Aristotle's sense.[9] Finally it has the dimension of silence and of solitude as well. A dialoguer must listen as well as speak and silence is as necessary to it as oral discourse. This is its proper 'docility' or the "art of responsiveness" that Prof. Wirth emphasizes. I have always been intrigued by the fact that, after the violent exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Book I of the Republic, Thrasymachus grows silent. He does not, however, leave the scene, and later Socrates mentions him again and claims that they have just become friends.[10] Could it be that Thrasymachus had listened to Socrates? And that in silent and docile dialogue, he had been won over to Socrates' position? More dialogue is necessary in the classroom and less lecturing. And more dialogically rich narrative is necessary in the books children read. But oral and written dialogue demand a wise silence as well.

Some Conclusions: Prof. Wirth does not argue that the basals are all bad. There is room, he says, for technique in reading instruction. I think we should also look at some likely intentions of basal reading programs. Certainly, for instance, they are designed to be democratic in nature. In this they share the aims of programs as old as the Comenius readers and as young as cultural literacy programs. But democracy is not undifferentiated sameness, it is a kind of universalized aristocracy, and in the development of individuals fully realized in community, the basals cannot bear too much weight. It is probably good strategy to include them in a program of reading where the contextual horizons and goals are always whole books. Whole books can provide (albeit vicariously) the practical wisdom Prof. Wirth argues for, and serve as springboards to rich dialogue and the cementing of community within the classroom. These whole books, such as the list in Mortimer Adler's *Paideia Program*, a host of children's books (Arnold Lobel and William Steig come to mind), Matthew Lipman's splendid Philosophy for Children novels, can all go a long way in the modification of programs too technically mired in the psychology and philosophy of basal readers.[11]

Prof. Wirth invites us to listen to teachers, an attractive leitmotiv of his paper. Perhaps philosophers of education can heed this advice too. Academic philosophers of education need to be closer than they are to the world of actual classroom practice. Listening to teachers means listening to them not only in our classes, but in theirs as well. It strikes me, and I conclude with this point, that such interaction can be a most fruitful means to the development of practical wisdom in schools. Broadening the dialogue to include teachers from all age groups and type of institution can surely enhance the full humanity needed for wisdom in action. Let us listen to teachers, then, and let them listen more to children. In so doing we shall certainly be closer to each other and closer to our own deepest selves as well.

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1. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916), 328.

2. Cf. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, chapter I. Comte invented the term ‘positivism’. His works are conveniently available in a two-volume condensation translated by H. Martineau, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte* (London: Bohn, 1853).

3. This is not to deny the influence of logical positivism upon behaviorists. Certainly B. F. Skinner's thought was formed in part by the work of P. W. Bridgman. But there is a difference between metaphysics and psychological methodology. Skinner's work is in the latter. In matters of philosophy, I would call him a "cracker-barrel positivist."

4. Any number of modern authors, Hobbes and Kant among them, use the word ‘prudence’ in this sense of self-interest. A fascinating book which epitomizes the new link between ‘art’ and ‘prudence’ is Baldesar Gracian's *Oraculo, Manual y Arte de Prudencia* (1653). A book called the "Art of Prudence" would have been virtually a contradiction in terms for Aristotle. Descartes's revolution in scientific method had much to do with the development of a modern theory of prudence, as an interesting text from Leibniz shows, where he reduces ‘prudence’ to ‘science’ on the one hand and ‘art’ on the other (see the Academy edition of Leibniz's works, VI, I, 60).

5. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 1.

6. John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935), 70-71. I am indebted for this reference to Philip Eddy's interesting article, "Kohlberg and Dewey", in the current issue of *Educational Theory*, 38 (1988), 405-13.

7. Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), Ch. IX.

8. Paolo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum, 1970), 79 ff.

9. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 8. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II-II, 50.

10. Plato, _Republic_, VI, 498.

11. Mortimer J. Adler, _The Paideia Program_ (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 188-238. Arnold Lobel's "Frog and Toad" books are excellent thinking skills instruments. William Steig's _Yellow and Pink_ (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1984) is a rich philosophical text. Matthew Lipman's "Philosophy for Children" series (available from the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, NJ) is an outstanding group of graded philosophy texts, designed to introduce children from their earliest schooling to philosophical inquiry and dialogue.

THE TEACHER AS PHILOSOPHER:

CONTENT AND CLOSURE

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In order to know what the teacher should do as philosopher, we must first determine what the philosopher would do as teacher. What would be that content? What would count as "closing it"?

One interesting way of addressing this issue is to say that philosophers would want to teach whomever among their students who do not know that we must study Hesiod to know that Homer is best.

Clearly this maxim is right in its insistence that to make an intelligent choice or judgement regarding two different matters, we must study both matters carefully. Moreover, this logic balloons when we take note of the obvious fact that almost all significant human choices must involve more than merely two paths, and so the maxim requires that we "study $\underline{n}$ number of matters closely before concluding that $\underline{n_i}$ is best." But what are the limits of "$\underline{n}$"? Stated differently, how do we select the range of matters to which we should attend? The practically-minded will want to know what the question is, what our goal is, what the issue is, and so on, but once we tell them that, the same worry begins all over again! That is, once the undeniably immediate needs are met, any assertion of the most primary question, the highest goal, the most central issue, and so on, must be met with the question of how we know that this is the most primary, the highest, the most central. Have we read all of the Hesiods to know that this Homer is best? Part of what the philosopher would want to teach is that setting this range is in itself a very profound philosophical act.

Such determining, defining, discovering--in some manner--delineating of the range of matters worthy of our concern must be energetic but not dictatorial. To avoid the pitfalls of dogmatism, the provincial fallacy, sophistry, and various other forms of epistemic inadequacy, we must be both decisively rigorous and intelligently open as to the limits of this range.

Secondly, philosophers would want to worry about the procedures and methods with which we approach the examination and analysis of what we do somehow set as matters in our range. No doubt the single most effective set of procedures and methods is that set which we call the scientific method and which has come to flourish in the last five hundred years. But, it has drastic limitations.

Both delineations, the setting of the range of matters thought significant and the setting down of procedures and methods of examination and analysis, are the roadways of philosophy cargo, the primary categories of

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philosophical content. A philosopher who has learned from history, a teacher who can squarely face the world, will insist that such roadways infuse every specific pedagogical doing, every section of a lesson plan, every response to the inquiring mind of the student. Now, what is this cargo and how ought we to handle it? What is that content, and what would "closure" mean?

My point of departure draws attention to the value and worth of human freedom--social and political freedom, economic freedom, individual liberties consistent with a like liberty for all. Indeed, without such freedom, how could our sense of the range of significant human interests or the choice of methods of analysis of them be convincingly determined? If our circumspection were forced, how could we claim confidence for our delineations? Clearly such freedom is a necessary condition for these endeavors. But is it sufficient?

John Stuart Mill eloquently insisted that

> . . . . complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for the purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.[1]

Mill's statement applies to opinions about what the significant human interests are as well as to possible methods of their examination and analysis. In his view, our opinions regarding both should be open to contradiction and disprove by others. But is he speaking of merely a necessary condition or a sufficient one for determining the best foundation for our actions? Clearly it is a necessary condition, but is it sufficient for that foundation? Stated substantively, is some basic content regarding human interests beyond contradiction? Is some method or are some methods above disproving?

These questions and their implied problems have a great deal to do with the philosopher as teacher and, hence, the teacher as philosopher. They are at the forefront, too, in Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind.[2] I want to use Bloom's work to further examine whether Mill's statement is one that sets only a necessary condition for well-grounded human action, or whether when Mill says this liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion "is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for the purposes of action" he means to assert a sufficient condition. It sounds like the latter is intended, but surely Professor Bloom is correct in worrying about such a view as that, a view where procedure is king and substantive criteria absent, a view where total emphasis is on freedom for speech and not at all on what is being spoken. As Bloom might have gone on to say,[3] if the only substantive criterion for what counts as an unacceptable public speech is "clear and present danger to public peace," how could there be any substantive public understanding of the prior question, namely that of what the public good itself is?

I will offer a summary of Bloom's major contention in three parts. First, I will focus on the evidence for the closing of the American mind and review his assertions as to why such closing has occurred. Second, I will delineate the sort of openness that he asserts as having worth for human beings and review his worry about the prospects for such openness. Lastly, I will warn that we are in the 1980s beginning certain projects which may exacerbate Bloom's worry. In the end, I will suggest that Mill's statement is merely necessary and not sufficient. If we do not somehow infuse it with qualifying character references such as can be found, for instance, in the Platonic dialogues, then we will end up being forced to honor the liberty of Thrasymachus as the highest good, or worse, that of the technical-methods-oriented genetic engineer. In short, we must have a confident substantive view of human nature before we face the possibility of substantively changing that nature. Put more locally, what Henry Steel Commager shared in his The American Mind (1950), few Americans know. Given our many highly sophisticated logistical systems, how could that be?

I

The American mind is closed; and why: An acquaintance of mine asserted a few weeks ago that Allan Bloom blames the decline of the West on rock and roll music. Of course, Bloom says no such thing. In Part One of his book, he does discuss the character of students he has seen over the last thirty years, especially those of the past decade. He reviews their apparent states of mind regarding books, music, and relationships. This first third of Bloom's text is admittedly autobiographical and first person sociology. Incidently, this is not a weakness. As Thucydides insisted, good history must be told by witnesses or those who have spoken with witnesses. Observational points of view, moreover, are not ever value-neutral. The notion of "objective observer" is a very problematic notion. Bloom's account is a rare opportunity for us to review an intelligent well-read person's description of his own development and of the genesis of those for whom he has eminently cared. To think otherwise would prove his worry about the American mind without the need for further analysis.

In a phrase, what Professor Bloom sees wrong with the attitudes and orientations of his students regarding books, music, and relationships is that these states of mind fail on the application of the Homer-Hesiod principle. That is, they assert that Homer is best--if they assert anything at all--without ever having read Hesiod. The American mind is closed because there is no appreciation of the truth, indeed the unavoidability, of this principle.

A typical student attitude can often be "Why should I read anything else, if I have already chosen a major?" or "Whose business is it to tell me what good music is?". This is exactly the response of the ancient Greek rhapsode, Ion, in Plato's work of that name,[4] when Ion asserts that he knows that Homer is best even though he has not read Hesiod. His standard of judgement, recall, is that he can "move crowds" by reciting Homer. That's enough to convince Ion, apparently. Ion has not read Hesiod and he certainly gives no defense of what is to count as good poetry. Even worse today, not only are many of our best young minds not aware of the Homer-Hesiod principle, but they often become angry at the suggestion that they are unread. They sometimes respond with cries of elitism and, ironically, claim that such a suggestion is un-American. (Although, if Bloom is correct, in at least a contemporary sense they may be right about the latter!)

But such student attitudes are not the cause of the decline or the closing, nor is Mick Jagger. They are the effects of the system of higher education which, Bloom claims, has failed democracy and impoverished the souls of today's students. How has this happened? In Part Two of his book, Allan

Bloom offers us what I think are three essentially different but related constructive hypotheses. These hypotheses are framed from a historical grasp not commonplace. Ironically, remarks such as the one made by my acquaintance which reduce Bloom to a misanthropist themselves convey the real misanthropy. To delve into difficult texts in the effort to frame accounts of the deepest motivations in our social history for the sake of giving us insight is not to hate what is human, but to love it. Moreover, we should see this even if we were to disagree with some or all of his specific conclusions.

Allan Bloom's accounting for the closing of the American mind can, I think, be subsumed under the following three hypotheses:

(1) A Lockean kind of mercantile acquisitiveness and a Rousseauian sort of direction of sentiment have come to characterize the economics and the psychoanalytics of our current society.

(2) A Machiavellian-Hobbesian assertion of the centrality of fear and security and the expediency of shoring against the former by pervasively seeking the latter dictates the underlying motivational structure of science and technology in the last two centuries, as that structure has come to be affected by the forces depicted in (1), above.

(3) The current attitude in the social sciences, predominantly positivistic against the better judgement of most of the guiding fathers of astute social observation in the 19th century (such as Mill, Marx, de Toqueville), has come to join the forces and their consequences mentioned and implied in (1) and (2) above in the manifestation of contemporary views regarding significant human interests as these are illustrated on today's university campuses.

The combined impact of these phenomena, should these interrelated hypotheses carry some truth, have caused the closing of the American mind. A social climate has been created, with evolving university curricula being both cause and effect, where getting ahead, protecting one's own, and just "trying to cope" takes place in an overall atmosphere where there is no discussion of the common good. No wonder Johnny and Jane do not want to read widely.

Professor Bloom describes in detail the sort of industrious calculation that befits Locke's civil society denizen, a decent sort who recognizes the practical worth of the assertion of natural rights as the basis for the civil compact which will guarantee his right to acquire good for his own, and, theoretically, eventually, for everyone's benefit. Jean-Jacques Rousseau found this bourgeois life stifling, coarse, and boring. But his counter-emphasis on the nobler sentiments of our experience congered up more of aesthetic ideal than any strong moral substance, either for us as individuals or as communities. While there are many theoretical and practical considerations in the fields of economics and psychoanalytics, these two fault-lines are visible. Whether historically causal or not, or to what degree, they stand visible as morally flat indices productive of current disinterest in history and community. As such, these factors in intellectual history fuel the felt inapplicability of the Homer-Hesiod principle in the current American cerebral vocabulary.

Moreover, the rooting of empirical science which antedates Locke and Rousseau by several centuries has carried into its system the specific offerings of those thinkers; industrialists and psychoanalysts have evolved and have been molded and shaped thereby. Locke's thought spurred the entrepreneur to greater acquisitive heights to consequence neglect of other social agenda; Rousseau's work directed later observers of the human passions to seek a peaceful homeostasis amidst a welter of opposing inner forces to the consequent over-representation of the weight of descriptive claims in the formation and direction of human character. The social forces mustered much earlier by those motivated by goals similar to those of Nicolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes guaranteed that the work of Locke and Rousseau would not fall into a static world. Indeed, longstanding motives regarding fear of loss and longing for security had been shaping social conceptions of the highest good for a long time. Science and technology were tools with which to make nature submit to protecting us. That we had in the course of human evolution achieved a nature potentially higher and more profound than the one which had become the object of immediate scientific attention seemed lost in the descriptive and scientific shuffles of the 19th century becoming 20th.

Finally, as twentieth century social science methodology developed its full sway with its consequent influence on the undergraduate curriculum (especially the undergraduate teacher preparation curriculum), the moral and prescriptive observations and lamentations of early social thinkers such as Mill, Marx, and de Toqueville were silenced by official methodological proclamation: the social sciences would be value-neutral. The consequence was the adding to the university curriculum of the great opening which was a great closing. That is, those who should be doing most to point out to us conflicting moral opinion in various cultures of the world and consequently doing the most to guide us to reasonable moral viewpoints in the face of what initially appears to be conflict and contradiction, opted to drop out moral discourse altogether. So strong was the grip of the apparent power of science, that it convinced relatively intelligent men that it was in our best interest to map our own discourse about ourselves on the model of those who had been somewhat successful for a short period of time discoursing about simpler natural complexities than ourselves. Such was the great passing from antiquity to modernity, such has been the most final passing to twentieth-century man. The great opening became a great closing. Students, bright ones especially, took cynicism from the attempts of their educators to act as if the human phenomena could be reduced to information. The failure of our educators to see that the human condition requires more than descriptive claims to account for its own best actions, has had the result in educational sociology that American students have absolutely no appreciation of the Homer-Hesiod principle, that sterling little gem which was so obviously set for all who would read to see in that small Platonic dialogue over two thousand years ago.

II

Genuine openness and its prospects: If the American mind were ever open in the following respect, the demands of the vast continent and the social logistics of the melting pot were challenges enough in the second of our centuries. Worse, educational methodology locked step with the natural problems of people and terrain to create the ever ugly American adult having arisen from an ever beautiful youth. The revolutions of the 18th century were the first ever brought by philosophers. The bottom line of all of them was individual development, freedom, and, for mode of operation, consent of the governed. With such a mode of operation, we are forced back to the principle which motivates this paper: One must study Hesiod to know that Homer is best. One must be aware of alternatives to inform an intelligent view as to what deserves consent. In order to be aware of alternatives, one must crave difference. The craving of difference is satisfied only in seeking what is other than one's own and for the sake of comparing for adequacy. The three hypotheses discussed above, or the motive forces under their description, have all but extinguished such intellectually erotic pursuits. Genuine openness has always been fragile in its appearance. Ironically, at a point in human history when the intellectual and material resources were amassing to a point wherefrom some genuine social program might have had this openness as a practicable goal, conditions congealed to produce the closing.

The following guidelines appear to be both necessary conditions for the openness Bloom deems genuine *and* for making Mill's procedural remark socially adequate; only with these conditions met, could there be a chance for open minds and a genuine approach to the common good:

(i) that students be introduced to the various prescriptive attempts to assert what it means to be a human being.
(ii) that the teachers of students be introduced to the content of and the importance of this enterprise,
(iii) that, in so doing, there be universal recognition in our system of higher education that descriptive methodology is proper in its place and that it may be applicable to some aspects of human life, but that descriptive methodology is never exhaustive of our being, nor are the technical applications based on it,
(iv) that we are by nature moral beings and that whatever we assert to be the highest good can only be so asserted in a prescriptive manner, which can only proceed comparatively, and
(v) that the nature of that prescriptive requirement is unavoidable if we are to accept our humanness: to reject this requirement is to reject our humanity.

III

The exacerbation of descriptive nihilism: Allan Bloom's worries are considerable. One is how to avoid being accused of saying that the decline of the West is Mick Jagger's fault. A more serious one is to try to figure out how to revitalize our affections regarding the history of the question "What is man?"--or as his mentor, Leo Strauss, so effectively put it, "*quid sit deus*?"[5] The publishing event that is *The Closing of the American Mind* is a considerable accomplishment to this end. The fact that Simon and Shuster was so successful may bespeak a sense of renewed social responsibility in the publishing industry.

I conclude with a sketch of what I consider to be the most salient focus for the most significant educational problem of the twenty-first century. It is one describable especially against the backdrop of the present concerns of this paper: revitalizing our sense of the essential place in the human world of prescriptive, moral discourse to the end of conceiving and keeping our humanness.

Your granddaughter is presented with the technical option of procreating without _in utero_ gestation. Her proposed fetus can be genetically constructed across many lines of variability. It occurs to her to raise an offspring which has no natural sexual response capability. Does she have the moral right to do this?

Without a solid substantive sense of what it means to be a human being and have a human nature, how can your granddaughter choose in any way but randomly?

Without a concerned study of the question of what human nature should be seen to be by your granddaughter _and by her teachers_, how can she have any chance of attaining that substantive sense?

Helping all of our young minds to that end by raising the question of what man is is the primary manner in which the philosopher would be a teacher. Consequently, it is the only way in which the teacher can be genuinely philosophical. It is the answer for which Professor Bloom hopes. It is also the supplement that John Stuart Mill should want in order to make his condition for proper human action sufficient.

This is _the_ primary content of the human teaching enterprise, a content significantly threatened in this century.

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1. Cf. J. S. Mill, _On Liberty_, Chapter 2.
2. Cf. Allan Bloom, _The Closing of the American Mind_, Simon & Shuster, 1987.
3. Bloom discusses this point in Part One of his text, 28f.
4. Cf. Plato's _Ion_.
5. Cf. Leo Strauss, _The City and Man_, Rand McNally, 1964, 241. The question is: "What might God be?"

A RESPONSE TO "THE TEACHER AS PHILOSOPHER : CONTENT AND CLOSURE"

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Professor Smith has asked, and provided answers to at least three interrelated questions. The first question is directed toward the passage from Mill's On Liberty, quoted near the beginning of Prof. Smith's paper. This question can be formulated, I think, in the following way: "What good is freedom of speech (or thought) if one has nothing to say?" The answer, Prof. Smith argues, is "none."

While Prof. Smith indicates that Mill's answer to that question might be different, that Mill be thought to be asserting that this "complete liberty" is both a necessary and sufficient condition for determining right human action, I am not so certain that Mill and Prof. Smith would be in disagreement over this issue. (I am certainly not a scholar of Mill's writings, so I only raise this alternative for consideration.) Later in the second chapter of On Liberty, after the passage referred to by Prof. Smith, we find Mill extolling Cicero as "The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity."[1] Mill's praise is based on his claim that Cicero "...has left it on record that he always studied his advesary's case with as great, if not greater, intensity than even his own."[2] Mill goes on to say that Cicero's practice ought to be followed by

> ...all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. His reasons may be good, an no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.[3]

On the basis of Mill's statement here (and I believe it is consistent with other arguments he advances in the second chapter), it appears to me that Mill would agree with Prof. Smith on the necessity for something at least analogous with the Homer-Hesiod principle.

In Prof. Smith's paper, however, I think that Mill's statement and the question raised with respect to it serve primarily to introduce two addition questions for our consideration. Both of these questions are very important, neither one is easily or simply answered. If unconstrained dialogue among people, alone, is insufficient for determining morally right action, then we need to ask and consider the answer(s) to these two question: 1) What should be the content of, the moral concepts and vocabulary used in carrying on that dialogue? 2) Quoting Prof. Smith here, "What would 'closure' mean?" On the one hand Prof. Smith's answer to the first question is clear and unambiguous. The content of this dialogue should be focused on the issue of "what it means to be a human being and have a human nature." The teacher as philosopher has the responsibility - perhaps Prof. Smith would want to argue the moral obligation - to raise and address this issue with his/her students. On the other hand we might be inclined to think that a complete answer to that first question will require identification of the Homers and Hesiods of human nature, and a discussion of the substantive criteria or standards that will allow us, after reading the Hesiod(s) of human nature, to *know that Homer is best*. Such a discussion would seem to be concerned with the second question referred to above - what would "closure" over competing claims about human nature and what it means to be human mean? It is not clear to me that Prof. Smith has provided us with an answer to that question.

Perhaps Prof. Smith did not intend to address *that* question. That is, perhaps I have simply misunderstood the intended scope of the questions raised in this paper, misunderstood what the question of "closure" referred to, and extended the Homer-Hesiod principle in a way not intended by Prof. Smith. Yet, I cannot help but think that the issues I have introduced above do fall under the umbrella of concerns Prof. Smith identifies in his paper, and are worth raising for our consideration here today. I will return to these issues again at the end of my remarks, but let me first briefly outline Prof. Smith's discussion of the questions of content and closure.

In his discussion of these questions Prof. Smith turns to Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind*. Three claims, advanced by Bloom in his book and by Prof. Smith here today, are central to his discussion. First, today's students are 'dogmatic relativists'. While I agree with Nussbaum that Bloom has not adequately analyzed the concept of 'relativism', nor explicitly addressed the sophisticated arguments for and against either epistemological or ethical relativism, I do think Bloom is clear in his characterization of students as relativists.[4] Secondly, the moral discourse of modern society, and that found in classrooms across this country is impoverished. The third claim is that the impoverishment of moral discourse (in both society and the classroom) has come about because questions and answers concerning human nature and the good life have been left in the care of economists, psychologists, and a variety of social scientists, all claiming an ability to provide us with value-neutral perspectives on these issues. Under these conditions, according to Profs. Bloom and Smith, lively, substantive, and informed moral discourse on what it means to be human, and what the good life is, are 'closed out' of the curriculum and the students' lives. The teacher as philosopher needs to, borrowing Jane Roland Martin's phrase and expanding on it, "reclaim the conversation". In the context of Prof. Smith's arguments it is clear that the teacher as philosopher is to introduce the 'Homers' and 'Hesiods' to students who have already 'read' or accepted the claims of the the economists, value-neutral social scientists
The moral discourse of students needs enrichment.

I certainly applaud Prof. Smith's proposal that the prospective teachers of his granddaughter be introduced to this enriched moral discourse. I would only add that the task ahead for Smith's teacher(s) as philosopher(s) is even more difficult and involved than that recognized in this paper. Not only will it be necessary for students to be introduced to a richer moral discourse, but they must also know why the economists and psychologists offer a bland and malnourishing menu. Rom Harré has argued that the history and philosophy of science should be construed as a form of science criticism, particularly as criticism of the social sciences, including psychology. Harré stated that "Science criticism of psychology tends to reveal images of man which quite patently have moral and political dimensions."[5] It is interesting to note that Harré's arguments lead him, much as Prof. Smith's arguments in this paper lead him, to locate the teaching of history and philosophy of science as science criticism in Colleges of Education: "The argument leads inexorably to the conclusion: [HPS should be taught] where teachers are taught, that is, in universities and above all in teacher training colleges."[6] The curriculum suggested by Prof. Smith and Harre is not, I think, the standard fare for prospective teachers, and I do have to wonder how sanguine we should be about the implementation of such a curriculum in Colleges of Education, especially in the face of current countervailing trends in education from elementary schools to colleges and universities. Prof. Smith recognizes these difficulties (Bloom's book i at least in part an attempt to explain why it will be so difficult); I raise the question here to highlight its importance.

Prof. Smith's arguments lead him to conclude that prescriptive moral discourse about human nature ought to be part of the curriculum. The economists, psychologists, and value-neutral social scientists are not the Homers and Hesiods we want students to read and discuss (although we might want to them to read in these areas in order for them to understand why they are poor fare). Who are these Homers and Hesiods? Bloom's answer has certainly not been accepted uncritically (There is no reason to think that Prof. Smith agrees with Bloom on every issue concerning the 'reopening' of the American mind. In fact, on one central issue the disagreement seems evident. Prof. Smith, unlike Bloom, does not think that the kind of education and curriculum necessary for raising and examining these moral questions is only for a few students in selected universities.) Perhaps more importantly, do we have any reason for thinking that concensus ('closure') over an answer to the questions of "what is the public good?" and "what does it mean to be human?" is possible? That is, while we rightfully object to an unthinking relativism concerning these issues (or to the kind of 'emotivism' described by McIntyre), will it be necessary, once we have read the Homers and Hesiods in this area, to accept that thoughtful and well reasoned answers to such questions represent a source of unavoidable and irresolvable conflict.

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1. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), 44.

2. Ibid., 44

3. Mill, On Liberty, 45.

4, Bloom is by no means alone in his assessment of students as relativists. Parr reaches a similar conclusion concerning students:

> I would contend that educational experience itself encourages students to oversimplify the complexities

> of the moral choices that the modern world and their personal lives occasion. It often devalues informed choice in favor of a more personal, subjective response.

Susan Parr, The Moral of the Story (New York: Teachers College Press, 1982), 9.

5. Rom Harré, "History and Philosophy of Science in the Pedagogical Process," in R.W. Home (ed.), Science Under Scrutiny (Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1983), 149.

6. Ibid., 149.

THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS:

IS THE CLASSROOM SUCH A PLACE?

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Balancing the rights and advantages of a teacher's decision on course content versus some measure of effective control by the state over the curriculum presents a difficult problem to individual teachers and school officials in public schools. Catcher in the Rye might well be regarded as an innocuous narrative of the adventures of a contemporary archetype--the adolescent anti-hero, the nonachieving but, appealing though misunderstood prep school student-misfit with a heart of gold. It is generally agreed the novel is well written, but as is often the case, it has sections dealing with its youthful protagonist's groping, fumbling sex life and, the author several times uses the controversial, if not vulgar, word "fuck".

This word, however, is not unknown outside the classroom to high school students and to their parents, if not younger students. Today, numerous books dealing with important personal and social issues contain similar language and related subject matter. Some teachers, who use these books in class, find it difficult to fathom how the presence of such language or themes could have any serious impact on the morals and behavior of their students or the orderly administration of the school system. This attitude is particularly common when the teacher selects the book because it affords a means to discuss the subject matter.

Whether it is out of consideration for matters of good taste or because of parental pressure, school officials have reacted to their use by teachers. They have required the teacher to cease using the text, banned the book from the school, or dismissed the teacher. These types of responses by school officials have created a sense of ambiguity as to the teachers' role as a moral agent.

This paper focuses on the conflict over what school officials determine is appropriate for transmission to students and those teachers whose selection of course content has been regarded as inappropriate. A primary question to be resolved in such a conflict is: What should be the extent a classroom teacher can determine the values to be presented in the content of a course? The consideration of such a question is important in the consideration of the teacher as a moral agent.

Today's teacher, who has a difference with school officials over the content of a course, often turns to the courts because of a possible loss of employment. Therefore, a review of court decisions can afford some insights regarding the foregoing question. The specific emphasis is on the extent a teacher's free speech rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution affords protection. This review was not to develop a philosophic resolution, but to indicate how one major institution (the legal system) has dealt with the issue. This paper is an attempt to encourage philosophy of education scholars to critique the court's rationale in determining what values and morals are appropriate to teach in the public schools of a democratic society. This is an important task at a conference whose theme is the teacher as a moral educator.

Rights Delineated

The courts have ruled that the state has the right to determine the curriculum

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content within the limitations of the U.S. Constitution. One of these limitations established by the courts is that teachers have some freedom under the free speech clause to teach and use material that is controversial in nature, even when it questions conventional values.

Teachers

The recognition of a right to academic freedom is relatively recent in American education.[1] Less than fifty years ago, the state had almost complete control over curriculum. The introduction of the German tradition of freedom in higher education (lehrfreiheit) and the decline of sectarian influence had a major effect on the state's absolute control.[2] The acceptance by educators and the general public of John Dewey's inquiry position has also been a factor. The U.S. Supreme Court in West Virginia v. Barnette acknowledged the importance of various values in the classroom when it struck down a local regulation requiring all students to salute the flag.[3]

> That they [boards of education] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount the important principles of our government as mere platitudes.[4]

A subsequent series of cases before the Supreme Court considered the legality of some states' efforts to require their employees to sign "loyalty oaths" as a condition of employment. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion to one case,[5] cautioned that state intrusion into the classroom "has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of spirit which all teachers ought to cultivate and practice."[6] He believed such a classroom spirit was needed so teachers could "foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone makes for responsible citizens."[7]

In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,[8] the Supreme Court reiterated its position on academic freedom in this, often quoted, passage.

> Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom .... The classroom is particularly the 'marketplace of ideas'. The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.[9]

In 1969, the Court in the landmark case on student free speech rights, Tinker v. Board of Education, Des Moines,[10] stated that "First Amendment rights, applied in the light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students .... [They] don't shed Constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."[11] The Court acknowledged that the schools' purpose is more than providing a place for teachers and students to say and do what they want. Their free speech rights are limited by the "special characteristics of the school environment." Yet, before school officials can legally justify a limitation of a particular expression or opinion, they must

> be able to show the action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany

> an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly when there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained.[12]

State

The state is recognized as having legitimate interests in the health, safety, and welfare of children.[13] These interests have justified restraints on teachers' use of specific content and methodology. What is the rationale for the state's interests?

The first rationale is premised on the fundamental right of parents to control the rearing of their children.[14] Parents, who are compelled by law to send their children to school,[15] have a right to expect the state to assure that their children are not exposed to "harmful" ideas.[16] The law is clear. The state, as an agent of the parents, can limit a teacher's speech in the classroom.

It does not follow, however, that parents can require arbitrary restrictions on a teacher's selection of curriculum content. Parental dissatisfaction, alone, does not afford school officials sufficient justification to prohibit what can be a legitimate activity by a teacher. The presentation of important topics can cause controversy in a community. Yet, if one purpose of the classroom is to be a "marketplace of ideas," then teachers need the freedom and protection to discuss various values, morals, and knowledge. The marketplace analogy does not lend itself to noncontroversial subject matter or to a majority vote of the community.

The second rationale for the state's interest in children is independent of the parents. It is that young children become law-abiding and functional citizens. In an effort to achieve these goals, states have passed compulsory education statutes, provided public schools, determined the curriculum, tested student learning, and certified teachers. Teachers are agents of the state and are viewed by their students and the general public as transmitters of accepted values and norms. When a teacher's values and norms conflict with those espoused by the state, it might harm students' intellectual and moral development. This is a particular concern within the classroom context where a teacher's actions and words can be perceived as irrebuttable fact, especially by young pupils.

The state's authority has not been regarded as unlimited by the courts. The state must prove that it is necessary to limit or sanction a teacher in order to protect its own legitimate interests. Those interests, student health, safety, and welfare, however, are very general interests and do not always prove to be clear and concise criteria in each factual situation.

Court Interpretation

The U.S. Supreme Court has not issued an opinion directly related to a public school teacher's free speech rights and the determination of a course's content. The federal appellate and district courts and state courts have decided cases on the subject with varying results. This outcome is reflective of disagreement between legal and educational scholars as to the primary purpose of schools. Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court's position in Tinker indicates that the public schools should be a much more open forum for expression than they are now. If so, then teachers should be afforded First Amendment protection.[17]

Other legal scholars, however, have argued that the Supreme Court and other courts have indicated that the purpose of instruction is transmission rather than open discussion and exchange of ideas. These scholars do not regard the classroom to be devoid of inquiry. However, they do advocate the need for certain boundaries to assure the achievement of the stated purposes of the school.[18]

Three federal court decisions are important to any consideration of the extent of a teacher's First Amendment protection for the selection of course content. The first is Keefe v. Geanakos that involved a teacher who assigned his senior English class an Atlantic Monthly article entitled "The Young and the Old."[19] The article considered dissent, protest, and revolt, and how the words "mother-fucker" had become a very significant expression in the street language of some groups. Keefe told his students that the reading of the article was optional and they did not have to discuss it in class if they found it objectionable. Some parents complained and Keefe was required to defend the article use before school officials. He brought court action to enjoin the hearing because the charge was a ground for dismissal. When the trial court denied his request for an injunction, he appealed.

The First Circuit found the article not to be obscene, since it condemned incest; moreover, the same word that offended the school officials was found in at least five books in the school library. The court made its own evaluation of the article and regarded it as "scholarly, thoughtful, and thought provoking." The court further determined the article was relevant to the subject matter being discussed in his class on urban language styles. Due to the article's scholarly nature, the maturity of the students, and the fact that the material was not artificially introduced into the classroom, the court afforded Keefe First Amendment protection.

The second case, Parducci v. Rutland,[20] concerned a teacher who assigned Kurt Vonnegut's short story, "Welcome to the Monkey House," to her junior English class. The next day her principal and an associate superintendent ordered her not to use the story because it was "literary garbage" that condoned euthanasia and free sex. She responded that she thought the story had literary value and that she had a professional responsibility to teach it. After further discussion (which included a threat to discharge her) Parducci tendered her resignation; it was accepted. She then filed a motion in a federal district court for reinstatement, alleging that her First Amendment rights had been violated.

The court stated she had First Amendment rights in the given situation, but like all constitutional rights, however, they are not absolute and must be balanced against the competing interests of society. The court applied the Tinker standard--whether her action materially and substantially interfered with the school's operation--to balance her rights with the school's interest. The court first concluded, from its own reading of the story, that the material was appropriate for high school juniors. The court noted that the "Junior English List" furnished by the school suggested books with words that were more offensive and books in the school library had the same controversial words. The court next applied the Tinker test to confirm its findings of appropriateness and found that, with the exception of three students who asked to be excused, most students greeted the story with apathy. The court ruled that Parducci's First Amendment rights had been violated, since the school officials failed to show either that "the assignment was inappropriate reading" or that it "created a significant disruption to the educational process of the school."[21]

The third case, Mailloux v. Kiley,[22] is important because it dealt with the limitations on a teacher's right to determine course content. Mailloux had assigned his junior English class a reading in the book, The Thread That Runs So True. The reading described parental opposition to a teacher's mixing the sexes in a rural Kentucky classroom. When some students questioned the parents' reactions, Mailloux replied that certain social conventions are equally ridiculous. As an example, he noted how certain words are taboo in society. After writing a meaningless word on the board, he wrote "fuck" and asked for a volunteer to define it. A student did respond, and Mailloux said that, while the first word meant nothing, the second word was an example of a taboo word and therefore not accepted in the general public. A parental complaint led to an investigation, and Mailloux was subsequently dismissed.

He sued, alleging his First Amendment rights were violated. The court made several findings before ruling on the case. The first was that, while the topic of taboo words had little relevance to the book under discussion, it was relevant to a junior-level English class. Second, the word was relevant to a discussion on taboo words. Third, the students' age assured they were familiar with the word. Fourth, there had been no disruption in the classroom. Fifth, the word was used in books found in the school library. Sixth, the teacher's method of asking for a volunteer response was appropriate. Finally, fellow teachers differed in their opinions as to the word's appropriateness and the relevance of Mailloux's method.

The court then determined that the method of teaching was not necessary to the lesson. It did so by making an independent judgment that the method did serve an educational purpose. However, the court was unable to conclude that the method was plainly permissible, because of the risk of abuse involved in the technique of questioning: "Too much depends on the context and the teacher's good faith."[23]

The court then turned to the question of whether Mailloux should be protected in his teaching method, since he had acted in good faith. The court decided that his due process rights had been violated, reasoning that teachers should be granted the procedural right of notice that a method is unacceptable, since "vital First Amendment rights" are involved. Teachers should not have to guess what will endanger their jobs, because it can result in having a "chilling effect" on a teacher's classroom speech.

Subsequent court decisions have used the foregoing three decisions as guides to help in reaching decisions. The guidelines stemming from the Keefe, Parducci, and Mailloux decisions can be grouped under content and consequences. The guidelines regarding content have been used by the courts to balance state interests and teacher rights. Three guidelines have been used consistently to achieve such a balance. They are: 1) Is the method appropriate for school use?; 2) Is it relevant to the subject matter?; and 3) Is it material to the proper use of class time? To determine the appropriateness of a method, the courts have considered the age of the students and have made assumptions about their maturity and possible exposure to the disputed teacher action. The relevance of method to the subject matter is key since there needs to be some legitimate reason for the teacher to do what he or she did. The materiality of the method to the subject matter is to determine if the teacher's action was a worthwhile means to enable students to understand the subject matter.

The concern over the consequences of a teacher's action focuses on primarily two questions. How does the use of a given method affect the efficient operation of the school? How does the use of a given method affect a teacher's employment status? The courts generally review the facts of the case to determine if the reaction of students, parents, or the general community is so strong as to materially or substantially disrupt the effective operation of the school. If the teacher is in danger of being dismissed or has been dismissed, the courts have favored the teacher's arguments for the use of a method, when it does not disregard community morals and can be perceived as an acceptable way to teach a subject.

Conclusion

A review of the case law up to 1988, subsequent to the *Keefe*, *Parducci*, and *Mailloux* decisions, clearly establishes agreement by federal and state courts that public school teachers have First Amendment protection to select course content.[24] The courts also recognize that the state has a legitimate interest in what is taught in the classroom. The duality of rights and interests was distinctly reflected in *Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School District*.

> A teacher's methods are not without limits. Teachers occupy a unique position of trust and they must handle such trust and the instruction of young people with great care. On the other hand, a teacher must not be manacled with rigid regulations, which preclude full adaptation of the course to the times in which we live. It would be ill-devised to presume that a teacher would be limited ... to a single textbook in teaching a course today in civics or social studies.[25]

The determination of whether the teacher has honored that trust is, however, beyond the teacher's control. As was noted in the foregoing discussion of the *Keefe*, *Parducci*, and *Mailloux* decisions, the court made an independent judgment as to the appropriateness of the material for the classroom. Other courts also have made similar determinations.[26] If courts can be the arbitors of what is appropriate in the public school classroom, a series of questions seem in order regarding the moral content of the classroom and the teacher's automony in determining the content.

Is the analogy of the classroom as a marketplace of ideas a viable one? What assumptions are necessary about the purpose of schools, truth, and nature of values for such an analogy to be possible? Who determines what shall be offered in the marketplace since the space is limited? Are the courts, as determiners of what is the correct balance, even weighing the content, or are they more concerned with the consequence; i.e. no material or substantial disruption and loss of employment?

The marketplace of ideas analogy requires that classrooms within a democracy be more than the place to inculcate accepted values. It requires that teachers be permitted to use classroom content which exposes students to various viewpoints on controversial issues. School officials serve a needed function in determining what general subjects and content assure the development of adults with basic values, norms, and skills necessary to become functional citizens. Teachers, however, need to have the ability and opportunity to expand upon the subject's content to be merchants of ideas. Or, is the marketplace analogy a viable one given the external controls over the subject matter content offered in the classroom?

Footnotes

1. *See* Hunter, "Curriculum, Pedagogy, and the Constitutional Rights of Teachers in Secondary Schools," 25 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 1 (1983).

2. *See* "Developments in the Law -- Academic Freedom," 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1968).

3. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

4. Id. at 637.

5. *Wieman v. Updegraff*, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

6. Id. at 195.

7. Id. at 196.

8. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

9. *Keyishian v. Board of Regents*, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).

10. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

11. Id. at 506.

12. Id. at 509.

13. *See*, *e.g.*, *State of Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); *Ginsberg v. New York*, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

14. *See*, *e.g.*, *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); *Griswald v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

15. It is recognized some courts have permitted home-bound education, but even these children must meet specific state-determined competencies.

16. *Brubaker v. Board of Educ., School Dist. 149*, 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974) (promotion of drug use); *Dean v. Timpson Indep. School Dis't.*, 486 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Tex. 1979) (partisan politics).

17. *See*: Note, "Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach," 48 *N.Y.U.L. Rev.* 1176 (1973); Nahmond, "Beyond *Tinker*: The High School as an Educational Forum," 4 *Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev.* 278 (1970).

18. Yudof, "Three Faces of Academic Freedom," 32 *Loy. L. Rev.* 831 (1987); Goldstein, "The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach," 124 *U. Pa. L. Rev.* 1293 (1976).

19. 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).

20. 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).

21. Id. at 356.

22. 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), *aff'd.*, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).

23. Id. at 1391.

24. There are exceptions to First Amendment protection: *Burns v. Rovaldi*, 477 F. Supp. 270 (D. Conn. 1979) (sectarian and politically partisan positions in a biased manner or to exclusion of other viewpoints); *Brubaker v. Board of Educ., School Dis't. 149*, 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974) (teaching or condoning illegal actions).

25. 376 F. Supp. 657, 661 (S.D. Tex. 1972), *vacated on other grounds*, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974).

26. *See*, *e.g.*, *Solmitz v. Maine School Admin. Dis't.*, 495 A.2d 812 (Me. 1985) (lesbian speaker at tolerance day assembly); *Fisher v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dis't.*, 704 P.2d 213 (Alaska 1985) (use of book on homosexuals); *Kingsville v. Indep. School Dis't. v. Cooper*, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980) (use of simulation activity on minority rights); *Cary v. Board of Educ. of Adams-Arapahoe School District 28-J*, 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977), *aff'd.*, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979) (use of supplemental texts); *Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Educ.*, 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (discussion of birth control); *Lindros v. Governing Board of Torrance Union High School Dis't.*, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, 510 P.2d 361 (1973) (reading of theme which concluded with controversial epithet).

BEEZER, KANT, AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

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As I consider the issues raised by Bruce Beezer in his paper, "The Marketplace of Ideas: Is the Classroom Such a Place?," I am contemplating my own strategy (open-field running?; the back door?; confrontation?) for seeing The Last Temptation of Christ at my local theater. Moral tensions are as common in everyday life as peaches in Spartanburg, but they are even more evident to us as philosophers and educators when they occur in the schools.

I mention this scenario to illustrate just how fundamental the issues of censorship and balancing the rights of teachers and the interests of the state raised by Beezer are to any conference that takes the "teacher as philosopher" as its central theme. If we are to take serious this theme, then we must afford teachers the opportunities to enhance their own capacity not only for the reflective, solitary thought of a Descartes or Husserl, but also support them as they try themselves out as Socratic gadflies. I do believe and advocate in my own work with K-12 teachers any effort that fosters their own intellectual autonomy as an avenue to better teaching and learning for all involved in education: students, parents, and teachers.

I would like to limit my response to Beezer to answering the questions he has raised in the conclusion of his paper. I shall use Kant's position in his essay "What is Enlightenment?"[1] to affirm the central thrust of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, while also commenting on Beezer's own hesitance about the actuality of the ideal of Sweezy.

1 Is the analogy of the classroom as a marketplace of ideas a viable one?: Given the subtle restrictions imposed by the state upon subject matter content, I would say that the notion of a "marketplace of ideas" is always in danger unless we have teachers, who by virtue of education and confidence, are willing to challenge their students. Sweezy v. New Hampshire clearly presents this point, and Beezer reminds us of the crucial role of the teacher in his conclusion. I would add that for the marketplace analogy to work, all ideas must be put forth and judged upon their merit rather than their source, and judged in a rational fashion that allows all implications of these ideas to be explored in an atmosphere of trust, inquiry, and fellow-feeling. Before anyone snorts that this hardly has relevance to the public schools, let me agree that though this ideal stated in Sweezy is tested in our red-brick edifices around the country, it

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must be fought for if we are to begin to see the teacher as philosopher and moral educator.

The problem occurs if we view teaching as merely a didactic transference of established knowledge, and learning as the passive acquisition of this knowledge. However, I can only suggest here what I think the proper role of the teacher should be: a partner in the enterprise of learning about and examining information and values. It is only in this fashion that teachers can assist students in leaving the "nonage" that Kant[2] believes many of us find dangerously comfortable.

2 What assumptions are necessary about the purpose of schools, truth, and the nature of values for such an analogy to be possible?: As suggested above, schools ought to be places where equals meet under the guidance of an unobtrusive, first-among-equals teacher in a free, wide-ranging, and open discussion of all issues relevant to the subject matter, whether it be physics or literature. The only relevant consequence is an enlarged view of self and society. Rather than treating teachers like servants, we must give trust to them and assume that they will take the students' best interests in mind. This certainly is a theme of both Sweezy and Mailloux v. Kiley. In the midst of our current blatant and veiled teacher-bashing, it would be refreshing to begin the conversation by assuming that teachers had minds of their own and were able to see the interests of the child as paramount.

An adaptation of Kant's distinction between the public and private uses of one's reason[3] may be illuminating here: "By 'public use of one's reason' I mean that use which a man, as scholar makes of it before the reading public. I call 'private use' that use which a man makes of his reason in a civic post that has been entrusted to him." A teacher would be exercising the private use of reason by teaching materials that as Deezer says "assure the development of adults with basic values, norms, and skills necessary to become functional citizens," but to "expand upon the subject's content" in a robust fashion, the teacher needs the support, confidence, and trust to make the "public" use of reason and thus allow the subject to actively engage their students.

Truth is not something fixed and received, but is only able to be approximated by the clash of opposing ideas. Truth cannot be injected into students by an omniscient teacher (or worse, through a "teacher-proof" curriculum.) The nature of values is embedded in history and circumstance and there is no one way to the good. Institutions such as the schools should be places which provide the support and atmosphere for thoughtful examination of all aspects of an idea. This is certainly not easy, as Ted Sizer points out[4] : "A lot of us are teachers because we like to tell the truth, not because we want to help kids find the truth on their own."

3 Who determines what shall be offered in the marketplace since space is limited?: Despite the deafening rhetoric about who really is or will be the "education" President, we are a long way from consensus on what constitutes a full and valuable education. Just what are we educating *for*: do we want our students to be critical thinkers capable of someday gaining autonomy and realizing that they are always "underway" as learners, or do we want our students to be rigid containers of inert knowledge? Do we ever finish being educated? I think not, and if we are to enable people to realize this at once liberating and frustrating condition, we must encourage what Harvey Siegel[5] calls the "critical spirit" and then join hands with octogenarian Mortimer Adler, who recently claimed that he only learned how to write reasonably well in the last twenty years.

4 Are the courts, as determiners of what is the correct balance, even weighing the content, or are they more concerned with the consequence; i.e. no material or substantial disruption of employment?: *Keefe v. Genakos* shows that the court clearly considered the content of the *Atlantic Monthly* article, and deemed it highly relevant to a discussion of urban language styles. Indeed, if the article were "scholarly, thoughtful, and thought-provoking" as the court ruled, the article may have been essential to a *classroom* discussion of the topic.

Parducci v. Rutland, on the other hand, shows that the court was clearly more interested in the consequences of the assigned reading, and, unlike the preceding case, made no argument based upon the content of the Vonnegut novel. Indeed the difficult moral issues of euthanasia and free sex were not touched; rather the court chose the easier way out by focusing on offensive language. (An aside: it is pathetic that the court saw the "educational process" going on when three students excused themselves from the discussion and most of the rest were apathetic about the effects of the Vonnegut novel!)

Finally, *Mailloux v. Kiley* affirms the earlier statements of *Sweezy*. *Mailloux* defends a teacher's right to experiment with different ways of teaching, since second-guessing the appropriateness of a particular method would inhibit the teacher.

It is clear in *Keefe* and *Mailloux* that the courts do consider content, and rule in the favor of the teacher based upon a careful consideration of the material in question. *Parducci* may indicate that when morally explosive topics such as euthanasia and free sex are concerned, the courts retreat to a safer position of considering in a content-free manner the consequence of the teacher's action. As a philosopher and educator, I find this unsatisfactory. I would hope that we could have a larger debate on these difficult topics, though the court may not be the arena for it.

Beezer leaves us with a tantalizing question which I hope can generate discussion. Is it possible to be "merchants of ideas" in the classrooms when the curriculum is state-mandated? Echoing Sweezy and Beezer, I would say that this is only possible if the teachers teach in a courageous and determined way that is attuned to the inherently philosophical nature of education. I have written about this elsewhere[6]; but no amount of conference-presenting can chip away at what I see as an enormous problem that the Sweezy decision may have unwittingly masked with its optimistic rhetoric. To make the often inert state mandated curriculum come alive with the many possibilities born of Socratic questioning, or even some few minutes of reflective thinking, is difficult and lonely. Quantitative assessment, which thrives like kudzu here in the South, and the uniform curriculum itself do not encourage the "robust exchange of ideas" affirmed by Sweezy or the art of reflective teaching, where the teacher is a Socratic "midwife" to students' thinking. And, as Beezer finished with a question, so shall I: are we supporting teachers so they may affirm and make real the ideals of Sweezy, or are teachers already so discouraged and humbled that they cannot help but perpetuate Kantian nonage? Do we really want a "marketplace of ideas?"

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1. Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?," translated by Peter Gay, in Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West, two volumes, second edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), I, 1071-76.

2. Ibid., 1071.

3. Ibid., 1073.

4. "Putting Ideas into Practice: An Interview with Ted Sizer," Harvard Education Letter, Vol. 4, #4, July/August 1988, 6.

5. Harvey Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education (New York: Routledge, 1988), 39-42.

6. Anthony G. Rud Jr., "Developing Teacher Knowledge for Professional Renewal: A State Professional Development Perspective," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans, April 1988.

SHOULD ARTISTS STUDY PHILOSOPHICAL AESTHETICS?

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I will present a dilemma faced by those of us who teach aesthetics and the philosophy of art, and then suggest one way it might be resolved. Each horn concludes that artists and art students have professional reasons for avoiding the philosophy of art. Since I teach this course, you can understand why I am uncomfortable with these conclusions.

The dilemma involves a gap that exists between the concepts many artists seem to have of art and artmaking, and the concepts of these things held by many philosophers. This gap has numerous manifestations. The one I will use to introduce the dilemma involves the idea that art's essential function is communicating the artist's statement.

1. Philosophers routinely explore the different ways artworks are held to have expressive meaning.[1] For example, two basic alternatives are: (i) that artworks provoke emotions of the sort felt by the artist, and (ii) that they communicate the artist's statement. There are many variations on these alternatives, some of which combine them. To avoid unnecessary complexity, I will limit my discussion to artists who seem to understand art's expressive meaning in terms of the second alternative.

The notion that an artwork's primarily function is communicating the artist's statement is exceedingly popular among artists and art students. Artists frequently endorse this view in conversation and in their writings about their work. Consider, for example, the following passage by the French artist Jean Dubuffet:

> Art addresses itself to the mind, and not to the eyes . . . Art is a language, instrument of knowledge, instrument of communication . . . Painting is a richer language than that of words . . . much more charged with meaning. . . painting allows especially, much better than words, one to express the various states of thought.[2]

This remark is typical of what many artists write about their work. But when I view Dubuffet's work, Natural History, or Le Metafisyx, for example, I realize that I am unclear regarding his conception of communication (or expression). Naturally, I want to rectify this, so I set about examining his work in light of my understanding of the various senses in which an artwork might communicate. From the start, I distinguish between a false and a genuine notion of communication.

Someone is using the false notion of communication (or expression) when

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all that they mean in saying that a work communicates (or has expressive meaning) is that someone's viewing the work results in her entertaining something. This notion does not distinguish determinate connections from mere chance connections between objects and the ideas people entertain when they experience them. Since it does not assume that something about an object narrows the range of things someone can entertain that will count as what it states or expresses, it implies that every object, artwork or not, literally communicates everything anyone entertains when they experience it. This completely trivializes the claim that art is created to communicate. It also makes it absurd to suggest that what is communicated is the artist's statement, since the mere fact that an artist's work provokes someone to entertain something is by itself no evidence that what is entertained has other than an accidental connection with the artist.

In genuine notions of communication it is not at all trivial to hold that a visual work communicates the artist's statement. What they have in common is that they narrow the range of things that count as what is communicated, or stated, by a work. In these senses saying that a work communicates implies that knowledgeable viewers can distinguish the things expressed by the work, however ambiguously, from what it does not express. It also implies that their ability to do this is explained, in part, by what the work is like. Lastly, it implies that what is communicated counts as the artist's statement only if the artist is responsible for the features of the work that in part explain the viewer's ability to discriminate between what it expresses, and what it does not express.

Genuine notions differ in the nature of the connection they require between a work and what it communicates. The strongest sense requires that it is unlikely that ordinary people can experience the work without recognizing its statement (or statements, where it carries multiple interpretations). The weakest sense only requires that the work's statements are accessible to people who are intimately acquainted with the artist and the context in which she created or presented the work.

When I relate Dubuffet's paintings to his remarks, and consider what art historians and critics say about these paintings, I find no evidence that they communicate in any of the non-trivial senses, from the strongest to the weakest. Because they do not make use of the interpretive conventions existing when they were painted, there is nothing about these paintings that distinguishes their legitimate from their illegitimate interpretations. (Factors external to these paintings may do this, but this is another issue.) It is always possible, of course, that Dubuffet intends to introduce new interpretive conventions into the artworld. If so, my position is that there is no evidence that he has succeeded in this aim. If this alternative captures his intentions we must conclude that by his standard these paintings are failures.

Now if we were only concerned with the paintings mentioned above, this might not be an unreasonable thing to conclude. But the point I am making about these paintings applies also to the work of a large number of artists who write that art's function is communication. So either we must treat all of these works as failures, or reconsider our assumption that we understand what these artist's are trying to tell us about their art. Faced with this choice, the reasonable thing to do is to conclude is that we do not really comprehend Dubuffet's conception of artistic communication. The notion that philosophers cannot understand artists provokes skepticism from philosophers. Artists, on the other hand, think that it makes perfectly good sense.

In pursuing this possibility in conversations with artists, I came to realize that in cases like Dubuffet's I could, at best, ascertain only what artists were not saying about their artmaking. While I suppose this is better than nothing, it certainly does not amount to understanding. Further, it began to seem to me that I was in a situation that was impossible to rectify.

I think that in many cases artists' conceptions of artistic communication differs radically from the notion of communication explained above, in that artists either do not admit the distinctions I use, or they deny their relevance to artmaking. In this respect the gap between these artists' conception of artistic communication and mine is reminiscent of the gap between Peirce's conceptions of various basic notions, and the way they are usually conceived. For example, Peirce observed that there is really no difference in meaning between saying that "all hard bodies remain perfectly soft until they are touched," and that "their hardness increases with the pressure until they are scratched."[3] And he said that there is no difference between saying that ". . . force is an acceleration, or that it causes an acceleration."[4] Analogously, from Dubuffet's perspective, and that of many other artists, there is no relevant difference between the plethora of alternatives philosophers like myself distinguish when we attempt to understand artistic communication. I have no conception of how the world appears to someone viewing it from Peirce's or Dubuffet's perspectives, since for me these distinctions are not merely verbal: they make a difference. But Peirce and Dubuffet remind me that I cannot take this for granted.

These observations show that the gap between the conceptions of art held by many artists and philosophers is in an important sense unbridgeable. To comprehend Dubuffet's remark I must conceive of artmaking as if the distinctions I presently take for granted are either non-distinctions, or are at least logically irrelevant to artistic communication. But given my current state of mind I cannot do this, just as I cannot omit to see a difference between something's being hard and its becoming harder, or between identities and causal relations. In order to comprehend the world from these perspectives I must, quite literally, loose my own. So the nature of the gap between the conceptual perspectives of many artist and philosopher makes mutual accessibility impossible.

2. Now I take it that we usually think that part of our job as educators is to bridge the gap we realize exists between our student's understanding of the relevant conceptual alternatives in a given area, and our own. But many art students tell me that they create art to communicate. Considering the kind of artworks these students produce, they seem to have a conception of artmaking as inaccessible to me as Dubuffet's. If my description of the nature of the gap between their views and my own is correct, then bridging this gap is impossible. The only way these students are going to appreciate my perspective is by loosing their own. Since I cannot bridge the gap, if I am going to teach them the philosophy of art I must attempt to destroy it.

Speaking more generally, I think that our actual pedagogical practice reflects an implicit recognition of this situation. In teaching we do not attempt to merely broaden our student's conceptual repertoire by increasing the number of concepts they possess, for example. Whether we realize it or not, when we cannot comprehend their basic conceptual perspective we attempt to change it into one we can comprehend. I suppose it is even accurate to say that from our perspective we aim to rectify a student's ignorance by helping her to realize that the conceptual distinctions we make are real and are relevant to the topic at hand.

At this point your reaction is probably "well, of course, if someone wants an education they must realize that they are unlikely to get one without its affecting some change in their conceptual perspective; that's a natural consequence of becoming educated." So I want to point out that I am not intending to object that it is wrong to alter a student's conceptual viewpoint in order to make her more knowledgeable, other things being equal. The problem I will raise now has to do with whether other things are indeed equal when the student is a developing artist. I will show that given our present understanding of the conceptual distinctions that generate a gap between artists and philosophers, there is reason to believe that altering a student's conception of artmaking may have an undesirable result. This result must be weighed against the value inherent in making students more knowledgeable philosophically. When I have finished discussing this I will be able to present the dilemma I promised earlier.

3. I will introduce the possibility that altering an art student's conception of art has undesirable results with what initially may seem to be an unrelated point. It has to do with my choice of examples. When I choose Dubuffet's paintings as examples I did so not merely because his comments on art suited my purpose, but also because by my standards they are good art. My position is that had they never been painted this would definitely constitute a loss to the artworld.

Now I have no idea whether these paintings communicate, in Dubuffet's sense, because I do not grasp his conception of artistic communication. I only know that they do not make his statements in the non-trivial senses of this term that I would read into his quote if I was still naive about these matters. So in claiming that his paintings are good art I reveal that I am not concerned that from my perspective they do not communicate. What does impress me about these paintings I will leave until later. For now it will suffice if you agree with me that if they are good art then they are good art in spite of the fact that they do not communicate Dubuffet's statements in non-trivial senses of "communicate." Assuming that this is so, I want you to consider the answer to this question: if Dubuffet had been my student, and I had managed to destroy his perspective on art by replacing it with one that contains the distinctions I recognize, would he have painted Natural History, or Le Metafisyx?

Dubuffet writes that if art did not function in the way he describes it he would ". . . not lose one hour of my time in this activity."[5] Assuming that his conception of art's function would be significantly altered if he acknowledged the various senses of "communicate" I cover in class, it follows that if his work does depend on his conception of art's function, had he been a successful student in my class there is a very real possibility that he would not have created these paintings. Were this to happen it would certainly be an undesirable consequence of his becoming more knowledgeable philosophically.

The possibility that this sort of thing occur depends upon whether or not an artist's work is actually affected by her conception of art and artmaking. This is an empirical issue, and so it is possible that an artist's ideas about art's function are not what determines the character of her work. When we consider both this possibility and its opposite in conjunction with the other things introduced thus far, we at last come to the dilemma we face when we teach the philosophy of art.

4. The dilemma begins like this: Either the artist's conception of artmaking and art affects her work, or it doesn't. If it should turn out that my belief that there is a strong connection between how artists think about art and the sorts of artworks they produce is just bad folk psychology, then this undermines one major reason for encouraging artists and art students to take a course in the philosophy of art. So those of us who teach this course and do not want to be wasting everybody's time must hope that an artist's work is affected by her conception of artmaking. If it is, then we avoid the first horn of this dilemma, only to face another problematic set of alternatives.

When we have students who's conception of art is incompatible with the distinctions we want to teach them, either it is reasonable to expect that we will have some success in destroying their original conception of artmaking, or it isn't. If it isn't, then the consequence is the same as if we were caught on the first horn of this dilemma: taking the philosophy of art is a waste of time. To avoid this conclusion, we must assume that it is reasonable to expect that we can have some success in our attempts to replace students' original conceptions with ones that are sensitive to the distinctions that seem clear to us. But if you will recall the question I raised above about whether Dubuffet would have produced the paintings I use as examples of good art had he been a successful student in my class, you will see the that if we make this assumption we face the possibility that successful teaching has an undesirable result.

Unless we are willing to accept that it would have been a waste of time for Dubuffet to have taken my course, we must agree that had he done so and met with success it is unlikely that he would have created the paintings I use as examples of good art. Assuming that this constitutes a genuine loss, I can summarize the dilemma that faces us as follows: If an artist's conception of art and artmaking does not affect her work then, professionally speaking, she ought not to bother taking a course in the philosophy of art, and we ought not to encourage her to do so. But if her work does depend upon her conception of art, then since this conception will be undermined or destroyed by a good course in the philosophy of art, it follows that she has a professional reason for avoiding the course, and that if we do not want to be partly responsible for the loss of good art, we ought not to teach it to her. Either way, then, she ought not to take our course, and we ought not to teach it to her.

Given my description of the conflicting conceptions of art and artmaking professed by many artists and philosophers, I have to take this dilemma seriously. The dilemma may be resolvable, however, through a reconception of the notions artists and philosophers have of artmaking.[6] In the space that remains I will give a quick sketch of reconceptions that I think lead to the dilemmas resolution.

5. Resolving the dilemma involves meeting three conditions. Our reconception must fit the actual artmaking practices that result in good art. We must assume that the degree to which an artist's work possesses artistic value is a function of the notions she has of art and artmaking. And it must turn out that an artist's grasp of these notions can be enhanced by studying the philosophy of art. I will outline a structure that satisfies the second and third conditions, and then offer an interpretation of the structure that I will argue fits the artworld.

Specifying a structure that satisfies conditions two and three is fairly straightforward. First, we must distinguish two elements, or levels, in the artist's understanding of art and artmaking. It suits my purposes to refer to one level as the artist's first order conception, and the other as the artist's second order conception. In doing this I do not invoke technical meanings these terms have in other contexts. Next, we must describe relations between first and second order conceptions that make it possible, at least in theory, that they have an interpretation under which they fit artmaking of the sort that generated the dilemma. To this end, assume that first order conceptions are operative in the ordinary course of this sort of artmaking, and that second order conceptions are not. Next, assume that an artwork's non-accidental artistic value depends on first order conceptions being operative. Third, assume that the distinction between first and second order conceptions is not obvious to artists because in most cases second order conceptions interpret first order ones. Finally, assume that philosophers can enhance an artist's awareness of her first order conceptions and the role they play in making good art, and that philosophical reflection on second order conceptions can alter or destroy them, but that this will not undermine artmaking, since these conceptions make no positive contribution to an artwork's possessing artistic value.

If there are conceptions of art that fit what I say about first and second order conceptions in the way they relate to the actual artmaking practices of artists like Dubuffet, then the dilemma can be resolved. To this end, let "second order conceptions" stand for conceptions of art like the one Dubuffet was attempting to express when he wrote the remark I quoted above. Artists who paint like Dubuffet are expressing second order conceptions when that say things like "art's function is to communicate the various states of thought," "art's function is to make a political statement," and "art's function is to make the artist's statement about art theory."[7]

Let "first order conceptions" stand for conceptions of differences in value tied to purely constitutive, or structural, or formal differences between objects, differences between the elements that together constitute the perceptible artwork.[8] Less problematic examples of elementary notions that are necessary to first order conceptions are balance, symmetry, unity, depth, breath, complexity, and so on. More problematic examples are serenity, intensity, dullness, vivacity, and the like. First order conceptions are conceptions of the relative artistic value of structures that differ in their manifestation of formal properties such as these.

A formal conception is said to be operative when the decisions in artmaking that affect an artwork's properties turn on the artist's conception of the artistic value realizable by manifesting a given formal property to a specific extent in a particular work. Since visual artworks all manifest structure, it is easy to think, mistakenly, that a given structure is determined the aim explicit in the second order conception of the artist who created it. This is because, given the nature of artist's second order conceptions, it is easy to read them into any structure.

For example, when we contrast Dubuffet's remarks about communication with his work we see that in the absence of interpretative conventions that do the job of tieing these work's meaning to their structure for us, we must derive their meaning from sources external to them and project it into their structure. Since they do not satisfy interpretive conventions, Dubuffet's second order considerations, whatever their content, are best understood as meanings he projects into the structures he creates. Consequently the character that defines these structures must be determined by other considerations. This does not necessarily mean that in every case their character is determined by first order considerations. But when a work has artistic value, either this is an accident, or it is something for which the artist can take credit. In those cases in which the artist is responsible for the work's being good art, this is because its structure is determined by first order considerations, irrespective of the interpretation the artist wants read into its structure.

If this account of first and second order conceptions fits what actually goes on when artists make art, then bringing this view to an artist's attention should enhance her understanding of her own artmaking, since there is nothing in the account that will negate her first order conceptions. The fate of her second order conceptions is irrelevant, as they have no operative role in determining her work's artistic value. So if this account is correct it resolves the dilemma presented earlier. The question that remains, then, is whether there is any reason to believe that this view fits the artworld. I will conclude by giving five reasons for accepting this resolution of the dilemma I presented above.

(1) It explains why it is possible for artists in one camp to recognize good art created by artists in another camp when these artists hold second order conceptions that are distinct from or even contradict those of the artists in the first camp. Artists can do this because their second order conceptions play no significant role in their assessment of the artistic value of each other's art.

(2) It explains why artists who hold different second order conceptions reach a high level of agreement with one another regarding good art from all the diverse art movements, despite the fact that the normative content of their second order conceptions are in conflict. They agree because they all have pretty much the same first order conception of art and artmaking, and when a work is good enough in these terms, this fact overrides their interest in second order considerations.

(3) It explains why artists are undisturbed when their own work, or the work of artists in their camp, or the work or artist outside their camp, utterly fails to accomplish its second order objective. For example, it

explains why artists are not in the least concerned that almost the totality of political art produced in the sixties had so little effect on the public's political behavior. This historical fact is not disturbing to artists because the value these "political" works have as art depends upon first order considerations, and thus has nothing to with their political efficacy.

(4) It explains why artists who profess to specific second order objectives and insist on the seriousness of these objectives adopt utterly impractical means for achieving these objectives. They behave this way because they are really more interested in making good art than in achieving their second order ends, and making good art involves being guided by first order considerations, not second order ones.

(5) Perhaps most important of all, it explains what actually goes on between students and instructors in art classes. For despite the demand nowadays that students address themselves to second order concerns; that they use their work to express their position on an art-theoretic issue, for example, the concrete suggestions they get from their instructors primarily function to develop their comprehension of the relative value of the formal characteristics visual artworks can manifest. This is so, even when, as is often the case, their instructor's suggestions are couched in the vocabulary of her second order conception of art.

Interestingly, what we find in cases where art instructors are completely dominated by their second order conceptions, having either lost sight of or never developed any first order ones, is that their students do not improve as artists under their tutelage. In the absence of any first order conception that guides the choice among the infinitely many possible structures onto which second order conceptions can be projected as interpretations, students link second order conceptions with structures randomly. This shows in their work, which consequently satisfies neither first nor second order criteria. Being insensitive to form, students in this situation usually produce bad art.

What such students and their instructors need to recognize is the difference between first and second order conceptions, and their relevance to artmaking. Fortunately, they can discover these things by taking a class in the philosophy of art. Doing so may undermine their second order conceptions, but it will enhance their understanding of the first order conceptions upon which good art depends.

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1. For example, see the alternatives listed by Marcia Eaton in Basic Issues in Aesthetics (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988) Chapters Two and Four.

2. Twentieth-Century Artist on Art, Dore Ashton, ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 122-23.

3. Charles Sanders Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," Philosophical Writings of Pierce, J. Buchler, ed. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955): 32.

4. Ibid., 35.

5. Twentieth-Century Artist on Art, 123.

6. Catherine Elgin and Nelson Goodman recently argued that a lot of the notions that have for some time grounded philosophical problems need to be

reconceived. See Reconceptions in Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988).

7. This is Arthur Danto's favorite notion of modern art, and it leads him to conclude that art is dead. If what I am arguing is correct, it shows that Danto's conclusion is drawn from a faulty analysis of the conception of art that results in good art. See The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), The Philosophical Disenfrachisement of Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), and The State of the Art (New York: Prentice Hall, 1987).

8. I do not assume that these differences are perceptible in material objects independently of some interpretation of them. At the same time, I deny that the artistically relevant aspects of a structure that becomes visible only under an interpretation are determined by the intention to communicate that interpretation. But I lack the space to discuss these points here.

A RESPONSE TO: SHOULD ARTISTS STUDY PHILOSOPHICAL AESTHETICS?

Tom Hawkins
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Professsor Bailey raises some interesting questions about the relationship between doing art and thinking critically about it. I must admit that I had a difficult time determining where or how to launch my response to the many points he makes in his paper. Several years ago, I wrote a paper for presentation at this conference. The paper was titled "Art, Aesthetics, and Education".[1] In that paper I attempted to explicate what I thought were the bare-boned essences of the concepts Art, Aesthetics, and Education, and then, using the Deweyan model of experience, I attempted to show how they all related to each other.

I make reference to that earlier paper only to indicate that some of the following responses to Professor Bailey's paper will in part emanate from some of the background work I did to support my points. With this in mind, I ask you to consider the following: What is the "dilemma" Bailey is so concerned about? It seems to me, he believes that on the one hand the art of painting is a worthwhile activity, one that certainly ought not to be jeopardized, if this can be avoided; and he believes that philosophy (or more properly, philosophical aesthetic criticism) is also an important activity, one which ought to be studied by those who are so inclined. But, he fears, there may be the possibility that the study of philosophical aesthetics by painters, instead of making better artists of them, may actually interfere to some extent with some of their "second order" conceptual, and hence creative, artistic abilities; and if so, this may not be so good. Here is the risk, the dilemma: Should we require artists to study philosophical aesthetics at the risk of diminishing some of their artistic ability? Or should we exempt them from a study of philosophical aesthetics and by so doing risk their not acquiring those analytical skills and criteria which would enable them to better critically examine all phenomena in the aesthetic realm?

Now, I must admit that if not a dilemma at least I am in a quandry at this point, simply because there are several directions I could go. For certainly much of what we call art requires of the artist some analysis and self-

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criticism. And, although this opens up a "can of worms," owing to one generic definition of art, it should be recognized that philosophy itself qualifies as an art, a point I'll clarify a little later. Thus we have a curious situation in which one art-form (philosophy) stands in criticism of another (painting). But lest we go off into the Never-Never Land of conceptual convolution, let us attempt to make some sense of the dilemma postulated by Professor Bailey.

If sense is to be made out of this dilemma, we'll need to get at the conceptual heart of a couple of key terms used in this discourse so that we can arrive at some clearer meanings. So a question arises: What is Art, anyway? In my earlier paper, with the help of John Dewey's book Art as Experience, I attempted to show that Art in its most fundamental sense is anything which is intentionally done to or with the environment, requiring some degree of skill, which produces an emotional reaction which is engaging or "consummatory," to use Dewey's word.[2] So we see that singing, writing, speaking, dancing, painting, sculpting, or doing any number of things with skill and intent are "artful" or "artistic," (which, incidentally, makes it rather silly to make a distinction between the so-called "fine" as distinguished from "practical" arts). Art is art, period; and all arts are part and parcel of basic human activity and experience. Furthermore, all art possesses aesthetic qualities. What are such qualities? They are essentially emotional/affective in nature and result from our perception of objects and processes which tend to intrigue and move us, and if they don't always give us pleasure, at least they capture our attention and imagination. For example, a beautiful picture qualifies as art because it is intentionally made by human beings and it produces aesthetic perceptions and experiences. While, although a beautiful sunrise may also produce profound aesthetic perceptions and experiences, it is not art--simply because it is not man-made. Logically, all art is aesthetic, but not all that is aesthetic is art.[3]

Now to the next question: What is Philosophy or more to the issue, Philosophical Aesthetics? It may be seen to be many things, but central to its meaning is the concern for perception, concept formation and categorization, analysis, and sometimes conclusion-drawing using logical tools. And all begins with a sometimes seemingly amorphous aesthetic gestalt which we experience. As opposed to merely sentimentalizing, emotionalizing or simply "feeling" the aesthetic experience and that which produces it, the philosophical aesthetician's mission is to bring such perceptions and experiences into the cognitive realm. By so doing, he attempts to describe aesthetic criteria and then to interrelate and clarify their meaning(s) and explain their myriad qualities and connections vis-a-vis the aesthetic object/phenomenon and the experiences undergone by the individual. This would be some of what Bailey means when he made reference to "first order" attributes of art works. In painting, for example, these would be "balance, symmetry, unity, depth, bredth, complexity," etc. These are some of the fundamental criteria, and hence the basic tools, of the aesthetic philosopher. Doubtless the artist as artist may possess such cognitive tools, but it is important to note that he may not always be aware of their use when he is undertaking his art production. And even if these philosophical tools are known to the artist, they may be operating at a non-reflective, "unconscious" level.

To help clarify this point, consider an analogy between the art of painting and the art of basketball playing. As there are good, bad, and mediocre painters and the paintings they produce, so too are there similarly proficient basketball players. If one critically examines what makes a basketball player proficient or good, he will begin automatically to analyze what basketball players do, then develop conceptual categories, and then attempt to determine whether or to what extent any basketball player fulfills them. (Some writers refer to these tools are "criteria.") Hence "first order" criteria of basketball playing would be such things as dribbling, passing, shooting, jumping, running, balance, pivoting, eye-hand coordination, rhythm, long-range vision, and a host of other sensory and psycho-motor/kinesthetic attributes and abilities. Then these "first order" attributes/criteria would constitute such conceptual tools by which we would critically examine the art of basketball playing. Now, does the basketball player need to know about such concepts, categories and cognitive criteria? Not at all. He simply needs to know how to perform such physical feats--usually without even thinking about them. In fact, if he had to stop to think about how he dribbled, etc., he would be incapacitated--his skills must be so over-learned/habituated as to appear to be spontaneous responses to the myriad of signals and other stimuli he receives continuously on the basketball court during play. Artists, I would argue, operate similarly. In painting, they mix, brush, shade, etc. receiving feedback from their operations on the palate and canvas until they are somehow satisfied that it is time to stop painting because they intuitively arrive at the conclusion that their work is complete. In fact a moment's reflection ought to inform anyone that many of our rather mundane and routine skills are so expert they seem to occur spontaneously, out of habit, with little or no reflection about precisely what it is we are doing, or why we are doing it. Consider the seemingly "simple" act of walking. It appears at first glance relatively simple to anyone who does it easily and has had years of practice. But when analyzed from kinesiologist's perspective walking becomes a rather complex activity both from a psycho-motor and a sensory set of criteria. Coaches, dance instructors, and physical therapists know this--they make it a life's study. It seems rather ironic that many outstanding coaches understand the game of basketball thoroughly but do not know how to perform the very skills they criticize. This, of course, brings this analysis into the so-called "know-how" versus "know-that" knowledge debate of the last three or so decades.

To take the differences between know-how performance and know-that cognitive knowledge to an extreme, consider the case of the so-called idiot-savant. As many of you may be well aware, there are some individuals who, while otherwise severely handicapped in their basic cognitive/intellectual abilities, are nevertheless gifted usually in a singular talent. That is to say with little or no training in music, for example, some intellectually handicapped individuals can sing in perfect pitch and can recall every note in an entire symphony and are able either to hum it back or play it in its entirety on the piano. Ask them how they are able to do this, and they will simply stare at you without understanding what it means to analyze anything. Somehow these rare people simply sing or play extremely complicated music without the least bit of reflection or analysis as how it is done. (Furthermore, no one else knows how they do it, either.)

At this point you are probably wondering just how all this bears upon Professor Bailey's dilemma and his analysis of it. I would argue that from basketball players to idiot-savant musicians to master painters, it is quite possible for artists to "know how" to produce good art and not fully understand the conceptual criteria by which such art may be judged. And although the aesthetic philosopher may not be able to produce good art in the form of paintings, like the coach, who is an astute critic of basketball playing, the philosopher acquires these intellectual tools which enable him to examine any aesthetic phenomenon--man-made or nature-made. Is it not often the case that the drama critic can determine with sound criteria that Marlon Brando is a much better actor than, say, is Sylvester Stallone, even though the drama critic has never once even attempted to ply his thespian skills in front of an audience? Who cares if Siskel or Ebert can act? The questions are: Are their criteria sound, and do they apply them fairly and intelligently when they criticize actors and the movies they make?

If the above has any merit, we could see how Bailey's dilemma can be resolved. Does art production require the conceptual abilities of aestheic criticism? Perhaps not. Does aesthetic criticism require the skills of art production? Probably not. Since the study of the philosophy of art may require buying into the concepts and language of aesthetic criticism, and since the acquisition of such tools may require the student to give up some his preconceived notions of the value of what it is he is doing, and if this reduces his spontanaity and creativity in producing his art, then, for him, the study of such criticism may be counterproductive, as Bailey seems to fear. My response to all this would be simply to let artists be artists, and let art critics be art critics. After all, expert basketball players don't need the critical skills of coaches and vice-versa. Finally, if artists and aesthetic philosophers want to hassle over such criteria issues as "first" and "second" order conceptions, it's fine with me. For, who knows, maybe through such discourses, debates, and deliberations they will be able to explain to me why I can be so enthralled by the works of Salvador Dali while at the same time regard some of the stuff Pablo Picasso passed off as art as a waste of not only time, money, and effort, but canvass as well. But this may only mean that my background and training are weak in "first order" criteria. If so, this is an educational problem. How will I learn better? Who will teach me? Will it be the artist, the philosopher, or both?

Notes

1. Tom Hawkins, "Art, Aesthetics, and Education" PROCEEDINGS, 23rd Annual Convention of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society, pp. 104-7.

2. John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch, & Co., 1934). p. 35.

3. Dewey, pp. 35-57.

GLASNOST, GORBACHEV AND SOVIET EDUCATION

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The purpose of an organized educational system in most societies includes the concept of perpetuating the society and its form of government. Since all courses taught in the educational system of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are taught within the framework of Communist ideology, their system follows this premise.[1] If glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) are to become reality in the Soviet Union, the educational system must reflect the change. There appears little evidence to suggest that the educational system will play a leading role as the change agent for glasnost and perestroika, but the long term influence of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's new policy of openness and restructuring may well be determined by the role of Soviet education.

Change is occurring in the Soviet Union. The issue should not be viewed as "if," but as "how" and its long range "effects." To deny change is occurring would be oblivious to the reality of recent events. Only yesterday, (July 12, 1988) the Soviets showed on television the blast-off of their rocket toward Mars. To cite a few events which occurred in the last week of June, 1988 should illustrate the point about change. The first called meeting of a Party Conference in 47 years convened in Moscow, and Gorbachev spoke for approximately three and one-half hours acknowledging many of the failures of the past and plans for the future. The Soviet people were able to watch and hear his speech on television. Open dialogue was exchanged between delegates and leaders, and internal party personality conflicts were publicly aired. Various demonstrations were openly allowed in Moscow, and at one of the demonstrations they called for a memorial to be built to honor the victims of Joseph Stalin's rule, their leader for nearly 30 years which included the Great Patriotic War, or World War II as we call it. In the last part of Gorbachev's speech to the Party Conference, he called for such a memorial to be built in Moscow. To say one can correctly predict the outcome of the change which is occurring would be unfounded arrogance.

Considerable space has been devoted in our educational literature and philosophical writings as to whether the purpose of education is to serve as a change agent or to help society adjust to change. While the entire proceedings of the recent Party Conference have not been released as this is being written, there appears to be no indication that the educational system will be in the forefront of dealing with glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev did state that the entire proceedings would be published, but do not expect to find many references to their education system.

Even though former president Jimmy Carter said that Mikhail Gorbachev is the most popular figure in the world today,[2] as the Gorbachev show continues on center court of the world stage, a reasonable observation appears to be that the Soviet educational system has not, is not, and will not be used as a leading change agent. It is totally subservient to the Communist Party and the Politburo. It will follow communist ideology, not mold it.

Contrary to the teachings of Vladimir Lenin concerning the "cult of the personality," a limited description of the man directing glasnost and perestroika appears relevant. Glasnost obviously has not reached their government controlled

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press, as evidenced by the very limited information given in the official biographical sketches of the General Secretary regarding his family background. The literature does appear consistent in stating that Gorbachev was born on March 2, 1931 in the southern part of the Russian Republic, joined the Komsomal at age 14, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor at the unusually young age of 18, and was admitted to the prestigious Moscow State University in 1950. He married while attending the university, had one daughter, and received his degree in law, but never practiced law. Very little is revealed about his life between graduation in 1955 and his return to Moscow in 1978.[3] The parents of Gorbachev are described as being hard working peasants with an emphasis on denying they were serfs. Apparently, his mother is still living, but the reports on his father are conflicting. There is general agreement in describing his father as being a combine harvester driver before serving in the Great Patriotic War. One account states that he did not survive the conflict.[4] A Time Book describes his father's enjoyment of working in the fields with his son after the war and cites the father's death as having occurred in 1976.[5] Another source, by a highly regarded Soviet historian, agrees with the 1976 date.[6]

A personification of the personality cult may be illustrated when one reputable biographer writes, "Research indicates that Gorbachev has a brother," and the topic is dropped.[7] Several sources indicate he may have a brother, but his name, age or other information is not given.

Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader to be born after their revolution and his birth occurred shortly after Joseph Stalin started his brutal policies of forced farm collectivization. Considerable emphasis may be placed on this because he was not exposed to the day-to-day political and physical ordeals of the revolutionary years. While to young to have served in the military service during the Great Patriotic War, he did live through a brief period of German occupation. He is the best educated leader since Lenin, and his wife is also a university graduate. Their daughter is 28 years of age, and she and her husband (his name is not revealed) are both doctors, a profession of moderate esteem in the USSR. Their oldest child is a girl and the sex of the youngest has not been acknowledged. In the meeting last year with former President Carter, Gorbachev referred to his new grandchild, but refused to say whether it was a boy or a girl.[8]

Being a graduate of the law program at one of their leading universities, the General Secretary has been exposed and influenced by many hours of lecture and study on Leninism. It is a required course. His political and economic posturing reflect an appreciation for Lenin's pragmatism as he explains that suggested changes are being compatible with Lenin's socialism. An example of Gorbachev's masterful technique of interpreting Lenin to serve his purpose may be documented by quoting from his recent book, Perestroika: "Lenin never believed that the road to socialism would be straight. He knew how to change slogans when life required it. And he was never a slave to resolutions once they were adopted."[9] This places Lenin's stamp of approval on Gorbachev's political glasnost and economic perestroika.

The theoretical foundation of the Soviet educational system is based on the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels; Lenin put them in practice.[10] The theme which states socialism is superior to market capitalism is assumed as it represents the Marxist-Leninist ideology.[11] The Soviet educational literature also emphasizes the bringing together of theory and practice, work and academics, and associating them with Lenin.

This paper is not intended as a history of Soviet education. However, a few references to it appear appropriate. Education under the Tsarist system was elitist, formal, and authoritarian. Soviet educators give credit to Johann Amos

Comenius for his influence on general education, Jean Jacques Rousseau for his concern with the psychology of the child, Johann Pestalozzi for theories of teaching methodology, and Robert Owen for his advocacy of combining school with industrial training.[12]

After the revolution an attempt was made to broaden education for the masses, as this would assist in developing a classless society. However, during the 1930s a movement developed to return to the pre-revolutionary school system. Lenin's wife was well educated and was one of their educational leaders after the revolution. She was a strong supporter of Marxism and an advocate of early childhood education, public nurseries, free public schools, and free lunch programs.[13]

Soviet schools begin in September 1 throughout the country. The day is not viewed as just the beginning of another school year, but more as a holiday, festival, and happy occasion with students and parents bringing flowers as gifts for the teachers. Their constitution gives them the right to free tuition, including higher education. There are no private institutions of higher education in the Soviet Union. The system requires compulsory education, and they attend school six days per week.

An article written in 1986 praises Lenin as having formulated the universal principle of polytechnical education which connects theory and practice. It also states that the Soviet society is". . . the most industrious, the most hard working."[14] The quote hardly appears compatible with Gorbachev's explanation of the need for perestroika. It does not reflect the view held by many Soviets, which expresses their attitude toward the Kremlin as "They pretend they're paying us, and we pretend we're working."[15] After citing the quote, the two ex-Soviet journalism continued their publication by saying that the people regard their leaders as parasites and exploiters, and the leaders regard the people as loafers and drunkards.[16]

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, they say it corresponds to our Congress, approved "The Fundamental Directions of General Education and Vocational School Reform" in 1984. The resolution passed by the Central Committee stated that it would be expected to raise the educational quality to new levels, eliminate shortcomings, enhance basic knowledge, shape communist convictions, and nuture love for the socialist Motherland.[17] Perhaps it should be acknowledged that Gorbachev was not General Secretary at this time. However, he was in the Politburo and was viewed as the number two man and heir apparent.

The reform lengthened the school program from 10 to 11 years by enrolling six years olds in the first grade. Previously, children had started elementary school at age seven. This changed their elementary organization from three to four years, as had been the practice since 1966. Incomplete secondary education consist of grades five through nine, while two years of senior secondary education are grades 10 and 11. After the ninth grade, usually at the age of 15, students are enrolled in one of the three programs: the general education school for senior secondary education, a specialized vocational school, or a program technicum which is an institution of para-professional study. A recent study indicated approximately 15 per cent enrolled in the technicums, while the other two groups were nearly equally divided.[18]

The school reform policies called for new textbooks for the 1986-87 school year. The outline for the academic material to be covered acknowledged that some of the previous subject matter was too advanced for the age and grade level of the students. This tends to explain why the additional year of schooling was placed at the beginning for children age six rather than adding the additional year with advanced material at the other end of the program. The influences of demographics may also have been a major contributing factor as to where the additional year would be added. The tremendous loss of men during World War I, the purges of the 1930s, and the Soviet Union's losses during the Great Patriotic War have widespread implications on the current available work force. Since a large percentage of the adult females are already working, the lowering of the school age for elementary school would assist to a limited extent the care for their children. The Soviet society does place a high priority on their children as even the casual tourist can observe.

Of particular interest is that the outline of the new social studies program elaborates on the advantages and progress provided by collective farming, as well as the industrial advancements made during the Five Year Plans in the 1930s and after the victorious Great Patriotic War; however, Stalin's name is seldom mentioned. The fact remains that he was their leader from 1924 until his death in 1953. Will the new text describe the horrors of the methods and slaughter used to develop collective farming, the evils of their slave labor camps, and the mass purges directed by Joseph Stalin? Will the speech denouncing Stalin, made by Nikita Khrushchev on February 25, 1956, be made available to students? It has not been made public. Will the text really acknowledge the widespread corruption of Leonid I. Brezhnev's rule, (1964-82), and the luxurious life style of the current Politburo members? I think not.

Mikhail Gorbachev has indeed become one of the foremost of the world leaders today. From an obscure background of becoming a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979, advance to a full member in 1980, then to become General Secretary in 1985 is truly amazing. For many, he is considered to be first among the equals of world leaders. Even though he admits the product he has to sell has had numerous flaws in its development, he steadfastly identifies himself and the future of the USSR with the one party system, the Communist Party. As he talks about glasnost to increase productivity and gain support of the masses both from within and outside the Soviet Union, the policy is one of brinkmanship for him and his nation. As he talks perestroika for efficiency and modernization, the policy is one of roulette, and the chips are high.

To stir human emotions for such basic desires as freedom and basic economic goods is extremely exciting and dangerous. The Soviet educational system, based on Marxist-Leninist ideology, will most aptly deny Gorbachev the goals he is seeking.

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2. Larry King, "Plain talk from Jimmy Carter." USA Today, June 27, 1988, D2.

3. Dusko Dober, Shadows And Whispers: Power Politics Inside the Kremlin from Brezhev to Gorbachev (New York: Random House, 1986), 284.

4. Christis Schmidt-Haver, Gorbachev: The Path To Power (Massachusetts: Salem House Publishers, 1986), 43.

5. Donald Morrison, ed., Mikhail S. Gorbachev An Intimate Biography (New York: Times Incorporated, 1988), 39-41.

6. Zhores A. Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986), 22.

7. Schmidt-Hauer, Gorbachev, 44.

8. James Kelly, "The Soviets Clints of Steel Behind the Smile," *Time* 125 (March 25, 1985): 26.

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11. Beatrice Beech Szekely, "The New Soviet Secondary School Geography Curriculum: Editor's Introduction." *Soviet Education* XXIX (February, 1987): 8.

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13. Ibid. 32-3.

14. M.S. Slutskii, "Contemporary Soviet Marxist-Leninist Philosophy of Education: The Gnosiological Aspect of Education," *Soviet Education* XXIX (May, 1987): 59-60.

15. Valadimir Solovyou & Elena Klepikova, *Behind The High Kremlin Walls* (New York: Berkley Books, 1987) 257.

16. Ibid.

17. Slutskii, "The Gnosiological Aspects of Education," 48.

18. Beatrice Beech Szekely, "The New Secondary School Mathematics Curriculum: Editor's Introduction," *Soviet Education*, XXIX (January, 1987): 4.

GLASNOST, GORBACHEV, AND SOVIET EDUCATION: A CRITIQUE

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Professor Holland has provided a summary, it appears to this reader/listener, of ferment in today's USSR. Emphasis has been placed on Glasnost, Gorbachev, and Education. His summary of the history of Marxism, including its determinist inclination, is helpful in establishing a context for the paper. His conclusion that ferment evident in a recent Party Conference regarding the purpose of education showed "...no indication that the educational system will be in the forefront of dealing with glasnost and perestroika" should not surprise us. After all, national systems of education have historically without exception been communicative rather than creative affairs. Their mission despite troves of rhetoric to the contrary has been that of transmitting rather than creating culture. To expect Soviet education to be in the forefront and serve as the primary change agent is to expect too much. Clear thinking reminds us that educational lag has been the trade mark of every developed nation, whether in early or late stages. Careful reading of educational history underscores this unfortunate fact.

Professor Holland has asserted that "...the long term influence of...Gorbachev's new policy of openness and restructuring may well be determined by the role of Soviet education." But if mass education by definition is a conservative rather that a progressive or change-oriented force, it does not seem logical to conclude that "The Soviet educational system, based on Marxist-Leninist ideology, will most aptly deny Gorbachev the goals he is seeking." The argument made in the paper could be strengthened by making a sharper distinction between "educational system" and "schooling system." I infer that Professor Holland is referring to the "schooling system." If so, his argument is unconvincing. If he had been referring to the "educational system" defined as public discourse and dialogue (as I believe he was not), his argument would be stronger. I disagree that the "schooling system" can lead.[1] At best, it can only play a supportive, symbiotic role vis a vis other social institutions.

[1] I strongly believe that with an altered mind set, schooling systems could lead. An altered mind set would thus take seriously the thinking of such progressive thinkers as John Dewey, Boyd Bode, Harry Broudy, Samuel Holton, Arthur Wirth, John Goodlad, and Sarah Lawrence Lightfoot.

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TEACHER ACCOUNTABILITY AND STUDENT LEARNING

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Teacher accountability for students' learning is not a new idea. It seems to come and go with the changing tide of educational opinion. An educational researcher, Robert M.W. Travers, has noticed this changing tide of opinion and spoke of it as follows:[1]

> Although educated people in most civilizations, through most of history, have held the belief that the pupil was responsible for learning or not learning, that belief has been abandoned from time to time in favor of the belief that the teacher has much, it not total, responsibility for how much the pupil learns. The 19th century showed one great flirtation with the myth of total teacher responsibility for learning when an effort was made in British schools to fix teacher salaries on the basis of the measured achievement of their pupils. This famous payment-by-results system had devastating effects on British schools and was eventually terminated by Act of Parliament as a result of public outcry.

This same researcher, speaking of some sources of the myth of teacher accountability in the United States, has stated:[2]

> One of the sources that contributed to the myth of accountability was the emergence of operant psychology and the idea that the environment totally controlled the pupil's learning. Given that premise, the teacher's task was to provide an environment that would control the pupil's behavior and achieve specific objectives. The concept of pupil responsibility had no place in the operant psychologist's description of school learning.

What Travers called "operant psychology" is a part of behaviorism. Operant psychology, in conjunction with some more general ideas of behaviorism, and entwined with some ideas of long standing in education, gave rise to what can be called "instructional behaviorism."3 Unlike some other forms of behaviorism, the central feature of instructional behaviorism is to change or modify behavior by instructional means; namely, by teaching and curriculum. From Edward Lee Thorndike to the present numerous educational psychologists and teacher educators have advocated that there should be specific behavioral objectives for both teaching and curriculum. These objectives were thought to make both curriculum content and teaching procedures explicit to student and educational evaluators. Learning was naively assumed to be measurable changes in behavior as predicted by the objectives.

Instructional behaviorism grew over the decades until it became a generally accepted ideology in education. As it grew it spawned or gave

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support to performance-based teaching, performance evaluations, teacher accountability, management by objectives, minimum competency testing, and such schemes as planning, programming, and budgeting to achieve objectives. These features seem to be the foundations of many of the newer reform programs in education.[4] It seems that the reforms, upon close examination, are "more of the same old things."

Teacher accountability, as part of instructional behaviorism, can be briefly summarized. First, learning is naively assumed to be change or modification of behavior. Second, the purpose of teaching is to change or modify behavior. Third, to insure that what is learned is specifically what was contained in the curriculum and taught by the teacher, the learning or behavior changes must be those stated in the objectives. Fourth, the teacher is accountable for achieving or failing to achieve the stated objectives. This means that the teacher is accountable for the student's learning. It seems as though, to use poor grammar, the teacher must "learn the student."

The purpose of this paper is not to explore the many and varied aspects of teacher accountability, but rather to identify and analyze some very basic arguments which advocates of teacher accountability must use in making a case for accountability. The arguments will be presented in ordinary language, along with their symbolic forms, and their validity or invalidity. The arguments cannot stand alone, so to speak, without contextual backings. Appropriate contextual backings will be discussed and problems will be identified. Finally, an alternative to teacher accountability will be suggested.

In order to make a case for teacher accountability that includes arguments for it, be they individual arguments, or parts of extended arguments, one would have to use at least one of four basic arguments. For convenience and to avoid unnecessary repetition, these arguments will be labeled A, B, C, and D. In the symbolic forms of the arguments, "T" will be used for "the teacher taught" and "L" for "the student learned." The arguments are presented in Figure I.

Figure I

Arguments	Logical Forms	Validity
A. If the teacher taught, then the student learned The teacher taught Therefore, the student learned	$T \rightarrow L$ T $\therefore L$	Valid by modus ponens
B. If the teacher taught, then the student learned The teacher did not teacher Therefore, the student did not learn	$T \rightarrow L$ $\sim T$ $\therefore \sim L$	Fallacy of denial of the antecedent
C. If the teacher taught, then the student learned The student learned Therefore, the teacher taught	$T \rightarrow L$ L $\therefore T$	Fallacy of affirming the consequent

D. If the teacher taught, then the student learned	$T \rightarrow L$	Valid by modus tollens
The student did not learn	$\sim L$	
Therefore, the teacher did not teach	$\therefore \sim T$	

If the teacher is accountable for the student's learning, then teaching by the teacher implies learning on the part of the student. This is an inescapable premise in any argument for teacher accountability. To be sure, the antecedents and consequence of the argument could be reversed and the second premise changed accordingly, but if that were done, there would be no changes in either the logical forms of the argument or in their validity or invalidity. If the arguments were stated in categorical form, there would be no change in their validity or invalidity.

The first premise is identical in all four arguments. Although it is a statement of implications, it is not clear what kind of implication it is. Four of the more common kinds of implications are represented in the following statements.

1. If A includes B, and B includes C, then A includes C.
2. If an adult male is unmarried, then he is a bachelor.
3. If there is friction, then there will be heat.
4. If it rains, then I will stay at home.

The first statement is a logical implication. The second is a definitional one. The third is a causal implication and the fourth is a decision. In the four arguments under consideration, the first premise is neither logical nor decisional. It, therefore, must be either definitional or causal.

Of the four arguments presented, only A an D are valid ones. It will be assumed that only valid arguments would be used in support of teacher accountability. The major premise of arguments A and D can be interpreted as either definitional or causal. On either interpretation the key words in the arguments are "teacher," "student," and "learned." Being undefined in the arguments, these words could be interpreted in several ways. For example, under what specific conditions can a person be called either a teacher or a student? Under what conditions could one say that the teacher was teaching, as opposed to doing many other things that teachers commonly do, such as grading papers? What is it that is taught? How do we know that it was taught to the student so that the student learned it? What is learning? How do we know that the student learned?

In order to make a convincing case for teacher accountability, the arguments would have to be supported by some sharp distinctions, defensible classifications, precise definitions, and considerable information about teachers, teaching, students, learning, and schooling. Relationships such as those of teaching to learning, teaching to schooling, or schooling to education may require detailed analysis. Arguments are context dependent. They do not stand alone. To make a case is to provide a context with appropriate support or backing for arguments which are a part of the case.

To make a strong case for teacher accountability, one should look beyond the walls of public school buildings. In doing so, one may realize that words like "teacher" and "teaching" are notoriously ambiguous. Parents teach their children, mother bears teach their cubs, craftsmen teach their apprentices, and people teach other people apart from formal schooling. At some time or other, almost everyone will find themselves in situations in which they are either teachers or students. The trappings of formal schooling may unduly limit one's view of teachers, teaching, and students.

In either formal schooling or in other life activities, teaching is directly observable. Although teaching activities appear to be obvious, it is difficult to classify them or clearly separate them from activities of the teacher which serve other educational functions. Moreover teachers and educators in general do not seem to be of one mind about teaching. Teaching has been characterized as guiding and directing inquiry, storing the mind with information, actualization of potential abilities, creating learning environments, intervention or even intrusion into the life of students, and modification of behavior. For these and other reasons, there does not seem to be an adequate definition of "teaching" which specifies truly defining characteristics of it.

Like teaching activities, some learning activities are directly observable, but learning itself is not. From observation of students engaged in learning activities, from tests of many kinds, and from more comprehensive evaluations one can infer that learning has or has not occurred. The inference, however, is an inductive one having the liabilities common to inductive inferences.

Because learning must be inductively inferred from observations and data, studies of learning have been largely empirical ones. Empirical studies of learning focus attention upon the learner rather than upon the teacher. Human learners are tremendously complex organisms. Many variables, some of which may not be recognized, enter into human learning. Moreover, people are learning all the time. To live is to learn. An adequate account of learning could not be limited to learning from teachers in classrooms. In short, learning is a complex phenomena. There does not seem to be an adequate definition of it.

Given what seems to be known about teaching and learning, our conceptions of them will be both inadequate and debatable. From our limited knowledge, however, it seems that teaching and learning are separate categories of phenomena. Students do learn from teaching and they learn in other ways in the absence of teaching. Teaching and learning are related, but the relationship is a contingent rather than a necessary one.

If the relationship of teaching to learning is a contingent one, then there will be problems concerning the arguments in Figure I. The first premise in each argument is a statement of implication. It seems to be a necessary rather than a contingent statement. One problem that arises has been called the paradox of material implication.

The concept of material implication in logic does not encompass the full meaning of the four kinds of implication previously discussed. It singles out a common feature of all statements of implication which denies that the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. This feature is shown in the truth table in Figure 2.

Figure 2

P	Q	$\sim Q$	$P . \sim Q$	$\sim(P . \sim Q)$	$P \rightarrow Q$
T	T	F	F	T	T
T	F	T	T	F	F
F	T	F	F	T	T
F	F	T	F	T	T

As the truth table illustrates, a denial of the conjunction of $P . \sim Q$ is to say that it is not the case that the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, or as shown in column five, not both P and not Q [$\sim (P . \sim Q)$]. The truth table shows that the expression not both P and not Q [$\sim (P . \sim Q)$] is equivalent in meaning and truth value to P implies Q [$P \rightarrow Q$].

The first premise in the arguments shown in Figure I is: "If the teacher taught, then the student learned." If the teacher taught, but the student did not learn, then the premise would be logically false as shown in the second row of the truth table. The words "taught" and "learned" are key words in the premise. If a teacher teaches a student, the student may or may not learn from the teaching. On the other hand, if the student was taught, then the student learned. "Teach" seems to be a task word, but "taught" is an achievement word. In the same way, "learn" is a task word, but "learned" is an achievement word.

The first premise in the arguments is analytically true by the meaning of the words used in it. It is a definitional implication. Arguments A and D are both valid and analytically sound ones. They are valid and sound however "teaching" and "learning" are defined, because the key words in them are achievement ones. The use of achievement words avoids questions about what was learned, how it was learned, or the quality and amount of the learning. Questions about how teaching and learning are related do not arise. Because arguments A and D are valid and sound by the meanings of the key words in them and by their logical form, they are purely analytic and devoid of substantive content.

The first premise in arguments A and D may also be interpreted as stating a causal relationship. That is, the teacher caused the student to have learned whatever was taught. The truth table for material implication does not, however, provide any empirical information about causal events or their effects. It only shows that _if_ there is a causal relationship, then it fits the _form_ of material implication. For example, if there is friction, then there will be heat. That all cases of friction produce heat would have to be established empirically and not merely by meaning of terms and logical form.

Both friction and heat are empirical phenomena, and they are causally related, but not all empirical phenomena are so related. For example, "If Plato was a philosopher, then Ronald Reagan is President of the United States." Both the antecedent and the consequent are empirically true, and the implication would show true in a truth table, simply because true statements imply other true statements. The subject matters are not related empirically, and certainly not by causality. This situation is part of the paradox of material implication.

In arguments A and D one may assume that the teacher was the cause of the student's learning. On the other hand, experience seems to indicate that students do not always learn from the teacher's teaching. The relationship of teaching to learning does not, therefore, seem to be an invariant one, but rather a contingent one. This would be true of tutorials as well as classroom teaching. Teaching is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for learning. People learn in many other ways. It seems very unlikely, given the numerous variables that enter into teaching and learning, that a causal relationship could be experimentally demonstrated.

Arguments A and D are valid because the key words in them are achievement words in the past tense. They speak only of cases in which teaching and learning have been successful. Unless these arguments are understood for what they are, their use in cases for teacher accountability for student learning may be more harmful then beneficial to the teaching profession. To expect success in teaching and learning day to day and on all occasions, is to expect too much. Success in teaching and in learning are always matters of degree resulting from effort over time. Learning cannot be mandated.

Teachers work in situations that limit their range of activities. Teachers almost never have the opportunity to set standards for admission to their classes and to recruit students who exceed these standards. They take the students who are assigned to them. They have little control over numerous variables in the school and community that greatly influence students' achievement in schooling. They cannot compensate in their teaching for all of the faults in society that make for poor learning in school. A teacher may teach very well, yet students may not learn what is expected of them.

Teacher accountability for student learning may be an oversimplified idea.[5] It may result in scapegoating teachers for failures in society and education.[6] It does not hold the teacher accountable for teaching or the student accountable for learning. It is misdirected in holding the teacher accountable for the student's learning and holding the student accountable for little beyond attendance. It naively assumes that teachers "learn students."

Some problems about teacher accountability result from ordinary meanings of "teach" and "taught." For example, dictionaries define "teach" as "to cause to know a subject," "to cause to know how," "to make to know," "to impart knowledge," and "to preach." These older meanings do not fit contemporary teaching practices. Dictionaries also define "teach" as "to guide the studies of." This latter meaning is closer to prevailing practices. The older meanings of "teach" are retained, however, in the belief that teachers can control student learning by control of the classroom environment. The belief that teachers can compel students to learn supports the idea that "if the teacher taught, then the student learned." This belief is falsified daily in classrooms across the land.

An alternative to teacher accountability is that of teachers' professional responsibilities. Teachers are responsible for mastery of the subject matter they teach. They are responsible for keeping up to date in their teaching fields. It is their responsibility to be aware of the standards for practice in their fields and to practice according to those standards. It is their responsibility to understand the code of professional ethics in teaching and to adhere to it. Incompetence, malpractice, and violations of the code of ethics are grounds for removing a teacher's certification. Where students are properly and competently taught, but do not learn, are not the faults of teachers. They may be victims of social conditions, faulty prior education, lack of interest or motivation, or what not. Learning from the curriculum and teaching is on the student's side of the ledger.

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1. Robert M. W. Travers, "Myths, Scripts, and Educational Research," *Journal of Research and Development in Education*, *20*, 3 (1987), p. 23.

2. *Ibid*.

3. George L. Newsome, "Instructional Behaviorism: A Critique," *Philosophy of Education 1974: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society*, pp. 336-350.

4. Alan C. Ornstein, "Teacher Accountability: Trends and Policies," *Education and Urban Society*, *18*, 2, (1986) pp. 221-229.

5. *Ibid*.

6. *Ibid*.

TEACHING: THE IMPOSSIBLE PROFESSION

A RESPONSE

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Rather than critically examine the devastating impact that the accountability movement has on education, George Newsome has chosen to confine his remarks to an analysis of "some very basic arguments which advocates of teacher accountability must use in making a case for accountability."[1] I want to consider briefly that analysis as well as the conclusions drawn from it. In the process, I want to examine the value of Newsome's approach to a substantive educational problem.

In outlining those arguments which accountability advocates "must" use in making their case, Newsome observes that all contain the premise, "If the teacher taught, then the student learned." This premise, he argues, is "inescapable" in any accountability argument claimed to be valid. After a lengthy analysis, Newsome concludes that the premise is analytically true and that the valid arguments for accountability which use that premise "are purely analytic and devoid of substantive content."[2] On the way to that conclusion, we learn that words like "teaching" and "learning" are ambiguous and can be clarified as task and achievement words. Once that identification is made, the premise in question is revealed to be "analytically true by the meaning of the words used in it."[3]

So what has Newsome taught us? Or perhaps more appropriately, what have we learned? Simply, that successful arguments for accountability are devoid of substantive content and that we should give up an unproductive way of thinking about teaching/learning, and move on to a more beneficial examination of "teachers' professional responsibilities." That way, we will not have to worry about the absence of student learning. Because there can be no causal relationship between teaching and learning like there is between friction and heat, there can be no causal implication in the premise under question.

In adopting this posture, teachers will not have to be concerned about students learning. They need only worry about their own knowledge of subject matter, and whether they are performing according to accepted standards of practice and adhering to a professional code of standards. If students learn, so much the better. But if not, well that's either their problem or society's, depending upon whether students are to be held responsible for their own actions. Students do learn from teachers, but teaching as it is now practiced does not, by itself, produce learning on every occasion. Because a causal link cannot be established between teaching and learning, the key premise in the accountability argument is nothing more than an analytic statement devoid of any substantive meaning.

Newsome claims that his list of accountability arguments are the ones accountability advocates must use if they are to make the case for accountability. But Newsome is mistaken if he thinks that accountability advocates are out to create valid arguments. Good logic is clearly not a top priority of our educational and political leaders. Good schools are. If logic has to be violated in behalf of childrens' learning, so be it. To them, invalid arguments are not moral crime. Lack of student progress is. As a consequence of this attitude, advocates use

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accountability statements not as elements of valid syllogisms but as tools for holding teachers responsible for student learning. They make their "case" by actually holding teachers responsible for student learning. They simply will not allow teachers to hide behind the shield of "professional standards." Our nation has a crisis of confidence over education and the only way to improve the present condition is by forcing teachers to a higher level of professional performance.

The danger of the accountability movement from my perspective is not that logic will be violated, but that teachers will actually make Newsome's model argument empirically valid. My concern is that, under pressure, teachers will redefine teaching and learning so as to establish an empirical connection between teaching and learning, the kind of connection Newsome claims does not now exist. That initiative would be disastrous for public education.

As David Cohen notes,[4] teachers are very vulnerable to their students, more so than in most other human service professions. Dependence and uncertainty interact in ways that can have very devastating consequences on teachers' professional lives and the lives of students. Conscientious teachers, under the pressure to be accountable, have a strong desire to reduce the risks of failure. They realize that they are very dependent upon students for their own success especially when teacher accountability for student results is the order of the day. The real danger comes when teachers see that the only way for them to cope is to redefine student success in such limited terms that students can achieve with relative ease.

> The convention that teachers are primarily responsible for students' learning in a mass-enrolled, compulsory system creates incentives for teachers to accept students' values, ideas, and ambitions. It pushes them toward definitions of knowledge and learning that make it easy for many students to succeed.[5]

Cohen rightly observes that the promise of success made by accountability advocates, creates pressures on teachers to avoid failure. Because students are not held accountable for learning, teachers become enormously vulnerable to students for their success. To reduce the risks of failure, teachers rely less on the initiative of students and more on their own efforts. The way for them to avoid failure is by reducing the criteria of success so that it is more acceptable to those students who otherwise might not learn.

> Teachers often do this by defining knowledge in clear and tidy ways, by teaching material in small increments that make modest departures from past knowledge, and by organizing lessons so that most students will perform decently, even if they learn little.[6]

If knowledge can be organized in discrete and well-define packages, then chances are better that students, who have little inclination to work, will learn. Students will be rewarded for successfully acquiring little packets of facts or skills. No longer will teachers be foolish enough to conceive of teaching as an intellectual adventure in which both the teacher and student take considerable risks in behalf of student learning. No longer will teachers attempt to get students to embrace uncertainty as part and parcel of their educational development. No longer will they be encouraged to assume greater responsibility for their own learning so as to develop greater autonomy of thought. A tradeoff between student and teacher is firmly in place. Teachers see the value of simplifying school work so that all normal students can manage it successfully. Both student and teacher are then "off the hook." Accountability is achieved and Newsome now has a substantive first premise leading to valid syllogism. Causality between teaching and learning has been established.

Teaching is a "no-win" profession. The more teachers try to define teaching and learning in ways that enlarge society's vision of human nature and its destiny, the more they stand to loose as accountable agents in our society. As long as society holds teachers' feet to the fire, teachers will be forced to limit their vision of how human improvement is defined and how it can is to be realized. In this threatening educational environment, teachers need to become even more courageous in challenging the limited conceptions of knowledge and learning generated by the current accountability craze. They need to increase the risks rather than lessen them if they are going to generate what Cohen calls "adventurous instruction."

> Such instruction invites teachers to open themselves to the great problems that lie at the heart of their work, to frame a pedagogy that embraces uncertainty, to increase the risks of learning and teaching and to enhance their vulnerability to students.[7]

I seriously doubt that Newsome's notion of "professional responsibilities" will nurture the kind of risk taking to which Cohen alludes. In fact, his call for teachers to keep up to date with the standards of practice and to teach students in a proper and competent fashion sounds a great deal like a plea for maintaining the status quo rather than enhancing teacher vulnerability. Newsome would have been more helpful had he explored how professional standards are shaped and the role that conceptions of human destiny play in shaping such standards.

John Goodlad observes that our public schools presently shape their professional standards without consideration of a conception of the good life that can be shared with its constituents. Missing from the classrooms which he and his researchers observed, were any "norms of group cohesion and cooperation for achievement of a shared purpose."[8] Also missing was the extensive development of students' intellectual or creative powers.[9] What he found instead was the cultivation of passivity. What concerns me about the accountability advocates and those who promote professional standard is that "passivity" is a part of their agenda. For they stand ready to divide instruction into nice, neat little packets that can be managed by even the most disengaged student, with proper reinforcement of course. But as high school teacher Donald W. Thomas laments, with this approach to instruction, no room is left "for wonder or perplexity, no place for wisdom or student insight."[10]

Modeling his own approach toward teaching after Socrates, Thomas makes a very strong case for immersing students in dissonance and perplexity.

> And so each time I enter class I bring with me some part of the abyss that I plan to reveal. We begin, as Socrates so often does, with pleasantries and talk of surface things. And as they negotiate these waters, splashing amiably about in specifics, I lie in wait for them, ready to deliver the torpedo's touch and pull them under as far as they can go. I want them to leave exhilarated yet perplexed by what they have considered, conscious that we have managed but a glimpse of the depths that surge below.[11]

The press for accountability can only move teachers away from challenging students to reach below the surface to gain a glimpse of the depths that lie below. The need to limit our teaching to "surface things" for the sake of being accountable can only "deny them [students] the wonder that is the basis for everything we know."[12] I only wish that I could take heart in Newsome's call for professional "responsibility" and believe that his "standards of practice" would lead to those depths. But I don't. Instead I believe it will only drive "responsible" professional educators to work harder to make the empirical connection between teaching and learning, the connection which Newsome now finds so lacking.

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1. George L. Newsome, "Teacher Accountability and Student Learning," SAPES Proceedings, 1988.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. David K. Cohen, in "Teaching Practice: Plus Que Ca Change . . .," Contributing to Educational Change. Phillip W. Jackson, editor (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Computation, 1988), 68.
5. Ibid., 68.
6. Ibid., 61.
7. Ibid., 78.
8. John L. Goodlad, A Place Called School (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1984), 108.
9. Ibid., 234.
10. Donald W. Thomas, "About Teaching and Teachers," Harvard Educational Review Vol. 55 No. 2 (May 1985): 220.
11. Ibid., 222.
12. Ibid.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE ISSUE OF NEUTRALITY AND ITS RELATION TO TEACHING THINKING

John J. Furlong
William J. Carroll

1. You are a social science teacher in a public high school. You are also a committed Roman Catholic and believe passionately that abortion is morally wrong. This very issue is raised in class and is being hotly debated. You try to be neutral, making sure that all sides are heard, and no side is favored, but toward the end of the discussion, you are disturbed: should you tell them the truth, as you see it, or should you stay neutral and let them make up their own minds?

2. You are teaching history in a Community College. In treating the second world war, you find that you have two members of the American Nazi Party in your class. "We want to tell our side of the story," they say. You want to be fair, but on the other hand, you don't want to condone nazism. What should you do?

3. You are teaching a literature course at Bloomsend University. You are discussing Sophocles' **Antigone**, and you raise the question: who is in the wrong here: Creon, the advocate of law or Antigone, the exemplar of family love? Most of the students look blank. "Frankly, Professor," one especially precocious student begins, "I don't think we know what you're talking about. You see, most of us think its not proper to question the ethics of other people unless they bother us." Your first instinct is to show that there are such things as transpersonal values, but you stop yourself. Aren't you supposed to remain neutral on ethical matters, and is this not an ethical matter? So if you do begin to enlighten this student, shouldn't your motive be to have the student think more deeply rather than to change her mind? Or does her change of mind automatically occur as a result of her thinking more deeply?

. . . .

All three of these incidents invoke the problem of remaining neutral about ethical issues in the classroom. By neutrality here we mean the practice of taking no position on an issue or issues, for some significant period of time.[1] Certainly the classroom is not the only place in which neutrality is practiced, not even for a teacher, but it is paradigmatic. Our intent in this paper is to pursue the issue of neutrality as it appears in this paradigmatic context with the hope of offering to thoughtful teachers a brief philosophical analysis of what neutrality involves and an application of the fruits of this analysis to the three incidents described above.

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The brevity of this presentation constrains us in three ways: 1)there is far more to be said about the philosophical issues, especially those of relativism, the kinds of education, and the lessons for a reflective culture that Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum find in ancient literature (see below); 2) a more detailed examination of what teachers should know about good reasoning is needed; and 3) the application of our distinctions to other significantly different issues that arise in the classroom should be made. Although we have contributed to the discussion of 1) and 2) elsewhere,[2] and on 3)there are excellent examples around-- those of Richard Paul and Matthew Lipman pre-eminent among them--we believe that the central issues surrounding neutrality remain unexplored. One can view this paper, then, as an exercise in cartography, a mapping of where the issues lie and what the landmarks are in this too seldom visited terrain.

We will limit our discussion to the practice of neutrality in high school and college and university classrooms, because the teaching of younger students presents quite different problems. As Plato says "at this tender age, they are most impressionable and are therefore most likely to adopt any and all models set before them."(377b)[3] Children's education should consist, then, in learning unequivocally and unambiguously that some things are right and wrong, although, even in early grades some neutrality is advisable.[4] We note here, too, that our discussion is limited to classroom practice. If a student actively seeks a teacher's advice outside the classroom, neutrality should still be engaged, but the situation is different enough from the classroom to warrant separate consideration.

The practice of neutrality in the context of ethics has an ancient lineage. Sextus Empiricus and other early skeptics and cynics practiced **epoche**, the bracketing of belief about right and wrong.[5] But the very mention of skepticism should make us wary about saying anything very general about neutrality without making careful distinctions. For instance, neutrality can be practiced as an **áskesis**, as the skeptics did it, and, quite separately, as a **téchne**, a cognitive tool, as it were. (Formally speaking, this might be a way of looking at Descartes' method of doubt.) In other words, one can make a faith of neutrality, of not advocating or believing in anything **because** one thinks there is no truth or certainty. This would be the skeptic's stance, and, with certain very important qualifications, the stance of those young relativists whose souls Allan Bloom mourns in **The Closing of the American Mind.**[6]

The second type of neutrality is instrumental, not ideological. The crucial difference between this stance and skepticism is that one does not commit himself or herself[7] to an ideology; one just uses the technique of neutrality as a means to an end. In fact, this instrumental use has become a useful tool in the arsenal of teaching thinking. Recent studies in creative thinking, for instance, have shown that the longer one "brackets" believing or deciding the better thinking one does.[8] Also, in classroom practice, a teacher might want to withhold some bit of information in order to have students find it for themselves. In fact, thanks to interest in critical thinking, there are any number of efficacious tactics for holding off closure,[9] and all are instances of instrumental neutrality. The Instrumental Neutralist, then, should plot his historical origins from Descartes' methodical doubt, perhaps, not from Sextus Empiricus' **époché**.

This type of neutrality, however, is not what is at stake in ethical discourse. For one thing, instrumental neutrality is designed to open rich intellective space between the posing of a problem and the decision on a solution. Instrumental neutrality is, to use the current taxonomy, a tactic that develops certain critical thinking **skills**, where the functional term here refers to an activity that is engaged in as a means to achieve a goal.[10] However, if the goal is to develop students with good intellectual skills, then instrumental neutrality is too thin a concept to help us answer the questions in our opening trilogy. Applied to ethical issues instrumental neutrality undermines any advice we could give. Stocked only with cognitive tools we might produce adolescent sophists, moral technocrats, young ciphers who are prepared at the drop of a challenge to justify themselves expertly but who have no depth of understanding and no moral vision.

Well, is there a **tertium quid**, a middle ground between making young skeptics and turning out post-cartesian ciphers? Put in this way, the issue of neutrality in ethics takes on an ironic twist. For between skepticism and amorality there lie the various forms of morality, and neutrality lies in between these. Instead of being a term denoting impartiality in moral contexts-- as it is usually presented-- neutrality appears as some part of a moral position.

In some societies,then, if we are correct, being neutral will be the right thing to do at certain prescribed times--and advocacy will be wrong. It should surprise no one that such a polity will put a high price on free inquiry and rational discourse. Bernard Williams calls this type of society--ours-- "critical reflective" or just "reflective."[11] He contrasts this society with the "hypertraditional" which is "maximally homogeneous and minimally given to general reflection."[12] Critical reflective societies as we know them, born in the Enlightenment and baptized in revolutions, self-consciously plan and revise their ethical practices in the light of the general principles of equality, freedom, and the guidance of reason.[13] Such societies have been severely criticized in this century by marxists and others for well-known excesses, but, naturally, these criticisms themselves have become part of the ongoing discussion about how best to put reflective principles into practice.[14] Critical reflective societies live in the constant tension of debate about what practices are good; hypertraditional societies view reflection--rightly, to a great extent--as destructive of their "thick" ethical imperatives. In nonreflective societies, detailed maxims, stories, rules and incidents will be passed down to the young as moral knowledge, cultural treasures. A critical reflective society, on the other hand, will pass down maxims, etc., with the injunction that, in addition to being revered (or, perhaps, because they are revered in the right way), they must constantly be tested against new events, revised and re-invigorated, and, finally, re-appropriated. The key cognitive skill for moral education in a hypertraditional society would be rote memory; in the critical reflective, it is memory motivated, maintained, and guided by critical thinking.

Not everybody has gotten the word that we are living in reflective times. There are religious traditions and political ideologies that employ "thick" concepts yet they, whether happily or not, become part of the ongoing reflection. Our polity is pluralistic, and it is a truth of our Founding that no person may impose his or her "thick" doctrine on another. Hence, the political motivation of neutrality for teachers: if one is Muslim, Catholic, or Atheist, and teaching in a public school, these beliefs are one's own choice alone. The result of this liberal policy is the chaos one might expect when, to use the famous metaphor of Otto Neurath, we are trying to replace all the boards on the ship while still at sea. A much better result could be the opportunity, rarely capitalized upon, of developing thoughtful, fairminded, citizens by educating them in moral reasoning.

It is difficult to see at first how this position will insulate us from the charge that reflective polities, free of universally accepted "thick" beliefs, would inevitably produce young sophists, rampant post-pubescent relativists. We must remember, however, that reflective societies embed a moral point of view--a respect for truth and reason, a respect for persons and certain institutions, etc., so that training ought not to be tied to reasoning technique alone. Richard Paul's excellent work has made this point crucial. He distinguishes between critical thinking in the weak sense, where teachers accent the craft of good reasoning, and critical thinking in the strong sense, where, in imparting the craft, the teacher accents the reasons for being thoughtful.[15] In strong sense thinking instruction, the ethical dimensions of thinking are treated explicitly. It is here that neutrality finds its natural home, serving two functions. The first is Socratic, or, more exactly, **maiutic**,: one remains neutral in moral discussions in order to allow students to think issues through for themselves, to make clear distinctions, to offer stronger reasons, to present more cogent appraisals of others' reasoning, etc. Socratic **psychagogia** requires neutrality to draw out elaborate thinking from erstwhile diffident students. Without the second function, however, the "socratic method" could degenerate into courtroom antics just as surely as could the teaching of thinking skills alone. In this second function, the teacher, in being neutral, is "modelling" a thoughtful approach to moral issues. The teacher says by his or her behavior that withholding judgment until all the facts are in, pondering alternative imperatives, examining one's own visceral reaction as one among several options, are worthwhile attitudes to cultivate. Such classroom practice is the compliment neutrality pays to fairmindedness. Neutrality is the symptom of reflective virtue.

Presumably, however, this reflective ethical framework must be taught, so we still have the problem of when to practice neutrality and when to advocate a principle consistent with that system which requires neutrality. How does one teach values in a reflective society? Is Bloom correct and does a reflective, pluralistic society produce nice but ignoble youths?

We first need to resolve a potential problem. We have been speaking of moral rules, values, principles, etc., loosely. Yet now it is important to distinguish what it is up to teachers to impart. For our purposes we distinguish moral principles (such as promise-keeping, honesty,beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, etc.) from moral maxims (never lie to your teacher) and practices (liars are punished), and what we might call ethical incidents (Should I lie if, in doing so, I save my teacher's life?). Moral principles may be debated, but, as a rule, these will be accepted in general by a moral community and will be the presupposition of a certain moral character.[16] Hence, it is, as a rule, dishonest to pretend to be neutral about them.[17] Moral maxims are usually innocuous enough unless there is a particular ethical practice or incident to which it applies. Hence, the only elements of ethical discussion in which, normally, a teacher would be engaged would be about those practices or incidents in which we find the wrong principle applied, many principles clashing, no principle applicable, or an applicable principle yielding a number of incommensurable pieces of advice. The range for the application of neutrality is therefore narrower than we might expect.[18]

We can narrow the application still further by distinguishing among three kinds of pedagogy about morality. First there is what we will call Brainwashing, in which the aim is to 1)inculcate specific principles, 2)force belief in specific applications of those principles to practices and incidents, and 3) maintain the consistent application of these rules by supplanting independent judgment. We are not sure that Brainwashing is ever permissible in a reflective society, since independent judgment is over-ridden. (But one can produce some compelling counter-examples from the annals of criminal justice and mental illness.) Indoctrination, the second, aims at 1) and 2) but rejects 3). I may want to be indoctrinated in a particular life and accept its discipline while maintaining my free judgment. Hence, one may choose to be a monk, an Army private, or an Amish matron, and , though one might not at first, see the point of many of the rules, he or she will accept them for the sake of the goal. We claim that indoctrination is not a bad idea for very young children; they are being initiated into the reflective community and must learn not only general principles, but maxims and practices.[19] In neither of these conditions is neutrality very appropriate except as an instrument.

Now we come to a third kind of moral pedagogy which we might call Education and which one must practice with High School and Higher Education students. The Educator needs to keep only 1) in mind. He or she might view the teacher's role in the same way that R.M. Hare suggests all moral education should be viewed-- as a sort of Drivers Ed. You can't show a student what to do in every circumstance, but you can show him or her how to "drive" their lives by reasoning with general principles.[20] Here neutrality will not only have an instrumental role. The teacher will want to be neutral **in order to** 1) show how neutrality works in moral decision making and 2) leave the student free to explore his own reasoning and intuitions.[21]

How do these distinctions help us solve the quandaries we began with? Let us take up the abortion issue first. Here the teacher is passionately committed to a position, meaning for him that, among other things, if a person pursues the opposite course, then he or she is acting immorally. In this situation the temptation to Indoctrinate would be strong. It should be resisted, we believe, because an impassioned plea from the teacher, or, worse, tight-lipped disdain, would interdict any reasoned consideration of the principles contending for dominance. After careful and reasoned consideration--examining reasons, clarifying positions, making qualifications, etc.--an honest statement of advocacy would be in order. "To be truthful, students, I myself am against abortion for those reasons we have examined. Good and reasonable people disagree on this matter, but that is how I see it." No proselytizing, no rhetoric: just an honest stating of position. **Qua** teacher, a person is an agent of reflective culture, even if his or her own moral intuitions might be "thicker."

But that response seems to put us in a bad position to answer the neonazis, for we seem to be saying that there is no place for strong advocacy.[22] But there are differences in the two problems. First of all, we might point out that nazism is radically hypertraditional, exclusive and antirational, opposing reflective principles, whereas many abortion advocates are not; hence, the ethical code surrounding reflection is violated in the one case and not in the other: those principles out of which neutrality gets its validity are in peril. This might be pointed out in class without Indoctrinating. But, to be perfectly fair, should you give time to the neonazis to have their say? There is no reason to absolve the neonazi from having to go about making a case, so as long as the students obey the rules of argumentation and cooperative inquiry--including neutrality. Let them display their argument. It will very likely be unconvincing, but even if they make a good run of it, there is always the inconsistency that they deny the value of free inquiry, or at least lessen its status. Again, as an agent of the reflective polity, the teacher should point this out.

As to the third problem, it should be clear now that the teacher should point out the problems with the student's Protagoreanism. Neutrality does not imply relativism; it is not a value in itself. It is tied to a moral viewpoint that requires defending and is not, in any simple way, relativistic. (Nor is our position aseptically objectivist, a reprise of the often discredited Enlightenment view of ethics, driven by rationality from the bottom up. We have not argued this point in any detail, nor will we be able to. We content ourselves to point out that Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum, two thinkers who have influenced our own positions greatly, have urged recently that it might be possible to be reflective without reduction or without degenerating into what Williams calls "vulgar" relativism.) This is a position that, as we mentioned at the beginning, will have to be pursued in some detail later.

It is obvious that we are asking a lot of teachers, and there is little doubt that current schools of education give very little, if any, training in informal reasoning, let alone reasoning about moral issues. And if the teacher is not comfortable and adept at reasoning, neutrality will probably be abused in both directions. For the opinionated, neutrality will scarcely ever be used, and for the diffident, it will be a secure hiding place. We hope that as teachers are trained in critical thinking in the "weak" sense, they will also receive serious training in the "strong." This is a major objective of the Coppin-Hopkins Humanities Program in the Baltimore City Schools, a program which we introduced in the **Forum** last year.[23] But there are also the groundbreaking efforts of the Philosophy for Children Program and

Richard Paul's Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique. We still lack, however, a national priority. We hope that discussions of neutrality and its importance will contribute in some small way to the development of such a priority.

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1. In this paper, we assume the possibility of neutrality and go on to examine problems arising **because** it is possible. Further distinctions would need to be made in defining neutrality if one examines its possibility. For a thoughtful discussion of such distinctions see Robert Ennis "Is it Impossible for the Schools to be Neutral?" in B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis, **Language and Concepts in Education**. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company), 1961.

2. See John Furlong, "Rationality and Cognitive Science: Bats, Vats and Black Cats," paper delivered at the Towson State University Annual Philosophy Colloquium, April 9, 1987; also, Leo J. Sweeney, William J. Carroll and John Furlong, **Authentic Metaphysics in an Age of Unreality** (New York: Lang, 1988), Chapter 11.

3. **Republic,** R.W. Sterling and W.C. Scott translators (New York: Norton, 1986).

4. The remarkably successful Philosophy For Children Program provides ample proof that very young students can be taught to think clearly about moral issues while being taught to employ neutrality judiciously.

5. See especially Sextus Empiricus' **Outlines of Pyrrhonism:** "Accordingly, the Sceptic ... suspends judgement [**epekei**] as to the natural existence of good or bad or (in general) fit or unfit to be done, therein abstaining from the rashness of dogmatism." III, 235. (translated by R. G. Bury in Loeb Classic Series, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 483).

6. Allan Bloom, **The Closing of the American Mind**. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

7. In the Unmarked Pronoun Dispute, we follow the lead of Martha Nussbaum. See **The Fragility of Goodness**. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

8. See Jacob Getzels and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, **The Creative Vision: A Longitudinal Study of Problem Finding in Art**. (New York: John Wiley, 1976).

9. For complete summaries of this research see the volumes of **The Research Into Practice Digest** from 1985 to the present, published by Joanne Capper, Center for Research Into Practice, 1718 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009. For an unusually innovative application of these principles, see the article by Jay McTighe and Frank Lyman in **Educational Research** (April, 1988), 18-24.

10. See Robert J. Marzano, **et. al.**, **Dimensions of Thinking: A Framework**

for Curriculum and Instruction. (Alexandria, Va.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1988), p.69.

11. See his **Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) especially Chapters 6-8.

12. **Ibid.,** p. 142.

13. See Michael D. Bayles, "Values of a Liberal Society" in Chapter I, **Professional Ethics** (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1981), pp.5-7. Also his **Principles of Legislation: The Uses of Political Authority** (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978).

14. This observation does not quite work with the criticisms of Alasdair MacIntyre (**After Virtue** [Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1981; **Whose Justice? Which Rationality?** [London: Duckworth, 1988]). But see Thomas Nagel's criticisms in the **Times Literary Supplement**, July 8-14, 1988, pp. 747-748. Also. see Bernard William's review in **The London Review of Books**, January 5, 1989, pp. 5-6.

15. See Richard Paul, **inter alia,** "Ethics without Indoctrination," **Educational Leadership**, May, 1988. Paul's emphasis on the eradication of ethnocentricity should always be placed within the reflective moral climate, as he insists; otherwise, it is likely to be mistaken for advocacy of an anti-American position, a mistake that is grossly unfair to Paul.

16. See Edmund Pincoffs' discussion in **Quandaries and Virtues.** (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986), pp. 141-149. That there is some consensus on moral character--a surprising amount, in fact--one might want to consult the **Report of the State of Maryland Values Education Commission** (Baltimore: Maryland State Department of Education, 1979).

17. There is a seeming conflict between honesty and our posture of neutrality. If I passionately hold X to be true, and the debate is over X or not-X, am I not being dishonest by acting as if there is a question at issue here? Two points will clear this up. First, we see no violation of neutrality in honestly telling students where you stand and why as long as you offer this as a reasoned option and that other reasonable people disagree with you. There is no reason why your advocacy should cut off the reasoning process of students, and there is every reason to think that your honestly taking a position will disperse the impression that the ethical debate is only a game. Second, in a reflective culture there are very few moral maxims that are either not implied by reflection (and are therefore not able to be questioned without inconsistency) or are not in some way truly aporetic. In short, there will be relatively few cases in which one would feel impelled by the truth of a moral claim to advocate it strongly as a clear winner above other competing positions. Abortion may be one of those cases, since one side argues that the practice is tantamount to murder, but would a reflective person feel the same urgency about violations of confidentiality to save innocent victims, legalizing drugs, giving sterilized needles to drug addicts and teaching sex education in the schools? In these extremely complicated cases, where generally accepted

moral principles are in conflict, and in many more, it is difficult to see how a reflective person would be tempted to indoctrinate. Our thanks to Ms. Karen Muller, a participant in our Coppin-Hopkins Humanities Program in the Baltimore City Schools, for pointing out to us this difficulty with honesty and neutrality.

18. One might, for the purposes of exploring the meaning and applicable range of an ethical principle, play the "devil's advocate" and question the validity of, say, autonomy. This local instrumental neutrality has a special pedagogical purpose very similar to Cartesian methodological doubt. One stays neutral on autonomy only for the purpose of getting clear about its nature. This is what we might call benign instrumental neutrality.

19. We therefore ascribe, generally, to the analysis Edmund Pincoffs gives Indoctrination in his **Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics,** Chapter 8, except that our further distinction between Brainwashing and Indoctrination makes the concept even more innocuous.

20. R.M. Hare, **The Language of Morals**. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), Chapter 4.

21. Hare imposes a very strong qualification on what we are calling Education: "Indoctrination only begins when we are trying to stop the growth in our children of the capacity to think for themselves about moral questions. If all the time that we are influencing them, we are saying to ourselves, 'perhaps in the end they will decide that the best way to live is quite different from what I am teaching them; and they will have a perfect right to decide that,' then we are not to be accused of indoctrinating." See "Adolescents into Adults," in **Aims in Education**. ed. T.H.B. Hollins (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), p.52. We agree with Hare as long as the quite different way chosen by our young is clearly and rigorously thought out and not elected out of coercion, **akrasia**, or the attempt to be "nice" in the Bloomian sense.

22. An interesting treatment of this question that takes a different view from ours is the videotape presentation "Advocating Neutrality" by Linda Bomstad and Harry Brod, Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique: Rohnert Park, Ca. 94928.

23. John Furlong and William Carroll, "Teaching Moral Reasoning," in **The Educational Forum**, Summer, 1988, pp. 363-373.

Is Ethical Neutrality Possible In Educational Contexts?

(Response to Professors Furlong and Carroll)

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John Furlong and William Carroll present their paper "as an exercise in cartography, a mapping of where the issues lie and what the landmarks are in this too seldom visited terrain." While I am doubtful that "the central issues surrounding neutrality remain unexplored" as they contend, I think that they have made a contribution to the discussion by bringing to bear several important distinctions on the topic. With good pedagogical sense, they introduce us to three paradigmatic situations involving teacher neutrality concerns. After identifying and explaining distinctions important to their view, most notably the distinction between "thick" and "thin" theories of critical reflection, Furlong and Carroll return to the original situations to see what clarity has been brought to the dilemmas. The linguistic return illustrates both the strengths and the weaknesses of their position.

Furlong and Carroll announced their role as cartographers, but as one more closely reads the map, it is evident that they have prepared a AAA Triptik for us! The route is only lightly highlighted to be sure, but it makes several contentious assumptions about the origin of the trip, the destination, and the preferences (values) of the travelers. At the conclusion of their analysis, they overlay the original dilemmas with the cartogrphic Triptik. The prescribed resolution of dilemmas 1 and 2 are plausible and defensible, I think, but for reasons other than those suggested by Professors Furlong and Carroll. It is the problematic suggestion for the resolution of dilemma 3 which reveals the incompleteness of their analysis, i.e., the question-begging assumptions controlling the highlighting of our prescribed journey.

Let me identify three of the more important assumptions which I do not think work well together in resolving the paradigmatic situations. First, Professors Furlong and Carroll, following the lead of Bernard Williams, assume that our present society is a "critical reflective" one. Critical reflective societies pass down maxims with the injunction that the maxims "must constantly be tested against new events, revised and re-invigorated, and, finally, reappropriated." Professors Furlong and Carroll move beyond accepting a description of critical reflection being a characteristic of society to it becoming a normative concept. For they lament that, "Not everybody has gotten the word that we are living in reflective times."

Secondly, Professors Furlong and Carroll assume that even in a critically reflective society moral principles, certain moral values (such as promise-keeping, honesty, beneficence, etc.) "will be accepted in general by a moral community and will be the presuppostion of a certain moral character."

And thirdly, by way of a footnote, they "assume the possibility of neutrality and go on to examine problems arising because it is possible."

These assumptions, along with other distinctions and an elaboration of a "thick theory" of critical reflection, work to suggest a theory of moral education and provide guidance for resolving paradigmatic situations involving teacher neutrality. Moral education would be the "opportunity, rarely capitalized upon, of developing thoughtful, fairminded citizens by educating them in moral reasoning."

This lightly-sketched theory developed within the context of an analysis of critical relection serves as the map for understanding the dilemmas. For reasons of brevity, I will not contest the application to cases 1 and 2, which seem to me to be fairly adequate, at least for prudential reasons. But let me direct attention to case 3, where Professors Furlong and Carroll recommend that the "teacher should point out the problems with the student's Protagoreanism" because "neutrality does not imply relativism ..." This sound pretty prescriptive for our descriptive cartographers! And ironically, the advice is proposed as an implication of a strong, "thick" theory of teacher neutrality. What went wrong? The answer, I believe, is with the assumptions previously identified.

With the authors, I agree that we are in a post-modern era. An era, at least in part, characterized by doubt in the rationally-constructed foundations of morality and science. Unlike Professors Furlong and Carroll, I am suspect of characterizing critical reflection as the descriptive model for our social discourse. I am even more suspect of this admitted step-child of the Enlightenment being an adequate normative model for guiding moral education. It is one model/paradigm competing with others, not the all encompassing model. The moral values implicit in a "thick" theory of critical reflection are among those contested, along with other moral principles mentioned by them, such as non-maleficence, honesty, etc.

Within my contrary view, teacher neutrality (where moral values are significantly embedded in the subject matter) is not a possibility. Neutrality in a very restricted sense, done within the context of assuming very contentious moral positions, is possible ('a la Furlong and Carroll) but it produces a steady stream of anomalies - i.e., espousing a strong theory of neutrality yet pointing out the difficulties with Protagoreanism, a religiously fundamentalistic view on ethics, gender ethics, etc.

No, the proper move, I think, is for the instructor: to acknowledge that neutrality about the truly significant metal-ethical positions is not possible, structure the treatment of the issues in academically-responsible and course-appropriate manner, express to students their moral positions in the least paternalistic way, provide instruction consistent with their stated positions, allow students to express diverging views, test understanding and not the adoption of certain moral positions, and where appropriate allow them to indicate diverse views on tests.

And by the way, one of those desirable routes (and perhaps a preferred route) on the Triptik would be Professor Furlong's and Carroll's (with the caveats stated above). Teaching a "thick" theory of moral reasoning (with certain moral positions embedded in the notion of "moral reasoning") and using classical texts, it seems to me to be one excellent approach, but not the only way to get to Spartanburg from Coppin State!

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

PHILOSOPHY IN TEACHING

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It has been apparent for some time now that philosophers of education are an endangered species. Enrollment in graduate courses has decreased, as has membership in professional societies; and jobs have become scarce as faculty positions have been either discontinued or combined with other positions more directly related to classroom practice. Teacher-certification courses devoted entirely to philosophy of education seem increasingly to be giving way to foundations courses that attempt to cover the waterfront, and the philosophy of education that does find its way into such courses often meets with benign indifference if not outright skepticism on the part of students. In other words, our efforts are widely viewed as irrelevant despite the fact that most educational problems and issues, including those questions relating to teaching strategies, lead eventually to philosophical considerations. Accordingly, this paper seeks in section one to demonstrate the value of philosophy for teachers; and in section two to indicate some of the reasons for our apparent inability to convince teachers of that value. In section two we shall also speculate a bit about the likelihood of educational philosophy becoming more relevant to practitioners in the foreseeable future.

I.

It is tempting and surely at least partly correct to attribute the decline in importance of philosophy of education these days to the prevailing emphasis on competency--based teacher education, which is designed to produce teachers adept at devising observable, measurable "performance objectives" and who may be held accountable for quantifiable, "effective learning," verified ideally through standardized testing. This more or less scientific and technical approach to instruction, with its positivistic and behavioristic overtones, tends at best to be indifferent to the philosophical aspects of the teaching-learning process and somewhat less than hospitable to the "interpretive, normative, and critical perspectives" that the Philosophy of Education Society and other learned societies in education consider essential to teacher education.

But I do not, of course, wish to imply that the plight of our discipline can be blamed solely on the positivists and the behaviorists. Much of our difficulty stems from the fact that we have created a sizable credibility gap for ourselves. Indeed, it is probably not inaccurate to say that teachers and school administrators find most philosophy of education to be largely irrelevant to their everyday concerns. Thomas Green is undoubtedly correct in suggesting, in this connection, that it simply would not occur to most educational policy makers that philosophy might contribute something truly meaningful to their deliberations.[1] Thus, Harry Broudy is moved to complain that philosophy of education is "too far removed from the particulars of everyday professional practice," and that educators "have a right to expect that philosophers of education will address themselves to problems of education in general and how these problems impinge on schooling."[2] Similarly, Jonas Soltis claims that educational philosophers should "provide a core of philosophical perspective on

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education that is judged by all to be basic and minimally essential in the preservice education of educators.[3]

Now at first glance at least, such declarations seem perfectly reasonable and proper, since a strong case can be made for the proposition that not only is philosophy an important guide to educational practice, but that educational practitioners--particularly teachers--whether they are fully aware of it or not, are constantly making philosophical judgments in their everyday professional activities. The teacher, in other words, whatever other hats he or she may wear, functions at least part of the time as a philosopher. As Max Black has observed with regard to this point,

> all serious discussion of educational problems, no matter how specific, soon leads to consideration of educational aims, and becomes a conversation about the good life, the nature of man, the varieties of experience. But these are the perennial themes of philosophical investigation. It might seem a hard thing to expect educators to be philosophers. But can they be anything else?[4]

The relationship between philosophy and education is nowhere more evident than in the making of value judgments with regard to educational policy and practice. Education, after all, is a purposive activity, one in which normative considerations are paramount. What we consider "good" or "bad," "right" or "wrong," "important" or "unimportant" constantly guides our practice, whether consciously or not. "Education," according to R. S. Peters,

> implies that something worth while is being or has been intentionally transmitted in a morally acceptable manner. It would be a logical contradiction to say that a man had been educated but that he had in no way changed for the better, or that in educating his son a man was attempting nothing that was worth while.[5]

Elsewhere, Peters suggests that the very meaning of the concept "education" entails connotations of moral uplift. "It would be as much of a logical contradiction," he argues, "to say that a person had been educated and yet the change was in no way desirable as it would be to say that he had been reformed and yet had made no change for the better."[6]

As John L. Childs observes, in this connection, "deliberate education is never morally neutral."[7] Surely Childs is correct. Since teachers cannot avoid imparting values in one way or another in the normal course of their activities qua teachers (a fact that seems to have escaped the notice of "value clarification" proponents), the real question is not whether, but how moral education should be carried on. As Childs argues,

> the moral factor enters whenever and wherever significant decisions have to be made about either the organization, the administration, or the instructional program of the school. All of these decisions, whether they relate to curriculum or to extra-curriculum affairs, exert an influence on the attitudes and the behaviors of the young.[8]

But of course moral education is just one, though perhaps the most obvious, illustration of the relationship between ethics and education. Indeed, as the above quotation from Childs implies, value judgments are an integral part of decisions affecting the curriculum, extracurricular activities, school regulations, grading, school-wide assemblies, and school-community relationships. Or as Peters puts it:

> There are assumptions about the aims of education and about worthwhile content which require justification. There are also assumptions about the desirability of the procedures by means of which this is to be transmitted. . . . Problems of procedure raise issues to do with liberty, equality, authority, and punishment. What is meant by these terms? How are the underlying principles to be justified?[9]

In other words, since schools are expected to achieve social purposes while they educate, ethical concepts come into play at the boundaries between social philosophy and educational policy, where issues such as equality of opportunity, integration, local control, and parent, teacher and student rights are debated. Disputes over public policy that affect our schools always entail certain assumptions about the meaning of concepts such as "justice," "equality," and "freedom" along with the economic, political, and psychological factors that usually receive more attention in the media. The social values are always operative at lease implicitly; perhaps the plane of the discussions would be elevated somewhat if those relevant values were better understood and more carefully considered.

One could go on in this vein, pointing to examples of how value judgments influence the educational process in ways ranging from the basic learning climate of the classroom (stretching from permissive to authoritarian, for example) to the everyday tasks of selecting teaching materials or grading essays. Perhaps enough has been said, however, to make the point that ethical or value judgments permeate the very fabric of the educational process. It seems, therefore, not unreasonable to expect teachers to have some understanding of the nature of these judgments, the linguistic functions they perform, how, or whether, they can be justified, and so forth. There is little consensus among moral philosophers on these issues, to be sure, but teachers need to resolve them to their own satisfaction, nonetheless, in order to provide a consistent rationale for their professional judgments.

In any event, the justification issue invites the question, "How do you know?" which leads directly to epistemology, where yet more questions of central importance to education arise: What is knowledge? How is it structured in the various disciplines? How does it differ from belief? What are the criteria for distinguishing between knowledge and belief? What counts as proof? How does the structure and function of an explanation differ from one subject-matter field to another? Is there such a thing as certainty? What knowledge is most important? (Here we have an evaluative question that leads right back into ethics.) What methodologies ought to be employed in the search for knowledge? How does knowledge arise? How is knowledge best disseminated? How does the range of terms such as "knowledge" and "belief" compare with that of "learning" and "teaching," and how are the latter logically related to terms such as "understanding" and "appreciation"?[10] And finally, what are the implications of all of this for the teaching-learning process? In view of the fact that the discovery and dissemination of knowledge is to a considerable extent what education is all about, it strikes me as odd that our teacher-training colleagues, do not, as a rule, expect teachers and other practitioners to be conversant with such matters.

Questions such as those just enumerated lead in turn not only to pedagogy and learning theory (i.e., educational psychology) but ultimately to metaphysical issues relating to human nature, including the nature of mind. That learning theories draw heavily from psychology is obvious. Often overlooked, however, is the fact that the sharp differences often discernible between schools of psychology are traceable to their underlying epistemological and metaphysical assumptions. And those assumptions explain much of the diversity manifested not only in various psychological points of view, but in a variety of instructional strategies as well. Although most psychologists would prefer to be regarded as behavioral scientists, it is clear that the metaphysical baggage they carry influences the facts they select from the data pool available to all of them. In other words, psychologists disagree not so much at the empirical level as on what they cannot observe; and it is that deeper, more profound, set of differences that explains how two such distinguished psychologists as Carl Rogers and B. F. Skinner, for example, can be positioned 180 degrees apart with regard to their psychological outlooks, learning theories, and prescriptions for instruction.

The nature of mind itself raises a host of metaphysical questions with educational import: Is the mind a substantive entity, every bit as real, despite its immateriality, as the body, or is it, as John Locke suggested, a tabula rasa or blank slate, upon which experience leaves its mark? Alternatively, should the mind be thought of not as a thing, but rather as a mode of behavior or a set of evolving abilities and capacities for coping with a problematic environment? Or to consider yet another possibility, perhaps we should dispense with the notion of "mind" altogether and following Skinner, et al. simply conclude that belief in the existence of the mind is a relic of unsophisticated, prescientific thinking. Historically, as we all know, adherents to these four positions (and there is of course no intention to imply comprehensiveness here) have found their metaphysical views to be compatible with rationalist, empiricist, pragmatist and behaviorist theories of knowledge, respectively; and each of those epistemologies have in turn suggested certain models for the teaching-learning process.[11] None of those models will provide a ready-made method for dealing with a classroom full of high-spirited adolescents on Thursday morning, to be sure, but they can contribute to a teacher's capacity to provide a theoretical rationale for her curricular and methodological decisions; and it is that particular capacity, more than any other, perhaps, that distinguishes a professional in a given field from a mere rule-following technician, regardless of how competent the technician may be.

Conceptions of human nature are also clearly relevant to problems relating to classroom management. Teachers who share with A. S. Neill and Rousseau a rather optimistic view of human nature,[12] for instance, may be inclined to conduct a relatively permissive classroom, whereas those who agree with Kant's contention that in order to establish a proper learning environment, the teacher must first take steps to eradicate the pupil's natural unruliness,[13] may well opt for somewhat stricter controls. It is interesting to note, by the way, that while many contemporary psychologists have tended to view basic human impulses in a more or less favorable, or at least neutral light, their psychoanalytic cousins have often drawn a considerably more pessimistic portrait. Consider, for example, the views of Freud's biographer, Ernest Jones, who argues that were it not for the meliorative effects of education in the broad sense of the term, the child "would remain a jealous, impulsive, aggressive, dirty, immodest, cruel, egocentric, and conceited animal, inconsiderate of the needs of others, and unmindful of the complicated social and ethical standards that go to make a civilized society."[14]

Well! Do you suppose it is safe to infer an educational implication or two in that appraisal? Can there be any doubt that a teacher who shares Jones's views on human nature would differ substantially in his approach to school discipline from one who agrees with Neill? Thus here again, considerations basic to philosophical psychology clearly impact on educational issues, all of which lends credence to James McClellan's observation that educational philosophers "cannot escape issues of metaphysics-cum-epistemology."[15]

The problem from a teacher's point of view, of course, is that many philosophers do manage to sidestep, if not escape, such considerations, whereas the teacher really cannot avoid them. In part, the problem stems from differences in motivation; that is, the thoughtful teacher wants to develop a philosophy of education, while the educational philosopher wants to contribute to the philosophy of education, which for many translates into doing analysis to the exclusion of alternative approaches.

II.

Not so very long ago, as late as the progressive era in education, as a matter of fact, the ties between a philosophy of education and the philosophy of education seemed closer, and one might not have been so hard pressed to make a case for the relevance of philosophy for educational practice. The progressives, as well as their reconstructionist allies and their essentialist and perennialist opponents, were quite comfortable in offering prescriptions for educational means and ends based on their convictions about how individuals and societies should live their lives. In those days it was widely assumed that implications for education could be gleaned from the various "isms"--idealism, realism, pragmatism, existentialism, etc.--and that philosophy could therefore serve as a guide to the establishment of educational aims and policy.

But as we are all well aware, the attempt to deduce educational implications from philosophical positions, and for that matter the very notion that philosophy should prescribe for education, fell into disrepute after World War II, when significant numbers of educational philosophers, trained in the parent discipline, began to eschew the speculative and normative functions of philosophy in favor of a restrictive analytical emphasis. To those not particularly enamored of the analytic approach to philosophy, it was precisely at this point that philosophy of education, heavily influenced by developments in general philosophy, took the wrong turn in the road, becoming increasingly preoccupied with esoteric, technical questions that were at best indirectly related to the everyday concerns of teachers and school administrators, and thereby confirmed practitioners' suspicions that contemporary philosophy of education had little to do with the real world. "Analysis," said Van Cleve Morris, "is seen as a me-too reflex by educational philosophers who want to be like Big Brother in the philosophy department. It is seen as sophistry, merely technical cleverness, maybe even downright dishonest. It is put down as irrelevant to the study of education. . . ."[16] The "me-too reflex" was a derivation of the term "me-too-ism" employed by Richard Pratte in recounting Philip G. Smith's criticism of analytic philosophy of education.[17] "After a quarter of a century," Smith had complained, "I have grown weary of this pathetic compulsion to attain academic respectability by imitating recent trends in general philosophy."[18]

But would it have been realistic to suppose that the generation of leading educational philosophers who came of age in the 1950s and '60s, trained in academic philosophy as most of them were, should or could have resisted the sea change that had occurred in the parent discipline during the Twentieth Century? After all, the virtual abandonment of speculative and normative philosophy in favor of a nearly exclusive concentration on analysis did not just happen willy-nilly. Rather, it was the culmination of trends that had been under way at least since the middle of the eighteenth century. Until that time, as Henry Aiken has pointed out, philosophy could still lay claim to the title, "Queen of the Sciences." Gradually, however, natural philosophy evolved into the natural sciences, mental philosophy into psychology and psychiatry, and moral philosophy into the social sciences.[19] Thus it was no longer possible to maintain with any credibility that philosophy was the means by which the most profound truths about factual matters could be uncovered, or that knowledge could realistically strive for certainty. The result was the onset of an identity crisis that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. As Aiken notes:

> General metaphysics and epistemology have become, at best, ideology, and ideology itself, as we have seen, is now in increasing disrepute. Who shall presume to tell us, as the old metaphysicians hoped to do, what are the eternal and pervasive elements or categories of being? Who shall instruct us, as the old epistemologist hoped to do, in *the* universal principles of human knowledge? Logic, by general consent, is no longer a philosophical subject, and all self-respecting logicians are, or wish they were, members of the departments of mathematics. As for ethics or "moral philosophy"--it has gone the way of all analytical philosophical studies and has wound up as "meta-ethics," a study which presumably will find its own proper niche in the science of linguistics.[20]

What, then, is there left for the philosopher to do once she or he concedes that the discovery of knowledge is the proper function of science and not of philosophy? The answer, of course, at least for most English-speaking philosophers, was analysis. Henceforth, the task of philosophy was to be drastically narrowed in scope. Rather than attempting to discover the nature of ultimate reality or providing sweeping, unifying theories about the universe, the philosopher would be engaged in activities such as the clarification of scientific and other concepts, the establishment of criteria for determining the validity of knowledge claims in the various disciplines, the meaning of terms, the logical structure of arguments, and so forth. If the philosopher's task was to be construed in terms far more modest than previously, at least his or her labors could be expected to result in useful clarification rather than in misleading obscurity.

Not surprisingly, the analytical emphasis in general philosophy was reflected in philosophy of education. As noted earlier, the progressives appear in retrospect to have been the last group of home-grown educational philosophers to have been quite comfortable in offering prescriptions for educational policy and practice based on assumptions firmly rooted in their social and political philosophies. Progressive educational theory drew heavily on American pragmatism, of course, and pragmatism, as Morton White notes, may be viewed as a kind of bridge between the older style of philosophy carried on in the grand manner and the new scaled-down approach favored by the analysts.[21] As a matter of fact, John Dewey, as John Passmore has observed (borrowing a figure of speech from Nietzsche), may have been the last major figure in philosophy to think of the philosopher, at least to some modest extent, as "a physician of culture."[22]

At any rate, the bridge had been crossed by the post-war period, and it was clear that philosophy, at least in most English-speaking countries, was no longer to be regarded as a guide to educational or other practical pursuits, or to life in general. Indeed, as Israel Scheffler pointed out, the common denominator that united the various schools of analysis was

> a unanimous distrust of large generalizations about the universe, of attempts to interpret all of human life in terms of a single idea, . . . and above all, to philosophies that scorn reasoned discourse in principle, that glory in the vague and the subjective, and make a virtue of paradox.[23]

Instead, the linguistic analyst, according to Scheffler, would attempt to clarify and hone the language in which we convey scientific and other theories and judgments.[24] Hence, one of the chief tasks of the educational philosopher was to "render explicit the criteria of judgment we use in reaching educational decisions. . . ."[25] With regard to the application of analytical methods to education, "we are, then," said Scheffler, "concerned directly with solving intellectual rather than practical difficulties. . . ."[26]

Now it is unlikely that even those who regard as somewhat dubious many of the claims regarding the merits of analysis would deny that the methods developed in recent analytical philosophy are well suited to cut through some of the ambiguities to which educational debate, because of its complexity and breadth of scope, seems particularly susceptible. And surely we can all benefit from further explication of such educational concepts as "teaching," "learning," "education," "indoctrination," "explanation," and the like. Analysis, moreover, has had its fair share of success in exposing as meaningless much that had previously masqueraded as profound, and in putting several pseudo-debates to rest. Nevertheless, by the 1970s, if not earlier, many educators, and a number of educational philosophers as well, had concluded that the analytical emphasis on the meaning and clarification of language, and on the logical analysis of various arguments employed in educational discourse, had led philosophy of education too far afield from their daily concerns. Even those who acknowledged the need for the clarification of educational issues and problems felt that linguistic analysis was not sufficiently focused on substantive questions. Abraham Edel, for example, noted the growing disenchantment among younger philosophers of education, particularly with regard to the analysts' lack of interest in providing guidance for teachers. "What is at issue," said Edel, "is its [analysis'] potential in the philosophical contribution to education."[27]

Edel's remarks were reminiscent of a comment made some years earlier by Abraham Kaplan, a respected representative of the philosophical community at large, who wrote: "If I had to express in one word the defect of character that I find in analytic philosophy, it would be remoteness--it simply is too withdrawn from so much that I feel to be so important. It is a bracing, antiseptic air, but too rarified to make my home in."[28] A number of similar critiques, inspired to some degree, no doubt, by the social and political turmoil of the past 25 years, appeared in the 1970s and 80s.[29]

Meanwhile, the writings of philosophers such as H. L. A. Hart (*The Concept of Law*), John Rawls (*A Theory of Justice*), Ronald Dworkin (*Taking Rights Seriously*), Robert Nozick (*Anarchy, State, and Utopia*), Bruce Ackerman (*Social Justice in the Liberal State*), and Peter Singer (*Democracy and Disobedience*); as well as the establishment of the journal, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, signaled a readiness on the part of general philosophers to return to the substantive issues of moral and social philosophy. In addition, a group within the American Philosophical Association formed a committee on pluralism in an attempt to insure increased volume to such other than analytical voices as existentialism and phenomenology.

Now all of this has influenced the applied discipline of philosophy of education, and the result has been a gradual broadening of the field in recent years to the point where in Nicholas Burbules's words, philosophy of education at present is marked by "a divergence of issues and a pluralism of philosophical methods."[30] Papers expressing a phenomenological point of view are appearing more frequently at the annual meetings of the Philosophy of Education Society and its regional affiliates. In addition, other perspectives--notably critical theory, feminism, hermeneutics, neo-Marxism, and the sociology of knowledge, have begun to command attention as alternatives to conventional views as to how the field should be conceptually mapped. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether these developments betoken a positive response to Broudy's call for relevance. In the first place, some leading contemporary educational philosophers remain unconvinced that philosophy of education is obligated to give priority to practical problems and issues. Harvey Siegel, for example, disagrees emphatically with Broudy's premise. In an article review of the 1981 NSSE yearbook, he argues that

> philosophy of education must aim at understanding the philosophical dimensions of education--not at improving education, or convincing educators that philosophy might be of value to them. . . . Philosophy of education, like all theorizing, must be distanced from and autonomous from the concerns of practice and practitioners; . . .[31]

Siegel's point is not that educational philosophers should ignore problems of educational practice. Rather, he wants to say that philosophy of education is analogous to other sub areas of philosophy. Just as philosophers of law or science seek not to confirm their relevance for lawyers or scientists, but only to solve the philosophical puzzles related to those fields, so, too, philosophy of education should abandon the effort "to demonstrate the utility of philosophy of education to educators," and instead strive "to deepen our understanding of the philosophical dimensions of education."[32] This is a defensible position, certainly, but it is unlikely to prove convincing to those who think that philosophy of education differs from other "philosophies of" in that the former has a unique, prescriptive relationship to education.[33] Arguments are available on both sides of the question, of course.

D. C. Phillips poses a dilemma to indicate his reservations with regard to Broudy's claim. "To put it pithily, then," he writes, "the dilemma is this:

> To make the kind of contribution to education that many would like, philosophers of education may have to turn away from philosophy,

> whereas to make a contribution to philosophy their skills in this latter area may have to be magnified and perhaps their educational interests will have to be given up.[34]

As Phillips notes, R. S. Peters makes essentially the same point in another context. Philosophy of education, Peters believes, must be wary "of polarization to one of two extremes. The work could be practically relevant but philosophically feeble; or it could be philosophically sophisticated but remote from practical problems."[35] But here again the Phillips-Peters point of view may beg a question as to the proper limitations of philosophical inquiry. To illustrate, Phillips holds that philosophers who venture beyond clarification to offer prescriptions for dealing with controversial issues exceed the bounds of their professional roles. "Any writing that is produced in such reformist spirit," he insists, "is no longer philosophy, it is advocacy (or if it is philosophy it tends to be bad philosophy, . . .)"[36] Those who represent some of the more recent emphases in philosophy of education mentioned above, on the other hand, tend to view it as part of their professional responsibility to take a stand on normative questions. Clearly, a case can be made for either side of the question, and the issue turns on one's conception of the nature of philosophy and philosophy of education.

Secondly, with regard to the trend toward pluralism in philosophy of education, it is not at all clear that practitioners find the European offerings, with their slightly exotic flavor, any more relevant to their professional lives than the more pedestrian fare served up by the analysts. Some of the imports, after all, notably existentialism and phenomenology, have been located on the periphery of American philosophy of education for several decades now, with only limited success in attracting adherents. That, of course, could be at least partly attributable to lack of exposure. For that matter, analysis, too, might well be more appealing to practitioners if its genuine contributions to educational theory were better understood. All of which leads to the unremarkable conclusion that in order to demonstrate the relevance of philosophy to education, we need a captive audience, and we cannot ensure ourselves of such an audience in the absence of firm philosophical requirements for teacher certification. Perhaps, then, we should enlarge somewhat on Broudy's query, and ask, "What sorts of instruction in philosophy and philosophy of education do teacher trainees need and therefore have a right to expect from teacher-preparation programs?" In the context of this paper the question is of course rhetorical.[37] If philosophy permeates the educational process to the extent suggested in this discussion, then teachers need a solid introduction to the major branches of philosophy and a thorough grounding in the application of philosophy to educational concepts, issues, and problems. As Broudy observes in another of his writings, a teacher-preparation program that took itself seriously would require exposure to each of these two areas.[38]

I am aware, of course, that I am preaching to the already converted in this setting and that it is no easy task to convince our colleagues and students of the import of philosophy for the educational enterprise. As Robert Ennis has noted,

> there is a need but no call. Why? Because we have not exhibited our prowess in dealing with the philosophical difficulties embedded in current educational study and practice, and because the people involved in the activities embodying these problems do not see the

problems as philosophical. In fact they often do not see the problems at all.[39]

Ennis's comments serve as a reminder that the preparation of teachers and other practitioners in the United States has long been characterized by impatience with theory that is not almost instantly convertible into practice. Thus certain areas of psychological theory, such as positive reinforcement, for instance, are acceptable because they can be employed in the classroom next Thursday morning. The epistemological grounds for a particular theory of learning, on the other hand, lie somewhere beyond the pale of practicality for most educators. As Myron Lieberman pointed out several years ago, "studies of teacher education curricula over the past half century show very definitely that the 'theory' courses have been and are a minor segment of the total program, whereas the amount of time devoted to 'practical' courses has increased markedly."[40] Similarly, Raymond Callahan sees the attitudes of a "cult of efficiency"[41] reflected in school administration programs, in which theory is at best of marginal significance in comparison with school finance, public relations, management skills, and the like.

The social, historical, and cultural reasons for our lack of enthusiasm for theory--many of them enumerated by Richard Hofstadter,[42] by the way--rest well beyond the scope of this paper. But in any case, it is apparent that the low esteem in which foundational studies (including philosophy of education) are typically held is not entirely a recent development.

Clearly, the reversal of those attitudes[43] will require a concerted political effort and a good deal of diplomatic acumen, but a convincing rationale in support of the relevance of philosophy to the educational process is a prerequisite to the success of whatever political measures we may deem appropriate. One of the aims of this paper was to initiate a dialogue along those lines. The paper will have served its purpose if it stimulates others to continue the discussion.

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1. Thomas F. Green, "Philosophy and Policy Studies: Personal Reflections," Teachers College Record 81 (Winter 1979): 212.

2. Harry S. Broudy, "Philosophy of Education Between Yearbooks," in Philosophy and Education: Eightieth Yearbook of the NSSE, Part I, ed. Jonas Soltis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 33. An earlier version of this paper appeared in Teacher College Record 81 (Winter 1979): 130-144.

3. Jonas Soltis, "Perspectives on Philosophy of Education," Journal of Thought 18 (1983): 20.

4. Max Black, "A Note on Philosophy of Education," Harvard Educational Review 26 (Spring 1956): 155.

5. R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, 2d ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970), p. 25.

6. R. S. Peters, "Education as Initiation," in Philosophical Analysis and Education, ed. Reginald D. Archambault (New York: The Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 90-91.

7. John L. Childs, Education and Morals (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 17; originally published by Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950.

8. Ibid., p. 19.

9. R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 143.

10. See Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1965), Chap. 1.

11. See Israel Scheffler, "Philosophical Models of Teaching," Harvard Educational Review 35 (Fall 1965): 492-496 for an illuminating discussion of such models.

12. A. S. Neill, Summerhill: A Radical Approach to Child Rearing (New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1960 and Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. and intro. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979). However, Rousseau's optimism is not consistently maintained in some of his other writings. See Peter F. Carbone, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Rousseau's Educational Ambivalence," Educational Theory 35 (Fall 1985): 399-410.

13. Immanuel Kant, Education (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 3.

14. Ernest Jones, Papers on Psycho-Analysis, 5th ed. (London: Bailliere, Tindall & Cox, 1950), p. 24.

15. James E. McClellan, "First Philosophy and Education," in Philosophy and Education: Eightieth Yearbook of the NSSE, p. 264.

16. Van Cleve Morris, "Living Without Bridges," Philosophy of Education 1980 (Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1981), p. 19.

17. Richard Pratte, "Getting the Fly out of the Bottle: Criticism of Something Called Analytic Philosophy of Education," Ibid., p. 6.

18. Philip G. Smith, "A Response to Professor Soltis," Philosophy of Education 1975 (Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1975), p. 28.

19. Henry D. Aiken, "The Fate of Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," in William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, eds., Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 4 vols. (New York: Random House, 1962), vol. 1, p. 16.

20. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

21. Morton White, ed., The Age of Analysis (New York: The New American Library-Mentor Books, 1955), p. 19.

22. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1957), p. 120.

23. Israel Scheffler, ed., Philosophy and Education 2d ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966), pp. 7-8.

24. Ibid., p. 7.

25. Ibid., p. 5.

26. Ibid., p. 4.

27. Abraham Edel, "Analytic Philosophy of Education," Educational Theory 22 (Spring 1972): 132.

28. Abraham Kaplan, The New World of Philosophy (New York: Vintage Books, 1961) p. 90.

29. See Karen Maloney, "Philosophy of Education: Definitions of the Field, 1942-1982," Educational Studies 16 (Fall 1985): 247-249.

30. Nicholas Burbules, "Introduction," Philosophy of Education 1986 (Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1986), p. VII.

31. Harvey Siegel, "The Future and Purpose of Philosophy of Education," Educational Theory 31 (Winter 1981): 15.

32. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

33. E. R. Eames, "The Relation of Philosophy to Education" Philosophy of Education, 1966. (Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1966). See also Max Black, op. cit., p. 154.

34. D. C. Phillips, "Philosophy of Education: In Extremis?" Educational Studies 14 (Spring 1983): 2-3.

35. R. S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers, p. VIII.

36. D. C. Phillips, "Philosophy of Education," p. 22.

37. Put another way, it has always seemed to me that John Dewey's suggestion that "philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education" was one of his most profound observations with regard to the thickness of the ties between philosophy and education. See Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 328.

38. Harry S. Broudy, "How Philosophical Can Philosophy of Education Be?" The Journal of Philosophy 52 (1955): 621. Perhaps, too, those of our colleagues who deny any obligation to deal with educational concerns when they "do philosophy," may nevertheless be persuaded of their obligation to introduce prospective educators to the ways in which philosophy bears on educational practice.

39. Robert Ennis, Philosophy of Education Newsletter, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, March 5, 1979, p. 1.

40. Myron Lieberman, Education as a Profession (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 196.

41. Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency (The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

42. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1966).

43. As well as the currently fashionable but simplistic notion that teachers need little more than mastery of content and some practice teaching in order to be effective.

A PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING: FIRST OF ALL, DO NO HARM

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The high school dropout rate has reached an alarming 40- 50% in many urban school systems across the nation. Questions are being raised by educators and our society at large. Who or what is responsible for this high dropout rate? The search is on to find the persons, social forces, or educational processes upon which to place the blame for student dropouts. The basic assumption is that something is lacking in the present educational process. Is it competent teachers, improved teacher education, a more rigorous curriculum, a longer school day, additional computers, or improved testing procedures? Everyone is looking to find the magical missing ingredient that will compel students to remain in school until graduation. Some school systems in conjunction with supportive businesses are already paying students to stay in school or to make passing grades in an attempt to quell the rising tide of dropouts.

When approaching the problem of high school dropouts I contend that one needs to examine the basic philosophy of teaching that operates on a daily basis in the public schools. In so doing, it is necessary to go beyond specific curricula or instructional methods and look at some underlying belief systems that influence the teacher-child-curriculum interaction. The problem, as I see it, is not so much that a particular ingredient is missing from the educational scene, but rather that an ingredient is present that is responsible for student failure and an increasing number of dropouts. In other words, the problem is not in what the teachers and administrators have failed to do for students, but in what they are doing that causes students to fail and drop out. The solution may not mean that education needs more of an ingredient, but rather less of it or even the elimination of an ingredient altogether.

In making such a supposition one needs to consider the teacher-child interaction at its very basic level. This may be likened to the physician-patient relationship in which the first consideration made by the physician, according to the Hippocratic Oath, is that he/she should "First of all, do no harm." In layman's terms, this means that the patient should be no worse off after treatment by the physician than he/she was before seeing the physician. One may apply this consideration to the act of teaching and say that the teacher should likewise seek to do no harm to the student. When examining the teacher-student interaction one might then ask, "Are there times when a student comes to a teacher and leaves in a worse condition than when he arrived?" It could be said that even though a student fails a

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grade level in school he/she is "no worse off than before" because he/she has gained some skills and knowledge that will be beneficial in life. The student is not harmed in the sense of being totally devoid of benefit from having been in the classroom. While this may be true, it only takes into account the intellectual development of the student. Within the school environment the student is affected emotionally, socially, and physically as well as intellectually. My contention is that the harm done to students in school is not primarily intellectual harm, but rather is emotional harm which influences the way in which the student chooses to use or not use intellectual capabilities. Students do not fail because the curriculum is not rigorous enough or does not include the latest scientific data. Students do not fail because the teacher skipped a chapter in the textbook or had too few textbooks in the classroom. Students do not fail because they are incapable of learning. Students fail because of their negative attitudes toward school, teachers, the learning process, and their own abilities. This negative attitude comes, I believe, not from what we are unable to provide in education, but rather from what is done to cause students to perceive themselves as failures as learners and as persons.

Therefore, to find the basis for school dropouts, one needs to examine the elements of the educational process that contribute to negative attitudes toward school and learning. On the basis of my experiences as a classroom teacher and as a supervisor and instructor of student teachers I have concluded that there are two basic elements of our current educational process that contribute to student negative attitudes toward school and learning. These negative attitudes and the factors which contribute to them are the basic reasons for student failure and subsequent dropouts. These two basic elements which create failure are denial of individuality and fear of failure.

DENIAL OF INDIVIDUALITY

The first factor which contributes to a negative attitude toward school is the failure of public school systems to respect each student as an individual. This may be a surprising statement since a basic and time-honored goal of education is to recognize, respect and meet the needs of the individual. The difficulty lies, not in the goal statement, but in the implementation of the goal. In other words, there is an incongruence in goal and implementation. Some examples of educational implementations which do not recognize each student as an individual will clarify this statement.

School organization. The organizational structure of public schools with lock-step graded classrooms in which each student is expected to learn the same material at the same rate of speed as others in the classroom is a direct denial of individuality. One may argue that it is up to the individual teacher to provide for individual differences within the classroom. While this is true, those students who do not complete a specified year's worth of skill and knowledge development are given notice of "failure" and asked to remain behind for an additional year of teaching. It's not that they are incapable of learning, but that their rate of learning and experiential level may be different from some other students within the classroom. The educational program with a specified time limit for completion does not allow for individual differences without an unwelcome penalty. This says to the student, "You are different, you do not measure up, and that is unacceptable."

Testing and student comparison. In addition, students are given increasing amounts of standardized tests each year. The results of these tests are not used primarily as a means of showing the individual student the progress he/she has made in comparison with his or her previous achievements but rather are primarily used to compare the student's progress with that of his/her peers within the classroom, the city, the state, and the nation. Pressure is brought to bear upon the teacher to prepare students not only to pass the multitude of standardized tests administered during the year but to score within or above the national average. In so doing there is an emotional upheaval experienced by the student and the teacher when the student does not measure up to the specified test norm. If each student is an individual why is he/she being penalized for not being like all of the other children his/her age? Our actions do not coincide with what we know about the nature of the student--an individual who possesses a unique developmental pattern, personality, talents, abilities, interests, and experiences.

How is it that the individual is frequently ignored in schools today in spite of goal statements to the contrary? Perhaps it stems from the need to educate all students but within economic constraints. These constraints have historically dictated that students need to be taught in large groups. Economic constraints are still with us, but the continuation of our current school organization may be more related to society's reluctance to change than to a lack of economic support. Also it may be the case that the individual is ignored due to the misinterpretation of the meaning of equality in education for all students. Unfortunately the meaning of equality has been narrowly defined to mean equality of treatment, when in fact equality of treatment may result in disrespect of the individual. Providing equal amounts of time for students to learn, equal amounts of instructional materials, and equal amounts of teacher attention does not recognize students as individuals. When defining equality within the educational experience one must define it as equality of opportunity and realize that equal opportunity does not mean equal treatment.

FEAR OF FAILURE

When students in a classroom are expected to learn the same material at the same time even though they are at varying developmental stages and possess varied abilities, they develop performance anxiety which leads to a fear of failure. I believe that fear of failure is the second major factor contributing to an increase in student dropouts. Student fears are manifested in various ways such as, (1) fear of not knowing the right answer when called upon in class, (2) fear of making a bad grade, (3) fear of failing a grade level, (4) fear of being separated from age-mates, (5) fear of not measuring up to the expectations of parents and teachers, (6) fear of being different, (7) fear of being ridiculed by peers, (8) fear of not being accepted by teachers and peers, and (9) fear of corporal punishment. These fears make life in the classroom less than enjoyable. It's no wonder some students refer to school as a "prison."

When students are treated as if they should all be alike they come to see differences in themselves and others as undesirable. Therefore, they become caught up in seeking to be like their classmates. In an effort to be accepted by teachers and peers students become involved in fierce academic competitiveness which may reach proportions of being psychologically unhealthy. In many cases such competition provides the basis upon which peers accept or reject each other. The student who learns at a slower rate than his peers may be embarrassed by a teacher's persistent questioning of "Who made a hundred today?" or "Is there anyone who doesn't understand?" The student who doesn't understand is reluctant to admit publically in class that he/she does not understand. Therefore, he/she may seek to hide feelings of deficiency through the process of cheating or creating behavioral disturbances. This is evident even in kindergarten classrooms. By mid-year the children have learned that acceptance is granted and praise is forthcoming if the right answer is marked on a worksheet. Thus, the behavior of looking on another child's paper for "help" in getting the right answer is quickly adopted. The result of this in kindergarten classrooms is that cardboard carrels spring up on each child's desk to ensure that everyone "does his or her own work." Accompanying lectures by the teacher about the "bad boys and girls who cheat" may be heard. Teachers decry the acts of cheating in the classroom, and yet they frequently make it so uncomfortable for a student who does not know the right answers that he/she is sorely tempted to cheat in order to save face with his/her peers.

The assumption that fear is an appropriate motivator for learning has been present in our educational system since its beginning. Indeed, fear may be a reasonable motivator to keep young children from experiencing physical harm. However, creating fear in a student with regard to academic achievement is of questionable value. We may smile at accounts of colonial teachers who used the hickory stick and the dunce cap to ensure student compliance. However, today in our modern school buildings filled with technology, we still find corporal punishment being used. Only eleven states have passed laws forbidding corporal punishment in the classroom. As a society we abhor child abuse. However, the practice of using corporal punishment in our public schools is widely condoned. In rural areas corporal punishment is used as readily for academic failures as for classroom misbehavior. The assumption is that the fear of corporal punishment for not completing an assignment, for failure to bring a book to class, or for not doing homework is supposed to make the student desire to work harder and to learn more. The harm done by corporal punishment is not only physical, but psychological as well. How many adults would continue working for an employer who threatened physical harm if an assignment was incomplete? And yet we expect children to accept such treatment as being good for them.

There are other areas of our educational process that promote fear in children. Report cards with their numerical and letter grades are a threat to a child's self-image. The child who is in third grade and reading with progress at a second grade reading level, may make a "C" in reading on her report card in spite of having made high numerical grades on classwork. When questioned, the teacher may say, "I cannot give an "A" to a student who is not reading on this grade level even though she has made "A's" on the assignments that I have given her this six-weeks." In spite of this seeming injustice the child and parents are expected to understand the circumstances completely, agree with the teacher, and be enthusiastic about producing more "A" papers for which she will receive a "C" on a report card.

The no-pass, no-play rule in effect in several states is intended to impress upon students the value of learning. However, the implementation of the rule ignores the individual needs of students and contributes to a fear of failure. This rule, in effect in Texas since January 1985, requires that junior high and senior high school students must pass all academic courses with at least a grade of 70 in order to participate in any extracurricular activities within the school for the following six weeks. Failure to maintain a 70 average means that a student is barred from participation in athletics, band, chorus, drama, cheerleading, or any clubs for six weeks. The rule is based upon the assumption that participation in extracurricular activities reduces the amount of time a student spends on academic studies and leads to his/her inability to maintain a 70 average. This assumption is based upon a belief that all students will benefit from more time on task and that if removal from extracurricular activities is threatened, students will automatically spend more time on task and grades will improve. The actions produced by this rule imply that all students should be treated alike, all have the same needs, and that fear is an appropriate motivator for learning. While well-intentioned and an attempt to impress upon students the value of academics, this rule has led to additional dropouts because of its punitiveness and unfairness to individuals. The fear of failure by some students actually becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Students who experience the consequences of the no-pass,no-play rule not only exhibit a fear of failure but a fear of humiliation. Students deeply fear humiliation. Kaoru Yamamoto, a psychologist at the University of Colorado in Denver, has conducted numerous surveys with regard to children's fears. He has found that children's greatest fear is that of losing face. According to his research, "It is more troubling to wet their pants in class, get a bad report card or repeat a grade, for example, than it is to undergo surgery or be confronted by a rival baby brother or sister.... For a child, a blow to self-esteem, the sense of being worthy, is a terrible thing to endure." (1) The no-pass, no-play rule certainly causes students to lose face. Even those students who excel academically experience fears of losing face for not making high enough grades or test scores to be in the gifted and talented program. The fear of non-acceptance by peers affects all students regardless of intellectual ability and performance.

Educators want students to experience success, to gain knowledge and skills, and move forward in the educational process and yet it seems that a greater emphasis is placed upon a child's deficiencies or mistakes rather than successes. We write the number of problems missed at the top of a paper rather than the number correct, send notes home to parents when homework is incomplete, and ask that "bad" papers be signed. How often are notes sent home to parents when the child is performing well or papers signed that reflect marked improvement? In other words, we punish students for not learning. If we punished a baby each time it fell when learning to walk, few of us would be walking today. We somehow have faith that with practice the child will learn to balance and walk. We have much less patience with the child who is struggling to learn the multiplication tables. Timed tests are frequently given and the children who cannot give all the right answers in three minutes may be required to stay in at recess, do extra homework sheets, or take a note of disapproval home to parents. They also feel badly when only the 100% papers are displayed on the bulletin board for all to see. Such a common classroom act of putting up the "excellent" papers not only makes the achievers feel good about themselves, but makes those who have not yet achieved feel badly. Punitiveness is experienced by the child who is not recognized for his/her efforts.

A basic difference in the level of patience exhibited with the baby and that afforded the students learning the multiplication tables is that the baby is one person whereas the classroom has many students. The teacher is expected to move all students along at about the same rate of progress. The emphasis changes from that focused upon an individual to that focused upon a group which is expected to function as an individual. This is becoming more of a crisis as teachers are being evaluated for competency on the basis of student test scores. For example, in Texas the TEAMS test is administered to all students in grades 1,3,5,7, and 9 each year during February. Of course all of the year's curriculum content has not been completed by February. However, in order to improve class standings teachers are trying to quickly cover all major concepts and skills for the year by test time in February. This means that some students who are having difficulty with concepts or skills are told that "We don't have time to spend on this any more now. We've got to move on." This leaves the student who learns at a slower pace at a disadvantage and with feelings of frustration, guilt, and failure. And yet he/she is expected to enthusiastically tackle the next level of material in spite of difficulty with previous tasks. Such acts deny individuality as well as increase student fear of failure and humiliation. It is no wonder that after repeated instances of this experience, the student simply gives up on trying to keep up the expected pace. Dropping out of school is a means of escaping those unpleasant feelings and humiliating experiences. Donald R. Grossnickle has said that "Probably the primary reason that students leave school early is that they are desperately trying to escape failure." (2) In other words, they are seeking to save what is left of their self-esteem, even though the act of dropping out will in the long run further deplete their opportunities to raise their self-esteem. They are simply seeking a way to stop the hurting for the present moment.

WHY DO WE USE FEAR AS A MOTIVATOR?

Why has fear become such a timeless method of motivation in the classroom? Much of it stems from the Judeo-Christian teachings which viewed the nature of a child as sinful and having need of force to be molded into a respectable citizen. Secondly, there is a history of a strong work-ethic. Adults, who have had more experiences in life, see the advantages of studying and learning when it comes to being successful in the work force. Realizing the importance of knowledge and skill development they try to foist this realization upon immature students through a "Fear of the future without education." Children are much more present oriented and the fear of the future is not as important. Thus, their greatest fear is to avoid unpleasant consequences of the present, such as the wrath of a teacher, principal or parent, and the lack of acceptance by peers. As a result, they do not study in order to learn for the future, but rather to escape unpleasant side effects of classroom failure. Therefore, using fear of failure as a motivator for learning does not accomplish its goal of helping students to value education more. Instead, it most likely accomplishes the very opposite effect and brings psychological harm to the student. Students come to value grades rather than the process of learning itself. The fear of failure results in lowered self-esteem which negatively affects classroom performance.

What evidence is currently available that fear of failure and denial of individuality has a detrimental effect upon student progress and may lead to a student's decision to drop out of school? To answer this question I turn to research studies that have been conducted with regard to self-esteem development of students and the subsequent affect upon academic performance. Numerous researchers have examined the relationship between academic achievement and self-esteem. In summarizing research in this area David Silvernail concludes that high self-esteem is related to high achievement while low self-esteem is related to low achievement. In other words, students with high self-esteem function at a higher level academically than students with low self-esteem. (3) If this is the case one needs to know how to raise self-esteem of students and what factors may contribute to its demise. A Self-Esteem Think Tank sponsored by the California State Task Force on Self-Esteem concluded in May, 1988 that:

> Self-esteem can be reduced or destroyed under many circumstances including oppressive conditions
> (a) where individuals have no choice or are forced to conform to a single standard,
> (b) where individuals are treated with indifference or rejection,
> (c) where individuals are judged by virtue of their ability, achievement, race, creed, or color to be inferior,
> (d) when individuals fail to meet their own expectations or the expectations of others,
> (e) when individuals fail to act consistently with their core values,
> (f) when individuals lose hope or vision, or when there is no recognition of virtue.(4)

The conditions given here correlate with those that I have observed in classrooms and from which I have personally concluded that denial of student individuality and the use of fear of failure to motivate learners is detrimental to educational success. When students face a daily diet of conditions such as these their self-esteem erodes continually. A study conducted by R. E. Bills in 1978 in which he surveyed twenty-six thousand students in grades three through twelve concluded that student self-esteem becomes more negative with each additional school year. (5) If this is the case, it is no wonder that academic achievement seems to also decline as students progress through school and finally they drop out altogether.

SUGGESTED REFORMS TO PREVENT DROPOUTS

How can education approach reform that leads to greater recognition of individuality and the elimination of the fear of failure? First of all, proponents of educational reforms need to examine ways to prevent educational harm rather than seeking only to remove it after it has occurred. Removing the harm done by lowering a child's self-esteem is a very difficult process and one that may never be fully accomplished. Evidence of the seeking of preventive measures is present in current attempts to identify pre-school children and elementary children who are potentially at-risk students. However, in identifying these at-risk students care should be taken to refrain from giving them the label of "at risk" as we identify them. If this is done, the parents, and the teacher may develop a set of expectations for the child that will be too low and place them at further risk. In identifying these children as "at-risk" we are saying to them and ourselves that we expect them to fail or not to measure up to a specified set of expectations. We are still trying to make the child fit the system rather than adjusting the system to meet the needs of the child. When a gardener opens a packet of seeds he/she does not think about how many seeds may produce "weak " plants. He plants each seed with the positive expectation that each will flower in its own time if given proper soil, water, and light conditions. Indeed some seeds may require extra fertilizer, water, or shade to produce to the fullest. The gardener recognizes the needs and provides them without blaming the seed or the parent plant that produced it for the slowness of growth or need for special treatment. Can we afford to do any less for our children?

The best prevention of educational harm, would be to accept each child when he/she enters school at what ever level of achievement he/she has attained, assess the level of current performance, and design a program of learning that allows the child to progress at his/her own rate academically while remaining with age-group peers for social development. Students could simply be grouped by teachers, rather than grade level, for a given period of time. Student assessment should be made only in terms of comparing the progress of the child with his/her own previous achievements and with the sequential levels of skills that are to be obtained. Grades would no longer be necessary. Evaluation would be reported in the form of sequential skill development as it is mastered. Emphasis should be upon the success levels of the student rather than their incompetencies. There should be no specific time limit placed on when curriculum is to be mastered. Some students may finish school in 10 years, while others require 14. There should be no stigma placed upon a person because of rate of accomplishment. Students should be respected, admired and praised for their differences. Being different should be the "norm." In addition, the curriculum should include opportunities for students to learn communication skills that would build their self-esteem and that of their peers. In so doing schools would be providing congruent goals and methods of instruction that indeed take into account what is known about the nature of the child. Taking such measures would likely mean that schools would take a leadership role in society rather than being a follower and succumbing to political and economic pressures. Educators are intelligent and creative and have the ability to make needed improvements in the educational systems within our country. The factor preventing this endeavor is that the self-esteem of educators has been lessened by social criticisms and lack of support. Political control also tends to keep education as it has always been. As Charles Ballinger says, "We're only 12 years away from the 21st Century. It's time to stop operating as though we were still in the 19th Century."(6)

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RESPONSE

TO

PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING:

FIRST OF ALL, DO NO HARM

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I was asked to respond to Dr. Self's paper "Philosophy of teaching: first of all, do no harm," because it's well known that I care very much about teaching that enhances self-concept, produces internal locus of control, contributes to the continued development of a democratic people. I'm glad, at any rate, that I was asked. I'm glad to have a chance to encourage educators to teach children, not books; meet needs, not standards. But there, it seems to me, is the rub. I've given you two good bumper stickers in "teach children not books" and "meet needs not standards." I'm afraid that "First of all, do no harm" may fit that category in its present form.

In my bumper stickers, the straw men I set-up, a philosopher would certainly want to ask some questions. If we're not teaching what's in books, what will we teach? I don't mean the mindless pedagogy of following page by page; I mean what is it we are to teach? I think that is a philosophic question. My straw man bumper sticker suggests meeting children's needs. The need for food, clothing, shelter - SEX? My straw men become Hollow Men as I begin to inspect them. I fear that "do no harm" might, also.

Dr. Self decries the fact that almost 50% of those entering high school dropout in some urban systems. That's alarming. But it's alarming only if we assume that having students continue through a certain number of years of schooling is somehow important. The author doesn't ask or even suggest that we pose it as an assumption. Thomas Jefferson thought those in rural Virginia should learn to read and write. The best then could be sent to higher education (even boarding if there was no higher school nearby). The best of those, then, would go to the University of Virginia, as Virgil Ward has taught me, "Jefferson's University." Where is it written that everyone ought to complete high school? In its present form lots of students choose not to. Historically, really parenthetically, my high school class, 19 and 49, was the first year that the nation hit the 50% mark. Japan and Germany have higher per capita income, lower infant mortality and don't try to get every one through high school. Some urban districts lag behind the United States average for high school graduation. Self sees it as a "problem," wants to find someplace to, "place the blame." I will contend that we, the Philosophy of Education Society, of all people, should be asking prior questions about the goals; we should be challenging assumptions. We need to take a broader look.

In this paper schools are called to task for working toward a goal

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that Dr. Self sees as "basic and time-honored." It is to "recognize, respect and meet the needs of the individual." Well now my reading of our educational history doesn't reveal that. Oh I've heard people say it. I've seen the case made for it by philosophers, and educators. Secretary Bennett, President Reagan, "The Nation at Risk" tell us, however, that our goal is to beat the Russians, even the Japanese - though not soon, I would think. We must get higher scores. Needs of individuals? Needs of culture/community? There's a philosophical issue which should be addressed. What is the purpose of the schools?

If this paper had made the case that everyone should spend X number of years in school, that certain goals should be met - had made that case well, I would be in complete accord. But assuming that we all agree on the goals of school and the only problem is that we have ingredients in the mix which aren't productive strikes me as a common error. Again, the philosopher should speak.

I agree strongly that we should do no harm, that schooling is good, that positive self-concept is important. What I question is the uninvestigated assumption that that is what schools ought to do. More, I question the assumption that it is what schools are trying to do.

The villains of this piece: the school organization, use of tests to compare students (half will, by definition, be below average won't they!), fear, especially of failure, and the accompanying humiliation, are my villains, too. But they are my villains because of the conception I have of the school: my philosophy of education. I read Dewey and tried. I read the existentialists. I read the developmental psychologists. I try to do those things.

Most American educators, even if they read those authors, thought those thoughts, still fall back on what I'll call American Positivism. American Positivism with behavioral psychology sets a goal, tests and sequences for mastery. It's all measured of course. Notice that this paper ends with the suggestion that we test and then "sequence" the learning for mastery. Those are American Positivist constructs. Dewey, Piaget, Rousseau, Carl Rogers would not look at it that way. American education, the American people, Secretary Bennett would. They are American Positivists.

Dr. Self used the packet of seeds analogy. The gardner will nurture each little plant expecting each to "flower in its own time." Let me carry that one step farther. I see the human being as a flower with inborn skills and abilities which will unfold in their own time. We can "teach" a child to walk but the child will do it, in its own time. Little children around the world learn to talk - in China they learn Chinese - at about the same age and they are not taught. Children express curiosity from the first day, motivation is internal as novelty seeking. Learning is multiplicative - not linear. It sparks like a roman candle not a laser. In a rich stimulating school environment children will choose and learn.

On the other side, and here's the rub, is American education. The child is a puppy dog to be trained up. Motivation is external. Learning is sequential. We know what the sequence is and we put children through their paces. Subtraction must follow addition, not the other way about. We test to design sequences to put children through.

Dr. Self, assuming a common conception of the place and purpose of education, sees certain villains. I contend that we can remove or at least ameliorate those villains as she suggests but, if we don't change our conception of school the villains will return. I suggest they are symptoms, not causes.

Dr. Self concludes her paper with a model for a school. That model includes American Positivist phrases which are sadly opposite of her flower metaphor. She describes the prototype British Primary school, (where philosophy and psychology come together with the flower metaphor), but she describes it with phrases like "program of learning," "sequential skill," "curriculum to be mastered," which are antithetical to it.

Dr. Self's villains, it seems to me, are just symptoms. They are natural by-products of a school organized to put people through the paces that a text or adult has imposed. I feel that the philosopher should be pushing us to challenge our assumptions and make them clear. I think this paper is important but took a narrow view.

EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN:

A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

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I

This paper is an application of philosophical analysis to public policy. It seeks to analyze the use of the term "education" as it appears in Public Law 94-142, or "The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975" (EAHCA), which consists of enactments of and amendments to certain sections in Chapter 33, Title 20, of the U.S. Code.[1] Chapter 33 comprises all sections of the U.S. Code that are addressed to the education of the handicapped. Without question PL94-142 has been an important educational policy for the nation. Among other things it has enabled millions of handicapped persons to enjoy equal educational opportunity. Even though the law contains a list of stipulated definitions of major terms, it gives no definition of the key term "education." Moreover, none of the other definitions of Chapter 33 clarifies the meaning of the term. This absence of an articulate conception of education has left in the law's application a semantic vacuum that has been filled by the preconceived and diverse notions of education held by parents, school boards, judges, and others. So, if PL94-142 is ever to give definite direction for distinguishing educational matters from others, there must be a clarification of what the law means by education.

Some of the extant literature on what EAHCA means by education is quite scholarly and profound, but none of it appears to examine the law's text as carefully as it should, especially the relation of its text to Chapter 33's section 1402.[2] My inquiry will begin by identifying various senses of education present in PL94-142. It next will argue that there is an underlying notion of education in the law. It finally will relate this notion to a court decision based upon the law.

II

There are several places in PL94-142 that suggest different senses of education. The places are the law's title, the law's statement of purpose, some of the law's stipulated definitions, and a passage that is found at section 1424(a)(3) of Chapter 33, which in turn presupposes a section that is not a part of the law.

The title of the law, it will be recalled, is "Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975." According to a literal reading of the title education is something all handicapped children — even children profoundly retarded and orthopedically impaired — can have. And if education is

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something that all handicapped children can have, it must be definable, some might think, as a very broad type of learning, such as, whatever a person can learn that will help him or her follow his or her natural course of development.

But it is dubious that the law's title should be read literally. Even though the title speaks of education for all handicapped children, the entitlements and allocations provisions of EAHCA make plain that the act is concerned not with all handicapped children but only with "handicapped children aged three to twenty-one, inclusive." Moreover, even though the title's reference to handicapped children is supported by the entitlements and allocations section, the reference must be taken with a grain of salt. Twenty-one-year-old people, handicapped or not, are not children. So we might do well to regard EAHCA's title as designating not all handicapped children but all handicapped persons aged three to twenty-one, inclusive. In demonstrating that the title should not be read literally, however, I have not thereby shown that the title does not identify education with learning of a very encompassing kind. If it is arguable that education is one and the same as learning of this sort on the condition that the former can be had by any handicapped child, it also is arguable that education is one and the same as this type of learning on the condition that the former can be had by any handicapped person three to twenty-one years, inclusive. Let us see, then, whether or not the position that PL94-142 views education as learning of the given sort is defensible with respect to the other relevant parts of the law's text.

One of those parts is this passage from the act's statement of purpose:

> It is the purpose of this chapter to assure that all handicapped children have available to them... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs...[3]

According to the list of stipulated definitions provided by PL94-142, "'free appropriate public education' means special education and related services which (a) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, without charge, (b) meet the standards of the state educational agency, (c) include an appropriate preschool, elementary or secondary school education in the State involved, and (d) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title."[4] Also according to the list of definitions special education is "specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions."[5] Related services comprise "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, and medical and counseling services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping conditions in children."[6]

It is immediately apparent here that the statement of purpose contains different senses of education. On the one hand, the expression, "a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services...," implies that education is something that may or may not stress special education and its related services. What it is specifically, however, EAHCA never explains. On the other hand, the stipulated definition of "free appropriate public education," which identifies such education with special education, or special instruction, and its required services, indicates that education is identifiable with instruction of any sort and its required services.

Because we do not know what the former sense of education is, we cannot say that it does or does not strengthen the position that EAHCA regards education as learning of a comprehensive type. We can assert, however, that the latter sense of education does not agree with this position. Even though instruction and its support services arguably might promote the type of learning mentioned, they certainly are not the same as it. Instruction and its services are at most means to learning of any sort; and learning brought about by instruction and its services is a result of and thus is separate from them.

We now should scrutinize the remaining passages in PL94-142 that suggest something about the meaning of "education." Some of them are definitions of certain types of agencies and institutions. EAHCA stipulates that the term "State educational agency" means "the State board of education or other agency or officer primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools, or, if there is no such officer or agency, an officer or agency designated by the Governor or by State law."[7] Implying that an educational agency is an agency or officer responsible for the supervision of elementary and secondary schools, this definition suggests that the term "education" might apply to something ingredient to elementary and secondary schools. The law's explanation of a State educational agency is followed immediately by a definition of a local educational agency, which is any public institution or agency having administrative control and direction or performing a service function for any public elementary or secondary school in a State.[8] For this definition too, education might be something in elementary and secondary schools. But what is that something? To try to answer this question, one must look at EAHCA's definitions of an elementary school and a secondary school: the former is a school "which provides elementary education, as determined under State law";[9] the latter is a school "which provides secondary education, as determined under State law, except that it does not include any education provided beyond grade 12."[10] According to these definitions education in an elementary school is whatever State law says is education in such an institution, whereas education in a secondary school is whatever State law declares is education in such an institution, for instance, nothing more or less than reading, writing, and arithmetic or a wide range of academic studies, a free lunch program, a clinical health program, vocational training, numerous extracurricular activities, and foreign travel experiences.

While PL94-142 intends that education in elementary and secondary schools is identifiable with what State law says is education in such schools, it plainly does not mean that education is limited to schools. In its definition of a secondary school, it will be remembered, the law refers to "education provided beyond grade 12." And in its definition of an institution of higher education the law indicates that an education beyond grade 12 is an educational program of at least two years that is authorized by a State and accredited by a recognized accrediting agency or, where need be, approved by an appropriate committee. The program must be countable toward a bachelor's degree or be "designed to prepare the student to work as a technician and at a semiprofessional level in engineering, scientific, or other technological fields" requiring "the understanding and application of basic engineering, scientific, or mathematical principles of knowledge."[11]

The foregoing definitions of educational agencies and institutions indicate that education is whatever a society's government declares or authorizes to be education in some institution, such as an elementary or secondary school or a four-year college. While this formulation of education appears to be overly narrow, it departs from the view that education is a broad kind of learning. The latter sense does not restrict education to officially recognized institutions whereas the former sense does.

The only other passage of PL94-142 that bears on what the law might mean by education is found at 1424(a)(3) of Chapter 33, but it involves sections of the chapter that are not a part of EAHCA. According to the passage of concern the Secretary of Education is authorized to pay all or part of the cost of such an activity as "training...of professional and allied personnel engaged or preparing to engage in programs" for handicapped children.[12] Because this passage speaks of training, not education, it suggests that for PL94-142 there might be a difference between training and education. That the law is committed to this distinction is suggested by an inspection of section 1402, which, although not one of the sections amended or enacted by EAHCA, authorizes a bureau in the Department of Education "for administering and carrying out programs and projects relating to the education and training of the handicapped, including programs and projects for the training of teachers of the handicapped..."[13] PL94-142 entails section 1402, then, in that it legally presupposes the latter as the policy for implementing 1424(a)(3). So, because section 1402 explicitly distinguishes between education and training, EAHCA too distinguishes between them, at least implicitly. Unfortunately, neither section 1402 nor PL96-88, or the Department of Education Organization Act, clarifies what is the difference between education and training.[14] But in drawing the distinction, the section and thus PL94-142 have in mind a sense of education that definitely cannot be readily identified with two senses of education that we have located already in EAHCA. Because education and training each might involve learning of a very encompassing sort, education cannot be separate from training and still be identifiable with such learning. Because education and training each might involve instruction, education cannot be separate from training and still be identifiable with instruction. That education as something distinguishable from training can be identified with any of the other senses located already in EAHCA is indeterminate.

III

Our critique of PL94-142 has concluded that "education" has several senses in the law. In the law's title, the term refers to something that may be had by all handicapped persons aged three to twenty-one, inclusive. In one instance in the law's statement of purpose, which employs the term in two different ways, the word refers to something that may or may not emphasize special education and the services for supporting it. According to its second use in the law's statement of purpose "education" signifies instruction and its support services. According to its use in the law's definitions of certain educational agencies and institutions the term refers to whatever a society's government declares or authorizes to be education in some institution. And in section 1402 the word refers to something opposed to training.

Even though these are different senses of education, they need not be mutually exclusive; they might share a unifying meaning. One likely basic meaning is instruction and its support services. Obviously this sense of education may be employed to help clarify what is intended by something that may or may not emphasize special education and its related services; for instruction and its support services may or may not stress special education, which is a type of instruction, and the services that such education requires. Moreover, education as instruction and its support services may be utilized to give some meaning to the word "education" in EAHCA's title, which may be read as "The Instruction and Instructional Services for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975." Still further, this sense of education may be seen as helping to clarify the view that education is whatever a society's government declares or authorizes to be education in some institution; for what a society's government usually declares or authorizes for schools, colleges, and other "educational" institutions are instruction and its required services. What keeps instruction and its support services from underlying all the other ideas of education in PL94-142 is that this meaning does not suit the education-training distinction found in section 1402. As commonly understood, training seeks to shape something, e.g., behavior, bodily development, or plant development; and as an effort to shape behavior, training may involve instruction. For instance, one may train a child in toothbrushing by telling him or her how to hold the brush, put toothpaste on it, manipulate it, etc. Because, therefore, instruction and its required services may be integral to training, they cannot constitute education in the sense of something to be distinguished from training.

Another likely unifying meaning is the view of education frequently held by social scientists, namely, that education is socialization. According to this view education strives to enable people to function within their respective societies, and it employs diverse means to achieve this end. One of them is instruction and its support services. Instruction and its services, then, are not the whole of education, nor do they necessarily aim at socialization. But when they do have this goal, they constitute a form of education. Hence, where PL94-142 is known to imply that education is instruction and its related services, it may be construed as saying not that education in each and every instance is identifiable with instruction and its services regardless of their goals but that education in the given context with which the law is concerned at that point is identifiable with instruction and its services that aim at socialization. Moreover, EAHCA's suggestion that education is something that may or may not stress special instruction and its services may be interpreted as intending that the something is socialization. Still further, the law's indication that education is whatever a society's government declares or authorizes to be education in some institution may be taken, with only a modest shift in meaning, as being about not education in general but officially recognized socialization. The statement, then, would read: officially recognized education is socialization that a society's government declares or authorizes to be socialization in some institution. Obviously, PL94-142's title may be rendered as "The Socialization for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975." Socialization, however, cannot satisfy the education-training test. The test requires that an acceptable notion of education allows that education is necessarily distinguishable from training. If, however, education is socialization, it is not necessarily distinguishable from training. Training, as in toilet training, military training, and job training, might be a matter of socialization.

Because our attempt to establish either instruction and its support services or socialization as a unifying definition has faltered upon meeting the education-training distinction, we might do well to consider whether or not education as something opposed to training might serve as the fundamental sense of education in PL94-142. Even though the distinction between education and training is not clarified by EAHCA or any of the other portions of Chapter 33, it is clarified to a noticeable extent in the field of special education. According to the literature of that field education, when opposed to training, is instruction in academic skills, e.g., reading, writing, and arithmetic; whereas training, when opposed to education, is instruction in nonacademic skills of some social worth, e.g., dressing oneself, feeding oneself, stocking shelves, and riding a bicycle. While training is not essentially a matter of education, it may be preparatory to or in some other way contributory to education; and when it is contributory to education, it may be and often is spoken of as educational. In view of these definitions an educable mentally retarded person is one who can learn, occurrently or prospectively, from instruction in basic academics as well as from training, whereas a trainable mentally retarded person is one who can learn, occurrently or prospectively, from instruction in nonacademic skills of social value but can learn at best very little in basic academics that is meaningful.

Education in this sense can be regarded as underlying the other senses of the term in PL94-142. Education as something that may or may not emphasize special education and its support services may be interpreted as academic instruction that may or may not stress special academic instruction and its required services. Education as instruction and its attendant services may be construed as consisting of academic instruction and its needed services, including nonacademic instruction and its services that contribute to academic instruction. Education as whatever a society's government declares or authorizes to be education in some institution may be taken as whatever academic instruction and elements contributing to such instruction are officially recognized in the given society. And the term "education" in EAHCA's title may be seen as referring to academic instruction and its support services including whatever training contributes to academic instruction. Thus, it is only in section 1402 that the term "education" refers to education in just the strict sense. In all its instances in PL94-142 the term refers not only to academic instruction, or education in the strict sense, but also to matters that are educational only in that they help make academic instruction possible. In EAHCA, therefore, "education" has a broad meaning. Yet, because this meaning logically presupposes the word's strict sense in section 1402, I submit that the term in PL94-142 has two meanings, a strict one and a derivative broad one.

As presented above, EAHCA's peripheral meaning of education involves an ambiguity. Seeing, hearing, talking, or walking is likely to contribute to learning from academic instruction in that it tends to contribute to such instruction regardless of particular circumstances or in that it probably will contribute to a given case of such instruction regardless of other cases. If, therefore, a person says simply that toilet training is educational, he or she may mean that toilet training contributes to academic instruction in that it tends to make such instruction possible in all circumstances or in that it is likely to enable a particular person in a given situation to learn from such instruction. Yet, there is no doubt about which sense of contribution that PL94-142 has in mind. Even though EAHCA is concerned with contributions to academic instruction only in that they pertain to the particular circumstances of such instruction, it does not thereby necessarily regard contributions to academic instruction regardless of particular circumstances as not educational. It just is not very interested in educational matters of that sort. As far as PL94-142 is concerned, consequently, training in dressing oneself or some other social skill is educational for a person if it is needed by that person and if it is likely to help enable him or her to learn from academic instruction. It logically cannot be educational for a person who is uneducable, i.e., a person who has no prospect of being able to learn from academic instruction.

It might be noted that this position is at odds with the law's title. The title, we have argued already, should be viewed as referring not to all handicapped children but at most to all handicapped persons aged three to twenty-one, inclusive. Even with this construction, however, the title appears to oppose our thesis. According to that thesis EAHCA allows that some handicapped persons aged three to twenty-one, inclusive, might be uneducable and therefore cannot intend that education ought to be provided for all handicapped persons within that age range. According to its title, however, EAHCA appears to mean that education necessarily should be furnished to all such handicapped persons and consequently cannot allow that any person in that age range is uneducable. What do we do, then? Do we reinterpret the title to fit our thesis, or do we alter our thesis to accommodate the title? Our interpretation will be refined to say that education is to be furnished for all handicapped persons aged three to twenty-one, inclusive, who are educable. There are two reasons for taking this alternative. First, it is consistent with PL94-142's expressed interest in promoting equal educational opportunity for handicapped persons. Such opportunity is to be extended to any handicapped person who is educable. Second, even though the alternative denies that each and every handicapped person in the 3-21 age range is necessarily educable, it leaves open the possibility that each and every such person is educable as a matter of fact: In construing the title to refer to all handicapped persons aged 3-21, inclusive, who are educable, it does not deny that all such persons might turn out, as a matter of fact, to be educable. By contrast, interpreting the title to mean categorically that all handicapped persons three to twenty-one years of age, inclusive, are educable forecloses the possibility that some handicapped persons in that age range are uneducable as a matter of fact. As far as I am aware, there is not sufficient factual evidence presently to warrant the exclusion of the possibility that some handicapped persons three to twenty-one years of age, inclusive, are uneducable as a matter of fact.

IV

Despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has decided a variety of cases involving PL94-142, it has yet to delimit what the statute intends by "education." One of the Court's decisions on such cases, however, is suggestive as to what the law means. It is the Rowley decision, which was the Court's first effort to interpret EAHCA. My view of what EAHCA intends education to be is compatible with what the Court says in Rowley.

In Rowley the Court noted that PL94-142 expressly defines the term "free appropriate public education" as "special education" and"related services" of a sort.[15] It also pointed out that the law forthrightly states what it means by "special education" and "related services." Special education is "specially designed instruction, at not cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions."[16] Related services are "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services...as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education."[17] With reference to these meanings of "special education" and "related services," the Court attempted to clarify further the statutory definition of "free appropriate public education" by rephrasing it: "'a free appropriate public education' consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' from the instruction."[18]

At first glance, it appears that the Court indubitably identified education with some kind of instruction. EAHCA's definition of special education seems to intend that education is instruction, at least of a type; and the Court's rephrasing of the law's definition of free appropriate public education, which depends partially upon the statute's definition of special education, refers to special education as a variety of "educational instruction," which surely raises the possibility that education is a variety of instruction. At second glance, however, it becomes apparent that the Court asserted nothing conclusive on the matter. That PL94-142 views special education as instruction of a sort does not imply that it is identifying all education with instruction of any type. The law here means only that special education, not all education, is identifiable with a kind of instruction. It is logically possible for education to be such that it includes both some variety of instruction as well as something apart from instruction, e.g., learning that is separate from instruction. A similar point may be made about the Court's reference to educational instruction. That some instruction is educational does not entail that all education is instructional let alone that all instruction is educational. Yet, even if the Court did not clearly identify education with some sort of instruction, it at least intimated that this is what education is. Insofar, the Court favors our position that for EAHCA education in the strict sense is academic instruction. That the type of instruction at which the Court might have been alluding is academic instruction cannot be determined by a reading of Rowley. But until the Court denies that education is academic instruction, its Rowley decision may be regarded as compatible with our thesis.

NOTES

1. 20 USC 1400(c) (1982).
2. E.G., Lauren A. Larson, "Comment: Beyond Conventional Education: A Definition of Education under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975," Law and Contemporary Problems, 48 (Spring, 1985): 63-91.
3. 20 USC 1400(c).
4. 20 USC 1401(18).
5. 20 USC 1401(16).
6. 20 USC 1401(17).

7. 20 USC 1401(7)
8. 20 USC 1401(8).
9. 20 USC 1401(9).
10. 20 USC 1401(10).
11. 20 USC 1401(11)(c).
12. 20 USC 1424(a)(3).
13. 20 USC 1402(a).
14. 20 USC 3401-3404.
15. 458 US 176, at 188 (Court's emphases).
16. 458 US 176, at 188.
17. 458 US 176, at 188.
18. 458 US 176, at 188-89.

RESPONSE TO ROBERT D. HESLEP

J. Don Reeves
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Professor Heslep's analysis of "The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975" is itself handicapped at the outset by his assumption that "Education" in the title must refer to something which such children, or persons aged three to twenty-one, can have. I will argue the term might refer to situations in which the handicapped are allowed to participate. He suggests that some might think it must be definable as a very broad type of learning. Through analysis of the term in various contexts in the law, he concludes that "Education" has several senses:

1) the term refers "to something that may be had."
2) the term refers "to something that may or may not emphasize special education and the services supporting it."
3) the term "signifies instruction and its support services."
4) the term refers "to whatever a society's government declares or authorizes to be education in some institution."
5) the term refers "to something opposed to training."

In an attempt to unify these meanings, Professor Heslep proposes that "education" in the title refers to "academic instruction and its support services, including whatever training contributes to academic instruction. Only one problem remains. His thesis requires that all handicapped persons three to twenty-one years of age be educable. He leaves this open as a possibility even though some may, as a matter of fact, be uneducable *if* education in the Act refers to academic instruction and related support services.

Suppose, however, that "Education" in the title does not refer to what may be had, but to an institutionalized arrangement of experiences, namely, schooling. The purpose of the Act was to provide "a free appropriate public education" for the handicapped. We do not use the term "public education" to refer to some kind of academic instruction, but to schooling situations which are open to all persons of appropriate age groups. The intent of the law was to open these situations to handicapped persons who either had enjoyed no opportunity for engaging in schooling or who were restricted to special purpose schools, ie. schools for the blind, etc., which, while public in the support sense, were not public in the enrollment sense.

Utilizing this interpretation of the meaning of "Education" in the title allows the analysis which Professor Heslep makes of other uses of the term to stand. The "training" issue is resolved since it is not contradictory to include training within the activities encompassed under "education" when education refers to schooling rather than to acts of instruction. This use of the term in the title does not exclude the possibility that the term may be, and is, used with other meanings in the text of the law.

The Rowley decision extended the schooling opportunities mandated by the Act of 1975 to areas, such as hospitals, outside the physical boundaries of school,

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but supported the intention of the Act that whatever was available in public schools had to be made available to the handicapped whether they could physically attend such schools or not.

My response to Professor Heslep's paper is to agree that the term education is used in many senses. Had he stipulated the schooling meaning for the term in the title, he probably would have arrived at the conclusions he did regarding other uses, but he would have had another unifying meaning to consider. That meaning is that "Education" is schooling. I am not suggesting that schooling is the meaning of education. I am arguing that Professor Heslep was handicapped from the beginning by assuming that the term education is limited to meanings related to instruction and/or learning, and that is not the case. Education is used often to refer to schooling. The questions "Has he completed his education?" and "How much education does she have?" are obvious examples.

The intent of Congress was to open public school doors to the handicapped and to guarantee what was necessary to see that the handicapped could profit from the experience. Not being philosophers, the bill's drafters used the term education in several senses, but parents know and understand what the Act means. Their children are to have the same opportunity to take advantage of what public schools have to offer as do other children. The Act could have been named "Public Schooling for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975," but this would have lacked the psychological impact carried by the term education. What the Act means will continue to create discussion in the courts and at meetings of philosophers. We thank Professor Heslep for his stimulation of our thinking about this issue.

SCHOOLS OF EDUCATION: THE SELF-TAUGHT TEACHER

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A question on a survey:

> What skills did your training program give you that you have never had to use?

Selected Answers:

> --Idealism
> --Philosophy-based programs
> --Lots of blue-sky theories and speculation which have been mercifully purged from my short-term memory.

These were some of the replies from a survey sent out to 1986 graduates from the School of Education at Chapel Hill. They have been heard before, but despite the obvious problem of seeing these answers as "skills" we were troubled by them. Central to our concern is a new Middle Grades teacher education program which has been implemented this fall at the University. The backbone of this program is that teacher training ought to reflect the tasks that teachers perform. It is openly and unashamedly clinical in its approach. Educational foundations has appeared in a 1.5 hour course that includes a day in the life of a teacher and of a student, visits to a school board meeting and a faculty meeting, and so on. It is rather like the "expanding universe" approach to social studies, geared to college students. Other than this one mini-course, not one class in the two-year program could be described as addressing typical "foundations" issues.

Both of us have been teachers, and have taught and supervised student teachers. Because of remarks and concerns like those expressed above as well as the current monolithic "clinical" approach which is being implemented to address assumed needs, we came to the conclusion that despite attempts to objectify the art of teaching and the subsequent reification of pedagogical knowledge, teachers, ironically, are largely self-taught. This paper concerns: what the business of being "self-taught" means; what ramifications it has for current pedagogical practice in universities and schools; and what can be done to assist the self-taught teacher.

We see three ways in which beginning teachers are put into the position of teaching themselves how and what to teach: (1) much of teaching is inherently idiosyncratic, requiring teachers to innovate as situations and students change; (2) their teacher education was inadequate, forcing them to teach themselves what they should have been taught; (3) they were exposed to vital information, but for some reason it did not "take." From our observations, we see beginning

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teachers as surprised that so much teaching is self-taught, angry that there was information they could have gotten but did not, and frustrated by information they did get but did not understand or could not relate to their teaching. The history and philosophy of education fall under the last category.

Schools of Education: The Self Taught Teacher

Our conception of the "self-taught" teacher has been largely an empirical one based upon our ten years in public education and five years of student teacher supervision. We have also been led to this idea by the solitary nature of teaching and by the "indeterminate" nature of the knowledge and skills required to teach. Teaching is "a high discretion task [that requires] the exercise of initiative, expertise and judgment with respect to organizational goals."[1] Teaching is (or ought to be) a profession in which teachers make fundamental decisions regarding, for example, course content, lesson plans, and classroom atmosphere.[2]

According to one line of reasoning, if we could operationalize this decision-making somehow, we could produce confident, knowledgeable people for the classrooms of America. This seems to be an assumption of "clinically" based programs such as the one at UNC already mentioned. But, while teacher education programs may be able to teach what course content, lesson plans, and classroom atmosphere are, can these programs train teachers to make fundamental decisions concerning them? Joseph Diorio suggests that in an occupation, the leverage with which one acts is determined by the precision of the knowledge governing the occupation. Teaching is an occupation in which the knowledge base is broad and imprecise. Therefore, the decisions to act and how to act are left in the hands of the actor.[3]

There may be some problems with the idea of a teacher as a self-taught professional. Perhaps beginning teachers are not as truly at a loss for ideas as they seem to be or claim to be. Lee Schulman and others in the "Knowledge Growth in a Profession" project, found that, "Teachers' frequent and specific references to coursework . . . belied their more global statements about its negligible impact."[4] Moreover, teachers' ways of thinking about teaching may derive from the ideology that underlay their teacher education experiences. Teachers might also be adhering to the techniques of a favorite teacher from their pasts or their own unconsidered biases on the "role of education" in society.

Yet "influences," whether they be courses, ideologies, grand old teachers, or *Good Morning, Miss Dove*, are, in fact, only biases. These biases may color the *way* teachers have to adjust, create, and teach themselves, but they do not weaken our basic proposition. (Later in this paper we will suggest ways of dealing with these biases, given the fundamentally self-taught nature of teaching.) In other areas, notably "pedagogical content knowledge," beginning teachers are forced into deconstructing disciplines they *thought* they knew in order "to conceptualize the subject matter for teaching, . . . to teach particular topics, . . . to plan content specific units and lessons, [and identify] current resources and curriculum materials."[5]

There are some things in any profession that are learned "on the job," especially in a profession as vital and fluid as education. Given this, we suspect there is a profound ethical dilemma in many schools of education: pre-service teachers are being led to believe they have "the answers," but find that they do not. They can survive the best they can; the creative teachers might well revel in the challenge. They can try to impose that with which they are familiar upon that with which they are unfamiliar. If teaching is perfectly predictable, anyone can be trained to do it. The teacher who has bought this line must in part blame themselves for their difficulties. If they avoid the shame of asking for help to "obvious" questions, they add a mental isolation to the physical isolation of teaching. On the other hand, a person might deny there is any problem--that there is no difference between what they learned and what they experience. If teaching really is "a piece of cake" then it is subject to what Johan Huizinga has described in reference to the late Middle Ages, as the "crystallization of images," an enervation of symbols, a loss of meaning and importance,[6] a ritualization in which, in Clifford Geertz's terms, "Life is just a bowl of strategies."[7]

Schools of Education: The University

Let us look further at the issue of what many student teachers receive as teacher education. Landon Beyer describes the philosophical basis of teacher education as a search for certainty in order to evaluate claims to knowledge.[8] Cleo Cherryholmes applies this idea to social studies: "If one shares [the] assumption that only logical positivism or empiricism counts as knowledge, it follows that there will be a tendency to focus on objects that lend themselves to quantitative research."[9] The forms that certainty takes when measured quantitatively are objectives, concepts, and generalizations that dictate not only what is taught, but how it is taught. In developing model lessons for the Middle Grades planning course, inquiry plans were written. After the plans were completed it was decided that they had to be altered to fit the Madeline Hunter-inspired state model. The discussion over what was to be considered as "input" in an inquiry lesson was not only ridiculous, but also profoundly revealed the kind of traps that had been set for creative teachers and students. A recently published textbook on teaching social studies not only has "anticipatory sets" and "expected outcomes" in each chapter, but also states that the method of science is the most likely method of determining truth. Knowledge is only scientifically derived knowledge, not self-knowledge.[10] The book also contains ready-made lists of concepts and generalizations for fledgling teachers. We believe such approaches to education lead to a reification of the established ways of looking at teaching and, in an extended view, of the way the learner sees his or her world. Logical positivism in teacher education is not inherently wrong. Rather, it is like a trompe l'oeil painting. It is presented as real and true; it looks real and appears to have depth and to portray to an individual observer what it seems to be. But put another observer on the side of the painting in order to see another dimension and a convincing argument can be made that there really is no hatchet in a piece of wood or actual coins on a table--just one representation of them.

One might be tempted to say, "so what?" One representation is better than none, and perhaps beginning teachers need to have "what works" spelled out for them. There are two flaws in this argument. The first is "what works" assumes a uniformity in classrooms that does not exist and denies the self-teaching that occurs in a heterogeneous classroom. The second flaw is that the logical positivist approach to teacher education in itself has engendered ideologies that reflective teachers may not wish to foster. This approach above all is a matter of names and language. John Dewey, Elliot Eisner and others have argued that ". . . language in its customary sense can divert our attention from the qualities of direct experience to their causes. It can easily be used to substitute concept for percept, the name of the thing for the thing itself."[11] Eisner, in a recent article goes on to make his customary case for non-discoursive ways of knowing. When the images we seek to learn and teach become crystallized in language, knowledge can be deprived of its richness and dimensions.

When teaching is evaluated by "practices," the definition of teaching becomes "practices." Clinical experience in teacher education becomes a matter of practicing those practices or seeing short clips on videotape, sans context, in order to illustrate a master of the practice or the dire results of ignoring the practice.[12] Schulman has argued that case studies can be valuable for teacher education, but only when tied to theory. Practices devoid of context or theory prepare a student teacher for an acting career should the script ever show up again in his experience. Otherwise, the teacher is on his own. It is amusing to speak to teachers who, having to undergo evaluation by the North Carolina Teacher Performance Appraisal Instrument, come up with the perfect six point plan, brief their students, and produce the play when the evaluator is in the room. Practice without an understanding of its theoretical base, is in error and unethical. The question is, how aware of that base is the teacher?

Margaret LeCompte and Mark Ginsburg write:

> "According to Popkewitz, Tabachnick and Zeichner (1979), 'Teacher education articulates not only "skill" competence, but communicates ways of reasoning about teaching that contain principles of authority, legitimacy, and control' (p.5B) These constitute a prevailing orthodoxy. What this means is that education may be an essentially conservative enterprise that in its role, at least in the public schools, has been to transmit to new generations those values and basic cognitive skills deemed legitimate and necessary by dominant groups in society."[13]

Cherryholmes is more direct: "Discourses about research design, educational objectives, curricular sequence, and so on are not simply about knowledge, but also about power."[14] This power derives from researchers who control discourse by their command of quantitative research techniques; from publishers who seek to provide textbooks for a conservative audience, and from a public which has itself been trained by teachers educated to count some things as knowledge and to exclude others.[15] As the power relations that shape the discourse become stronger, the etiquette of the discourse about what constitutes knowledge becomes more impersonal.[16] One simply does not say or do or question certain things. They have become reified knowledge, that which has lost its human authorship and is simply understood to be true.[17] Moreover, the anonymity of these relationships increases the sense of powerlessness of those who do not share in the construction of meaning about what they are supposed to do. Hence, the resentment that one sometimes hears from teachers towards research for which they share no responsibility.

The powerlessness of teachers in defining knowledge may have originated in changes in teaching itself. Michel Foucault has enumerated the operations of the "disciplinary power" of norms, including the differentiation of one individual from another based upon "minimum thresholds;" and the measurement of "the abilities, the level, the nature of individuals."[18] The result of setting these norms, according to Foucault, was the examination. From testing one's mettle in intellectual "jousts," or from producing a personal (and public) artifact as an apprentice, the "examination enabled the teacher, while transmitting his knowledge, to transform his pupils into a whole field of knowledge . . . it guaranteed the movement of knowledge from the teacher to the pupil, but it extracted from the pupil a knowledge destined and reserved for the teacher . . . the age of the 'examining school' [in the 18th century] marked the beginning, of a pedagogy that functions as a science."[19] For example, to what extent has the teacher become a clinician in Foucault's sense of the word? In requiring teachers to use diagnostic tests and other prescriptive data are we not promoting the teacher as an expert? Are teachers inclined to ask not, "What is the matter with you?" but instead, "Where does it hurt?"[20] In this sense, examinations remove the subjective ability of teachers to judge, in favor of an "objective" measure that is neither objective or particularly good at measuring much besides a few facts. The creative teacher who is really trying to "learn" his class would want to allow students to create as well--at the most fundamental level--the student's own description of his own cognitive or affective self.

There are two implications for the self-taught teacher: The first is that while the nature of teaching demands reflection and self-teaching, the rules of the discourse on what constitutes knowledge forbid the act, or at least deny its need. There may be useful results in learning, say, principles of classroom management, but, as C.A. Bowers writes, "[when] rules, schedules, and degree requirements . . . take on the quality of 'thingness' . . . . people lose sight of the fact that they have the power to change them when they cease to serve a useful purpose."[21] The "thingness" of teaching thus denies the need for subjective thought. The second implication is that teachers might see that teaching requires self-teaching and will rebel against the constraints imposed upon them.

Those who choose to rebel have no easy task. Not only does the physical isolation of teaching inhibit discourse which might lead to other options and critical stances, but the mental isolation of the logical positivist approach to education is also a hindrance. If a fledgling teacher has been told "what works" and his curriculum materials are based upon the same things, where is he to go for alternatives? "Teaching is conducted without an audience of peers. It is devoid of a history of practice."[22] Indeed, as LeCompte and Ginsburg write, ". . . professional teacher education continues to de-emphasize . . . systematic, collective, and expressive modes of problem solving."[23] In a new teacher training program that purports to be "collaborative" a proposal was made that all cooperating teachers should have had North Carolina Mentor Teacher training. One teacher, who had participated in designing the new program, protested, saying she had over ten years experience, had worked with a significant number of student teachers, and had a supervisory certificate. Her point was rejected by university personnel: she still "needed" the special training. After all, if all have not had the same training, how will the university know if the cooperating teachers are any good? The life of the individual teacher who realizes that teaching is a creative act, may be a lonely and frustrating one.

For those teachers who do take advantage of the creative, self-taught nature of teaching, there is one danger: the only criticism they truly have is their own, and the primary training they may have had in criticism has dealt with measurable teacher practices, learner characteristics, etc.. In breaking with this paradigm, teachers are also teaching themselves to critique themselves--in isolation--a practice that may lead to a narrow and dogmatic view of what they are doing. We will later maintain that communal criticism can resolve this problem.

So far, we have examined how teaching is largely self-taught; how this condition is forced upon the practitioner by the inadequacies of logical-positivist teacher education, and at the same time frustrated by the rules and isolation that this traditional teacher education engenders. Under the pressure of these conflicting messages, it is no wonder that teachers look for something to blame. If one has been told that one can teach with a certain set of tools and one cannot, one can either blame the tools--an event rendered difficult because of the power of the paradigm from which they were derived--or one can look for more tools and dismiss impediments such as philosophy, sociology, and history as unnecessary. It is curious, but understandable, that in the opening passage of this paper, "idealism" and "blue-sky theories" were written in response to a question about skills. "Idealism is a bad tool because I don't know how to use it. Give me something else that works." More tools do not seem to be the answer, but we have some suggestions.

Schools of Education: Another Approach

A beginning teacher faced with new situations and responsibilities might find it helpful to: (1) have the freedom to create by having a repertoire of ideas without being intellectually bound to one pedagogical approach; (2) have the confidence to interact with others to decide what makes sense, and (3) take an approach to teaching characterized by philosophic inquiry.

Beyer argues for a hermeneutic model achieved through social interaction. In his case for "contextualizing" philosophy and science, and we might add, education, Beyer wants to make teaching a more human activity.[24] Taking the "conversion" process of going from one scientific paradigm to another as described by Thomas Kuhn, Beyer sees knowledge as becoming constantly de-ritualized through the give-and-take of reasoned discourse.

So how can this happen? The answer may lie in making "blue-sky theories" more meaningful. To begin with, blue-sky theories need to be brought down to earth where students can reflect and make sense out of them. To leave them up in the sky is to idealize them just as classroom management is idealized. Teachers do not need any more "skills" they later perceive as not working. Beyer, following Richard Rorty, takes the iconoclastic approach of junking the idea of "foundations" entirely, or at least "foundational philosophy." His alternative would be to clarify "the connections among the forms of curricula, pedagogy, and evaluation that dominate in schools and . . . social, political, and cultural practices that interact with and help shape educational institutions."[25]

Making these connections will not be easy. A key problem for beginning teachers can be described by Clifford Geertz's exploration of Heinz Kohert's "experience-near" (seeing only the trees) and "experience-distant" (seeing only the forest) ideas. When a student teacher goes into the field to observe, he or she becomes "awash in immediacies," of words and actions, the meaning of which is often a mystery. If the student teacher only had the concepts from a teacher education text to go by, he or she might feel "stranded in abstractions and smothered in jargon." Despite the fact that a fledgling teacher has been through the educational experience before (but as a student), both the experience-near and experience-distant encounters with teaching are likely to make them feel apart from their profession. To see teachers as teachers see themselves, and even more difficult--to see themselves as teachers--requires experience, concepts, and a dialectical relationship between the two: what Geertz has described as a "hermeneutic circle."[26] Geertz's hermeneutics is different from Beyer's, but both are characterized by constant discourse and a freedom from what we have referred to as the crystallization of images.

Current field work for student teachers often takes the form of immersion: sterile experiences that not only leave students awash in "immediacies," but erroneously imply that what they see is the same as if they were not present, or what they would surely experience if they were "real" teachers. Beyer proposes that field experiences serve as "cultural laboratories" in which "theoretical insights may be revealed, social interactions analyzed and critiqued for their relations with moral and social ideals, and the possibilities of alternative actions assessed."[27] This "active research" for preservice teachers seems like an excellent way to encourage beginning teachers to reflect upon what they are doing. The power of the discourse referred to earlier is placed in the hands of practitioners instead of in the textbook market, or accepted scientific dogma.

It is all very well to say, teachers ought to be able to do this, or schools of education do that. It is quite another to make changes happen in the face of bureaucratic regulations and general understandings of how things are supposed to be. Helping teachers to question what and how they are teaching is a step in the right direction. As we have noted all along, teachers, because of the nature of teaching, have to constantly create and educate themselves and this is felt most acutely in their initial experiences. Teachers also, in the process of creating, critique what they are doing and make judgments. We have already mentioned the pitfalls of self-criticism in isolation. A key change then, would be to encourage self-criticism, but in a community. Beyer suggests that teachers adopt the idea expressed in Habits of the Heart of a "community of memory," one that does not forget its past.[28] Robert Bellah and his colleagues note how:

> "People growing up in communities of memory not only hear the stories that tell how the community came to be, what its hopes and fears are, and how its ideals are exemplified in outstanding men and women; they also participate in the practices--ritual, aesthetic, ethical--that define the community as a way of life."[29]

Conclusion

It would seem as though educational foundations could go a long way in helping to develop these communities. First, they could consider teachers primarily as a community of professionals and include beginning and preservice teachers in this group. The history of education would then be the history of this community, its myths, heroes, and ideals.[30] Second, local communities and the schools that are part of them could be studied. Gerald Grant, in The World We Created At Hamilton High, writes, "the ethos [of a school] represents the enduring values or character of the school community."[31] Students could see how a positive ethos (or lack of it) has arisen in a school and a community. Finally, educational foundations, especially philosophy, could address the seeming paradox between the world of the individual, self-taught teacher and, to quote Grant again, teachers who are "mutually creating and sustaining a world."[32] What questions need to be asked about the world of a teacher, the sort of power that sustains it, the means of evaluation that define it, and the individual and collective decisions that make it succeed or fail? Philosophers as teachers and teachers as philosophers need to address the differences between the following two remarks: The first is from a study done in 1979 in Houston; the second is from the survey mentioned at the beginning of this paper:

Quotation from an interview:

"I just don't have a philosophy of how to teach writing yet. I'd like to take a workshop or something."[33]

Question from a survey:

What were some teaching skills you never had to use?

"Learning educational issues and philosophies--but I'm glad that I learned them."

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23. LeCompte and Ginsburg, "How Students Learn," 21.

24. Beyer, "The Reconstruction of Knowledge," 120.

25. Ibid., 130.

26. Geertz, Local Knowledge, 57,69.

27. Beyer, "The Reconstruction of Knowledge," 131.

28. Ibid., 130-131.

29. Robert N. Bellah, et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment In American Life (New York: Perennial Library, 1985), 154.

30. See Schulman, "Those Who Understand," p.12, for a discussion of the importance of myths, or "pedagogical parables" in organizations.

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32. Ibid., 175.

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RESPONSE TO PETER HESSLING AND VAN DEMPSEY:

THE SELF-TAUGHT TEACHER

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It is difficult to respond in any meaningful way to a paper so compatible with one's own views. Usually in a response of this nature it is much easier to find a major point to which a strong exception can be made and go from there. In this case I cannot. Peter and Van have provoked much thought, however, and provided me with an opportunity to reflect upon and review my twenty-five years as a teacher educator and those first few years as a high school teacher when I learned to teach in three different school settings in North Carolina. There was a four year Navy gap between my initial student teaching experience and the first job.

It is important to note that in my first year of teaching, I was involved in a graduate program in teacher education and had the advantage of a running dialogue with experiences as a student and the day to day operations of a classroom. Much of that relationship was positive; some of it was not. For this reason I am not surprised at all at the responses UNC Chapel Hill graduates made concerning their teacher education program--even the association of "idealism" with skills. Similar responses have been made throughout my university career in a number of surveys conducted at East Carolina. In fact, I take comfort in knowing that some students indeed do not and should not passively accept in totality their programs but are more selective and hopefully reflective in what they incorporate into practice. This I think is what Peter and Van stress in their paper.

What Peter and Van Have Said

Peter and Van tell us that because of the efforts to "objectify the art of teaching and to reify pedagogcal knowledge," current "monolithic clinical" designs in teacher education programs produce practicing teachers who have been "led to believe they have the answers," but find that in the "bath of fire" they do not. Consequently, in order to survive in the real world of the classroom, beginning teachers find to their surprise and frustration that they have to teach themselves to teach. Part of doing this involves a rejection of the "idealism" and the "blue sky theories" they learned in school.

Teaching oneself to teach, however, is not only the way it is, but the way it "ought to be;" because teaching is "inherently idiosyncratic" requiring situational innovation and contextual immersion. Basing their conception of the self-taught teacher on an empirical base of ten years in public education and five years of student teaching supervision, Peter and Van suggest that current teacher education programs tend to overlook the "solitary nature of teaching" and the indeterminancy and contextually influenced nature of knowledge and skills which are important in teaching. Architects of such programs erroneously presume that decision-making could be "operationalized" and that "confident, knowledgeable people" could be produced for America's classrooms.

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It is recognized that there may be some problems with the notion of teaching as self-taught. Citing the Knowledge Growth in Teaching studies of Shulman and others, Peter and Van note that much of the global rejection of professional courses by beginning teachers is muted by their frequent references to course work. It is to this point that I would like to speak later.

Much of the remainder of their critique concerning the problems of "schools of education" is a review of the critical literature on the "logical positivist" approach to knowledge (Landon Beyer's assertation that the philosophical foundation for teacher education is a "search for certainty in order to evaluate claims to knowledge"). Such approaches to knowledge when incorporated into the "Madeline Hunter-inspired state model" create dilemmas as well as impossible limits when alternative approaches (inquiry plans) are forced to be rewritten in order to fit the model.

Certainty also promotes the assessment of novice teaching practice by how well one learns to emulate the practice (practice teaching) of one who is the master of a particular practice. Accordingly, say Peter and Van, "Practices devoid of context or theory prepare the student for an acting career should the script ever show up again in his experience." Practice in the absence of theory is essentially what Michael Apple calls the "deskilling of teachers," or in industrial labor/management relations, "the separation of conception from execution." [1]

Although Apple's concerns are primarily with power and domination, Peter and Van go on to suggest that discourse about educational objectives and appropriate research designs and the command of quantitative research techniques by those in control of research is not simply about knowledge but about power and control. Such concerns with control and efficiency leave teachers powerless in defining and selecting the knowledge they need to use in teaching.

In all of this Peter and Van find two major implications for the "self-taught" teacher. First, while the nature of teaching as they have described it demands reflection, what determines knowledged and what is considered appropriate discourse "forbid the act or deny its need." Again objectification and reification deny the need for subjective thought. Secondly, they contend that teachers faced with the requirements of self teaching will rebel against the system imposed upon them. Such rebellion, however, may be no easy task--may even be unpleasant, if not undesirable, hindered by the physical and mental isolation characteristic of contemporary teaching, and lacking the intellectual skills to cope with problems as they arise. It is here that another approach is called for in teacher education, one that would afford the novice teacher with the background and set of attitudes that would enhance the self-teaching effort. Blue sky theories might then be "brought down to earth and made more meaningful."

Through the application of Beyer's "hermeneutic model achieved through social interaction" and Clifford Geertz's exploration of Heinz Kohert's "experience near" and "experience distant," Peter and Van recommend with Beyer that field experiences become "cultural laboratories" where prospective teachers can learn to "question what and how they are teaching," and begin to see the connection of these questions with "moral and social ideals."

The final recommendation is a challenge to educational foundations, especially the history and philosophy of education. Self criticism must develop not in isolation, but in a community of professionals. This must include beginning and pre-service professionals. Historians must help students create a "community of memory" which would give meaning to this discourse, and philosophers must help students know the difference between the open and the closed mind and understand that teaching knowledge is problematic never certain.

There are two comments I would like to make not as a major criticism but more as a reinforcement to what I think are important points in this paper. One has to do with the idea that blaming may be wholesome, and that when students stop complaining we really have more to worry about. The other speaks to the importance of a community of discourse and what this means in terms of enhancing professionalism.

Although it was not overlooked, more balance could have been obtained if Peter and Van had looked closer at the Knowledge Growth in Teaching research of Shulman and others. As you know, this is a research program at Stanford University designed to investigate the process of learning to teach. Special emphasis is given to the way a teacher's subject matter knowledge is related to the planning and teaching process. The "interplay" of pedagogical understanding and content knowledge serve as the focal point of the experiments and case studies in the project. Important in its conclusions was that although both field work and course work are considered important, each offers opportunities for learning to teach. The study takes issue with research that found little impact of course work in teacher education.[2]

One of the conclusions of the study appears to be very important for the future of the social foundations:

> Our data suggest that while novice teachers usually cite their field work as the place they learn how to teach, matters of general pedagogy--both practical and theoretical--can be learned in teacher education courses as well as in the field. The data also seem to indicate that teacher education coursework provides norms for teaching. Courses can suggest an image of the possible, of what could take place in classrooms, balancing the emphasis place on survival skills during fieldwork.[3]

Could it be that the tension created in the student (provided he has had the opportunity for appropriate course work) between what is and what could be is at the base of much of the education course bashing so popular among novice teachers? With me it represented a kind of guilt that I was not accomplishing what was possible. I simply did not know how at the time. Such complaining, however, could become (with the aid of a developing philosophy of education) a continuing dialogue that would encourage the willingness to try new and different ways of teaching. As Joseph Schwab has said, in his now very well known article, "The Practical: A Language for Curriculum" "There are a dozen different ways in which the novel can be read."[4] Indeed there are many ways the novel could be taught, the Civil War be approached or a curricular item or text utilized. That is what I have learned over the years and what I am still learning.

I am still making an effort to find ways to teach the same or similar subject matter dealt with for a long time. A major part of that effort is centered in exactly what Peter and Van recommend: To treat beginning and pre-service teachers as part of that larger "community of professionals" and to make history of education the history of this community with its "myths, heroes and ideals" I might add, however, a history often quite different, plagued with deficient funds, poorly educated teachers drawing little respect from the public, and at times almost impossible environments in which to teach. Through the use of primary historical materials mixed with contemporary texts and articles, sophomores and juniors begin their study of the teaching profession. What these students will hopefully discover is that history will provide them with a strong sense of personal, social and professional identity with regard to the dimension of time. Not only will they develop a sense of history, but hopefully they may begin to make sense out of it as well.

Christopher Lucas says there is almost an impelling use of historical inquiry that satisfies an important human need and that is the use of "history as collective memory and as a source of identity."[5] Developing a similar professional perspective in teacher education would provide a deep and rich source for developing a sense of belongingness and a sense of community in which a shared discourse could begin for pre-service teachers. This is vital in learning what it means to be a professional.

It is said that a professional does not take orders, but is free by virtue of his knowledge and skill to make judgements and decisions in rendering a service to someone else. By its very nature this kind of service is moral. Margret Buchmann says "What is moral presupposes community on both the conceptual and pragmatic level." She goes on to state that the notion of community is "logically prior to the concept of role." The term "teacher," however, is a role word and as such must at times involve obligations that go beyond personal commitments. Role obligations constitute a set of rules of a professional community, and as such provide the framework for making decisions, taking positions and shaping action. Actions or decisions made in the context of teaching "are responsible acts of public significance" and must comply with a set of rules, (a code of conduct) of a professional community.[6]

Peter and Van have addressed the need and importance for teachers to participate in dialogue and discourse as a community of professionals. I think it vital that the discussion begin in that first foundations course.

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5. Christopher Lucas, "Toward a Pedagogy of the Useful Past for Teacher Preparation," Journal of Thought, 20 (Spring, 1985): 24.
6. Margret Buchmann, "Role Over Person: Morality and Authenticity in Teaching," Teachers College Record, 87 (Summer, 1986) 539, 531.

GENDER, THINKING, AND THE EDUCATIONAL IDEAL:

A RECONSIDERATION

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Certainly a central concern of educational foundations is the question: What is the aim of education? Or, stated differently, what kind of person should a sound education produce? The usual answer is, above all, a rational person, a person possessed of a rational mind, one who is able to think, and think well. So by what means should we secure the educated person, the thinker. "The Contemporary Ideal, at least in the late Twentieth Century United States is," as Jane Roland Martin indicates, "one who has had, and profited from, a liberal education... been initiated into the various forms of knowledge and will have acquired... conceptual schemes and cognitive perspectives by which to interpret experience."[1]

The premier contemporary example of the liberal theory of education, and the one referred to by Martin, is that of P. H. Hirst. This theory has many virtues, but it does tend to be exceedingly intellectualistic; one might even say it commits what William James somewhere calls the "intellectualistic fallacy," that is, the assumption that the entire drama of human experience may be grasped by concepts, categories and their relationships alone. Hirst certainly seems to fall into this fallacy, if fallacy it is; for instance, when he writes: "Whatever else is implied in the phrase, to have 'a rational mind' certainly implies experience structured under some form of conceptual scheme. The various manifestations of consciousness, in, for instance, different sense perceptions, different emotions or different elements of intellectual understanding, are intelligible only by virtue of the conceptual apparatus by which they are articulated."[2] Jane Roland Martin responds to this way of thinking about thinking:

> Because we equate educated persons with educated minds and interpret the concept of mind narrowly, a split between reason and emotion is also built into our ideal. But this is not all. Valuing rationality for its contributions to self-control and personal autonomy, we embrace an ideal that cuts the self off from others. No intimations of human connectedness complicate the picture. The ability to sustain human relationships, a desire to care for and nurture other living beings, a sense of oneness with nature -- these are not considered relevant, for the ideal guiding education today divorces self from other even as it alienates each separate self from its own body and emotions.[3]

The ideal of the educated person as divorced from others, their body and emotions is, at bottom, a masculine mode of thinking, one that we will trace backward to what Susan Bordo, in her important paper, "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought," has called

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"the drama of parturition."[4] That is, "the Cartesian re-birthing and re-imaging of knowledge and the world as masculine."[5] Bordo views the "great Cartesian anxiety... although manifestly expressed in epistemological terms, as anxiety over separation,"[6] not only from others, but most especially as an "intellectual flight from the feminine."[7] We will be concerned in this paper with critiquing the currently dominant masculine ideal of thinking and the thinker. We will find that we cannot carry out this critique without considering what we will come to call the narrative drama of culture. It is this drama that gives us our ideal for thinking, the thinker, as well as the thinker's sense of self and society.

The discourse that currently dominates discussion about the ultimate aim of education -- the rational mind -- provides no space in which to speak about empathy, nurturance, or emotion. Such sentiments cannot be expressed, so silence prevails. The characterizations and plots that tell the stories of care, concern and connectedness are not a part of the currently dominant masculine modes of thinking about thought. For this reason many, like Martin, have turned their attention to developing a more feminine ideal of the thinker, self, and society - a drama of connectedness rather than the Cartesian parturition.

In the attempt to develop scripts for a drama of connectedness rather than separation, many critics have turned to metaphors of voice and conversation to describe more comprehensive kinds of thinking than the exclusively individual and cognitive. Martin, in the concluding chapter of her Reclaiming a Conversation, calls for an ideal of "acquaintanceship and conversation."[8] Elsewhere, invoking Carol Gilligan's "ethics of care,"[9] Martin speaks of rethinking education in terms of "the 3 C's of care, concern and connection."[10] Elizabeth Fee, in her "Critiques of Modern Science: The Relationship of Feminism to Other Radical Epistemologies," denounces "the pro-masculine bias existing within science"[11] that legitimizes the active domination of mother nature and the separation of the knower from the known. Likewise invoking Gilligan, Fee urges us to consider the "subversive possibility implie[d] [by] the creation of new ways of experiencing thinking about the relationship of knower and known and a new approach to the 'natural,' structured as a conversation rather than a command."[12] We find similar remarks in the works of Evelyn Fox Keller. In Women's Ways of Knowing, the authors conjoin Jerome Bruner's distinction between "paradigmatic" and "narrative" modes of thought with Gilligan's and Nona Lyons's terms "separate" and "connected" to "speak of separate and connected knowing."[13] Paradigmatic or separate knowers "bring to their group propositions that they have developed as fully as possible and that they hope to sell in the free marketplace of ideas. Members must know the rules, but they need not know each other."[14] By contrast, narrative or connected knowers conduct "conversations among intimates"[15] built on intuition and trust, rather than propositions and the rules of logic. To a considerable degree the two different kinds of thinking appear to be gender distinct with regards to moral thinking.

We see a similar gender distinction in Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice; for instance, in the difference between Jake and Amy's responses to a moral dilemma posed by Kohlberg. Jake sees the dilemma like a "math problem," that is, "impersonally through systems of logic and law,"[16] whereas Amy sees it as a "narrative of relationships that extend over time."[17] Amy views the dilemma like a "drama," that is, "personally through communication in relationship."[18] In this paper we want to further explore the conversation metaphor of thinking in terms of drama and narrative. The goal is to connect them all together to yield a notion of dramatic narrative as a metaphor for thinking that goes beyond voice to gesticulation -- that showing as well as saying is able eventually to connect to the narrative drama of culture.

Perhaps a careful reconsideration of the currently dominant ways of thinking about gender and thinking will truly allow us to reclaim and reconstruct a conversation -- as well as a culture.

In fairness to Hirst, "others" play a larger role in his theory of education than in most. For him the forms of knowledge are ways of structuring experience that "are firmly rooted in that common world of persons and things which we all share..."[19] rather than the private possession of an individual who has knowledge only when their minds correspond to mind independent reality. For Hirst objectivity lies in intersubjectivity. It is here that Hirst himself invokes Michael Oakeshatt's continuing conversation of humankind, wherein "the various forms of knowledge are seen as voices in a conversation...."[20] Ironically, the liberal theory of education, as currently conceived, silences some voices. The hope of many is that thoughtful conversation within caring communities can restore connections and provide a place where new voices can be heard.

Reconstructing the conversation

As already indicated, the place we wish to occupy is within the public forum built by the recent feminist critiques of the aims of education, the ideal of the educated person, and especially the nature of the self-reflective thinker. We especially wish to explore the possibilities created by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl in her paper, "The Education of Women as Philosophers." This title could be misleading. Any confusion it might cause is, however, cleared up immediately by her opening paragraph: "It is unfortunate that, for reasons of personal and cultural habit, when we think about ourselves as askers of questions, thinkers, or, using the generic title, as philosophers, as lovers of wisdom, we think of ourselves as selves. That is, we think: I am thinking -- first person singular, one person solitary, an interiority, a mental machine."[21] In western thought, at least, lovers of wisdom have loved alone and, in a queer sense, only themselves. Traditionally, it has been assumed that the Socratic admonition to "know thy self" may be obeyed without coming to know others. Indeed, many thinkers have thought that others distract us from our thoughts, thereby depriving us of our truest selves. In any event, to talk intelligently about thinking we must, in one way or another, speak also of personhood, self, and society.

Young-Bruehl, and those she represents, reopen questions regarding what thinking is, what it is to be a thinker, and what it is to think about thinking within and without one's self, and even what selfhood might mean on a number of possible rethinkings of the question. Young-Bruehl, for her part, would "re-pose the question: Do men and women think differently?"[22] She answers yes. Perhaps woman's thinking is better. In any case, "the message is clear: no longer are women or their thinking to be judged by the standards of male rationality."[23] It is here we want to begin our own journey. First, though, let us say something about how Young-Bruehl completes her own sojourn.

Young-Bruehl desires to escape mental monism: the idea that there is "one kind of thought, one kind of truth, one form of rationality."[24] So do we. Monism is dogmatism. Her response is Freudian. She writes: "The mind or psyche has structures, but these are in constant interaction; id, ego, and superego are not separate faculties or compartments; they are definable only in dynamic relation to each other. ... Our mental processes are, to speak simply, conversational. We are not solitary when we think; we are full of voices."[25]

The voices that comprise the cacophony of voices that are the dynamic dialogue of self are "representations of both our drive or instincts and their worldly encounters, from the first ones in our parents' care to the most recent, from the early ones with objects and words to the later ones with ranges of others and with our cultural heritage...."[26] Furthermore, "Reason does not rule over instinctual desires in this conception; desires are the reason for reason and reason is the reason for desires. Reason without desire is empty, as desire without reason is blind."[27] So understood we may think of thinking, even self-reflective thinking, as a dialogue or multilogue rather than a soliloquy. "The value of the idea that our mental life with ourselves is conversational -- that it is a constant interconnecting of all sorts of representations of our experience and also potentially an extension of our experience as we hear ourselves and others and reflexively interpret ourselves in and through novel conjunctions or conversational moments -- the value of this idea is that, if we take this idea seriously, live this idea richly, we cannot become monist. And the corollary to this impossibility is that we cannot become prescriptivists of the mental realm."[28] This means, above all, that "we cannot hope to organize the social world in order to structure the conversation of mental processes, including the conflictual conversations, for our mental life does not reflect directly or reproduce unremediatedly the social world -- it is not in any simple way causally related to the social world."[29] Young-Bruehl's nondeterministic connection between the outward conversation of culture and the inward conversation of self allows us to strike a balance between self and others. As Martin says of Plato, "the educational idea he developed emphasized 'inner' harmony to the expense of 'outward' connection."[30] A conversational metaphor that only considered conversations with others in culture would err in the opposite direction -- the loss of inner harmony. What we want is a harmony of the inner with the outer. Young-Bruehl makes herself quite clear: "What I am trying to suggest is that all of the voices or purposes that are our minds must be heard in order for us to achieve not an identity but a more communicative form of life -- the possibility of conversational reconciling, both in ourselves and others."[31] Young-Bruehl's extension of the conversational metaphor in education draws us back from the abyss of indoctrination.

Michel Foucault uses the phrase "dominant forms of discourse" to describe the hegemony that arises when one and only one linguistic structure holds sway. When the dominant form of discourse is most successful it not only suppresses other ideas and actions, but even alternative forms of thought, the darkest form of indoctrination. Considering Young-Bruehl's thinking in terms of critical theory, a reading she seems to invite, it is clear that she is seeking to use a dialectical strategy to reconstruct the currently dominant masculine discourse on thinking.

For our part we want to enter the dialectic at a slightly different point, although for much the same purpose and, hopefully, with much the same results. Many perspectives are consonant with Young-Bruehl's pluralism. Ours is meant to be but another perspective, another voice in the conversation, or, more accurately, a different drama. An extension of the conversational metaphor would readily accommodate Molly Bloom's soliloquy (although Young-Bruehl's extention may already do that), books by the Bronte sisters, the dance and the pantomime, showing as well as telling. Thinking involves sights, insights, silences, as well as sounds, moments of mood as well as poetic moments, denouements as well as conclusions. We seek to extend the conversational metaphor of thinking to include narrative, and eventually dramatic narrative.

The Cartesian Self

The two different modes of thinking yield two very distinct models of the thinker, the thinking self, and the self in society. The locus classicus for connecting self with argumentation, rather than with others, is the Cartesian quest for certainty. This quest centers on the certainty of self, i.e., self identity. It does so to such a degree that Descartes comes to confront himself, not with ordinary others, but with one all powerful, evil and deceptive other. The very word argumentation suggests conflict and confrontation. In the Cartesian case the confrontation is between the self and an evil genius that would attempt not only to deceive him about the world, but about his very self-identity as well.

The truth functional proposition that constitutes the conclusion of the Cartesian argument is, of course, the famous cogito ergo sum. Here, quite literally, the existence of the self is the conclusion of argumentation and the process of argumentation; the thinking is itself a crucial premise. The cogito was to be the Archimedian fixed point, the fulcrum from which the philosopher could move the world of ideas and secure certainty. Unfortunately, the indubitable Cartesian center has remained elusive. Critics have contended, for instance, that all Descartes proves is that thinking exists and not where it exists, much less for whom.

The Cartesian way is the way the western world has thought for the last three hundred years or what is commonly called the "modern era." The Cartesian way is also the culmination of the preceding two-thousand years of thinking, or more exactly, reflective thinking. Such thought traps us in a Cartesian cage; it leaves us alone, always alienated from the other. It is thinking exactly as Young-Bruehl expresses it: "first person singular, one person solitary, an interiority, a mental machine."[32] Such thinking generates a tremendous problem for itself and others, a problem that has remained intractable for western thought at least since the time of Descartes. The problem we have in mind is the so-called "problem of other minds." This is a problem whose very intractability says something about the commonly received relation between reflective thinking, the thinker, self, and society.

Susan Bordo, following Richard Bernstein, Sandra Harding, Margaret Mahler, Richard Rorty and others, refers to Cartesian rationalism and the Cartesian quest for certainty as an attempt to escape the anxiety of doubt and the dread of human finitude and sense of aloneness in an uncaring universe. The "Cartesian way" is seen as a path leading away from history, culture, and, in the end, others, all and each of which or whom at least could and probably already have deceived us. The result of Cartesian rationalism, to use the words of Karl Stern, "is the pure masculinization of thought." This is what Susan Bordo terms the "great Cartesian Anxiety, anxiety over separation -- from the organic female universe."[33] The Cartesian approach to the world is not biologically masculine according to Bordo, but cognitively and epistemologically masculine:

> Its key term is detachment: from the emotional life, from the peculiarities of time and place, from personal quirks, prejudices, and interests, and most certainly, from the object itself.[34]

But this detachment is more a mode of denial, "a reaction formation to the loss of 'being one with the world'," or a "defiant gesture of independence from the female cosmos -- a gesture that is at the same time compensation for a profound loss."[35] This is an "aggressive intellectual flight from the feminine rather than (simply) the confident articulation of a positive new epistemological ideal."[36] Bordo then goes on to describe "Cartesian objectivism, and modern science in general," in terms of a cultural "drama of parturition" by which she means the internalization of European culture, what Stephen Toulman has called "the inwardness of mental life."[37]

Epistemological crises, Cartesian Anxiety, and dramatic narrative

In his paper, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," Alasdair MacIntyre connects Cartesian anxiety to the idea of dramatic narrative by means of his idea of epistemological crises. Although MacIntyre develops his position for the purposes of appraising Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, his remarks greatly resemble those of Bordo and others in a way that will allow us to expand their thinking and see more clearly the way in which the Cartesian mode of argumentation attempted to ignore dramatic narrative altogether.

According to MacIntyre epistemological crises arise from a disharmony in "the relationship of *seems* and *is*...."[38] the other seems to love us, or seemed to love us; is their love true, or how could it have seemed they loved us, but did not; how could we be so deceived? Such circumstances certainly can induce anxiety and lead to doubts about our interpretations of ourselves and others. What's more, "were we all of us all of the time to have to reckon with the multiplicity of possible interpretations open to us, social life as we know it could scarcely continue."[39] The vicissitudes of human intentions can induce anxiety, paralyze action, and render asunder the threads of the social fabric. The problem here, according to MacIntyre, is our attempt to justify "inferences from premises about the behavior of other people to conclusions about their thoughts, feelings, and attitudes, and of inferences from premises about how individuals have acted in the past to conclusions expressed about generalizations about their behavior -- generalizations that would make reasonably reliable predictions about their future actions."[40]

Once in an epistemological crisis we share the plight of Shakespeare's Hamlet. Something is rotten in our Denmarks, although we are uncertain what. We find that our schema's will not allow us to correctly interpret the intentions of those around us; effective action is impossible. It is all too easy to see ourselves in Hamlet's predicament. As MacIntyre describes it: "Hamlet's problems arise because the dramatic narrative of his family and of the kingdom through which his own place in society and his relationships to others has been disrupted by radical interpretive doubts."[41] MacIntyre then goes on to observe that, "to be unable to render oneself intelligible is to risk being taken to be mad, is, if carried far enough, to be mad. And madness or death may always be the outcomes which prevent the resolution of an epistemological crisis, for an epistemological crisis is always a crisis of human relationships."[42] Descartes, unlike Hamlet, fails to attend to the fact that an epistemological crisis is a crisis in human *relationships*, and so he ends up turning inward and misrepresenting his crisis to himself and us, the results of which are even more tragic than the denouement of *Hamlet*, at least in part because the tragic hero in the latter case does eventually resolve his epistemological problem.

"An epistemological crisis is resolved," according to MacIntyre, "by the construction of a new narrative which enables the agent to understand *both* how he or she could intelligibly have held his or her original beliefs *and* how he or she could have been so drastically misled by them."[43] Epistemological crises are always crises in the *context* of our existing interpretive schema, a schema constructed from our inherited cultural narratives and modified through personal experience. Solving epistemological crises may involve engaging in a Cartesian-style reflective thinking, but goes beyond it to make connections with things and others outside ourselves.

MacIntyre expresses puzzlement about two things. First, why "the history of epistemology, like the history of ethics itself is, in fact, usually written as though it were not a narrative?"[44] Second, "how is it, then that narrative is not only given so little place by thinkers..., but has so often... been treated as a merely aesthetic form?"[45] In both cases the answer stems from the Cartesian quest for certainty and devolves from reasons MacIntyre could have borrowed from Bordo.

In an epistemological crisis the agent begins by knowing that his or her inherited schema of interpretation has broken down. Such at least was the case for Hamlet. Descartes, however, presents himself as departing from the assumption that he knows nothing until he can discover a presuppositionless and indubitable first principle, a principle free of the schema and narrative tradition that have so far deceived him, and upon which all else can be founded with certainty. It is supposed to be a contextless doubt, and it is, of course, impossible, for without at least some inherited presuppositions; how could Descartes even know what his task was or what would bring it to a successful conclusion? As MacIntyre indicates, the admonition, "Doubt all your beliefs here and now without reference to historical or autobiographical context is not meaningless, but it is an invitation not to philosophy, but to mental breakdown, or rather to philosophy as a means of mental breakdown."[46] Descartes ignores entirely the tradition from which he inherited the epistemological ideals that direct his inquiry. MacIntyre sums up Descarte's situation in words that could have been written by Susan Bordo: "Shakespeare invites us to reflect on the crisis of the self as a crisis in the tradition which has formed the self; Descartes by his attitude to history and to fable has cut himself off from the possibility of recognizing himself; he has invented an unhistorical self-endorsed self-consciousness and tries to describe his epistemological crisis in terms of it."[47] Isolated, alone, self-centered, and in a strange sense selfish, small wonder that Descartes seems childish and insane. Tradition is indeed, as MacIntyre indicates, "the bearer of reason." When we are entirely out of our inherited narrative tradition, we are out of our minds.

Tradition is the bearer of reason, but not reason in any absolute, settled, and fixed sense. It is here that the connections between tradition and dramatic narrative become decisive. A cultural tradition is constituted by a variety of conflicting narratives, each of which provides a different interpretation of human relationships (e.g., woman to man, man to man, woman to woman, man and woman to nature). MacIntyre remarks, "If I am a Jew, I have to recognize that the tradition of Judaism is partly constituted by a continuous argument over what it means to be a Jew."[48] Similar remarks hold regarding on what it is to be a woman, a man, a philosopher, and a person, what, we might well ask MacIntyre, holds the conflicting narratives together. MacIntyre eventually turns to "the possibility of constructing an intelligible dramatic narrative which can claim historical truth in which such theories are the subject of successive episodes."[49] Ultimately "historical truth" is for MacIntyre turned into external "ontological truth" toward which the different narrative traditions all converge.

For our purposes here we need not plumb the epistemological and ontological depths. At least along the road to knowledge we need each other, so we would like to suggest a different way of binding together the various conflicting dramatic narratives that constitute a cultural tradition.

MacIntyre describes the situation well: "For it is not merely that different participants in a tradition disagree; they also disagree as to how to characterize their disagreements and as to how to resolve them. They disagree as to what constitutes appropriate reasoning, decisive evidence, conclusive proof."[50] So, one might well wonder, what, if anything, could bind together disagreements so seemingly incommensurable? The answer of course is the shared tradition, that is, shared mutual interests, cares, concerns, connections, and involvements.

Discourse can be maintained in the absence of total cognitive disagreement, but only if we acknowledge some measure of shared values and affective concerns within a common linguistic community. The "logic" of rationally incommensurable narratives, within a rational tradition is dialectical. We see MacIntyre come close to something like this when he says: "A tradition then not only embodies the narrative of an argument, but is only to be recovered by an argumentative retelling of that narrative which will itself be in conflict with other argumentative retellings."[51] For instance, what is the aim of education. Here MacIntyre turns to a Kuhnian revolutionary reconstruction of traditions: "it is traditions which are the bearers of reason, and traditions at certain periods actually require and need revolutions for their continuance."[52]

Ironically, Descartes' non-narrative, contextless, and alienating epistemology is the dominant cultural narrative within our inherited western tradition of reflective thinking. It is an interpretive tradition in crisis; we, the inheritors of the Cartesian idea of self, are in a crisis of the self, an epistemological crisis. We have gone too far in one direction in the dialectic. Descartes' ideal of self cast exclusively in argumentative form is indeed a masculinization of thought; however, as Bordo suggests, the words of Carol Gilligan, Sarah Ruddick, Nancy Chodorow and others "claim a natural foundation for knowledge, not in detachment and distance, but in closeness, connectedness, and empathy."[53] What these people present is a different cultural narrative, a true narrative, of the self as thinker.

Conclusion: Toward a gender sensitive ideal

We are currently in an epistemological crisis regarding the narrative tradition surrounding the liberal philosophy of education, a tradition that is easily tracable at least as far back as the Republic of Plato. In the Twentieth century philosophy itself has seen tremendous upheaval. This upheaval may be characterized as a narrative crisis, one in which the metaphysical tradition, centering upon classical realism and an epistemological tradition is tied to the correspondence theory of truth. These two intertwining traditions have provided the primary interpretive schema regarding the relation between men, women, and nature. As MacIntyre indicates, all epistemological crises are, in one way or another, crises in human relationships within a narrative tradition. It was these emendations in traditional philosophy that led P. H. Hirst to revise the classical theory of liberal education using scripts borrowed from the metaphysics of experience.

Feminist philosophers like Bordo, Young-Bruehl, and Martin are responding to the same metaphysical and epistemological narrative crisis as Hirst. They would accept Hirst's highly cognitive "forms of knowledge" as schema that structure experience rather than the transcendent realities of Plato's forms, as far as it goes. They would especially applaud Hirst's insistence that "objectivity,... is no longer backed by metaphysical realism," but rather "public criteria... which gives objectivity to knowledge; and this in its turn gives objectivity to the concept of liberal education."[54] It is only the exclusivity of a purely cognitive construal of liberal education that feminists find disturbing. The collapse of such positivist dogmas as the theory-fact and fact-value distinctions and the accompanying collapse of objectivism has compelled many to acknowledge that there is no higher tribunal for adjudication of truth claims than the community of those competent to judge. Intersubjectivity *is* objectivity. If so, then the liberal theory of education should be expanded to include an emphasis on care, concern, and connectedness and those other virtues that bind together communities and sustain Michael Oakeshatt's continuing conversation of humankind.

The feminine ideal of the thinker unites self and society, builds bridges of human connectedness, rather than autonomous rationality, and allows us to begin to redefine what it means to be an educated person. There are no limits to the possibilities for reinterpreting and redefining what we know, or think we know. Perhaps the truly educated person has reached a conciliation between the rational mind and thinking that is founded upon empathy, nurturing, and emotion, using each at appropriate junctures in experience, "taking gender into account when it makes a difference and ignoring it when it does not."[55] Just how we genderize thinking may, ultimately, be less important than how we use the resources available to us; the useful syntheses and creative possibilities are what ought to concern us most.

NOTES

1. Jane Roland Martin, "Redefining the Educated Person: Rethinking the Significance of Gender," *Educational Researcher*, Vol. 15, No. 6, 1986, p. 7.
2. P. H. Hirst, "Liberal education and the nature of knowledge," in *Education and reason*, part 3, R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters, eds., Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 10.
3. Martin, "Redefining." p. 7.
4. Susan Bordo, "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought," *Signs*. 11(2), 1986, p. 441.
5. *Ibid*.
6. *Ibid*.
7. *Ibid*.
8. Jane Roland Martin, *Reclaiming a Conversation*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, see Ch. 7 "Acquaintance and Conversation," pp. 171-199.
9. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*, Harvard University Press, 1982.
10. Martin, "Redefining." p. 7.
11. Elizabeth Fee, "Critiques of Modern Science: The Relationship of Feminism to Other Radical Epistemologies," in *Feminist Approaches to Science*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1986, p. 56.
12. *Ibid*., p. 47.
13. Mary Belenky, Blythe Clinchy, and Nancy Goldberger, Jill Tarule, *Women's Ways of Knowing*, New York: Basic Books, 1986, p. 113.
14. See Jerome Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, see Chapter 2.
15. *Ibid*.
16. Gilligan, *Different Voice*. p. 29.
17. *Ibid*., p. 28.
18. *Ibid*.
19. Hirst, "Liberal Education." p. 23.
20. *Ibid*., pp. 23-24.
21. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, "The Education of Women as Philosophers," *Signs*, 12(2), 1987, p. 207.
22. *Ibid*., p. 212.
23. *Ibid*.

24. *Ibid*., p. 214.
25. *Ibid*., p. 215.
26. *Ibid*.
27. *Ibid*.
28. *Ibid*., p. 216.
29. *Ibid*.
30. Martin, "Redefining." p. 7.
31. Young-Bruehl, "Education of Women." p. 219.
32. Young-Bruehl, "Education of Women." p. 207.
33. Bordo, "Cartesian Masculinization." p. 441.
34. *Ibid*., p. 451.
35. *Ibid*.
36. *Ibid*., p. 441.
37. *Ibid*., p. 442.
38. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," in *Paradigms and Revolutions*, Gary Gutting, ed., p. 54.
39. *Ibid*.
40. *Ibid*.
41. *Ibid*., p. 56.
42. *Ibid*.
43. *Ibid*.
44. *Ibid*., p. 57.
45. *Ibid*., p. 58.
46. *Ibid*., p. 63.
47. *Ibid*., p. 61.
48. *Ibid*., p. 62.
49. *Ibid*., p. 73.
50. *Ibid*., p. 62.
51. *Ibid*., p. 63.
52. *Ibid*.
53. Bordo, "Cartesian Masculinization." p. 455.
54. P. H. Hirst, "Liberal education and the nature of knowledge," in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters, ed. *Education and reason*, p. 14.
55. Martin, "Redefining." p. 10.

RESPONSE TO "GENDER, THINKING, AND THE EDUCATIONAL IDEAL"

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Professors Garrison and Pappas have touched upon at least two important issues for philosophy of education today. One of them is the problem of gender, and the other is the view of philosophy as a conversation of culture. Indeed, their perceptive comments offer us food for thought. Let me add that I am in general agreement with the thrust of their remarks, particularly their efforts to treat philosophy as a conversation with diverse voices.

There is a difficulty, however, with the premise upon which they begin their case, and this difficulty may belong as much to their sources and an enduring philosophical tradition as it does to their treatment of the material. Perhaps the best way to explain this difficulty is to start with a personal dilemma. I have been puzzled by much of the contemporary dialogue on gender, for it seems to me to be inflicted with a troublesome contradiction. On the one hand, women have demanded equality and have expressed the desire to be treated on the basis of individual merits due to all members of the human race rather than on the basis of sex or the happenstance of biology. On the other hand, there has also been the claim that women *are* different, and as shown by Garrison and Pappas, one of these claimed differences is that women do, in fact, think differently from men. Thus, the contradiction: women are equal, and women are different.

At first blush, this contradiction may seem insurmountable, and a continuing insistence on maintaining it can only lead both to furthering an age-old conflict between the sexes and inhibiting the flow of the conversation. Deeper consideration will, I believe, lead us to reject this view, however. It is significant, as Garrison and Pappas point out, that we are not talking about *biological* gender, but *cognitive* and *epistemological* gender. Because the kind of gender we are discussing is cognitive and epistemological, in the broadest sense it is culturally-based gender. In short, we are talking about a *cultural* condition.

If this much is granted, then a reasonable question is how we arrived at gender-identified thinking. If Descartes is responsible for setting us off in the direction of the detached and isolated thinking self, what makes this direction identifiably masculine? And, what makes connected thinking, the kind that puts no onus on consideration of the care and nurture of others, decidedly feminine? Indeed, Garrison and Pappas uncritically buy into the separation of thinking into masculine and feminine modes in their acceptance of Susan Bordo's description of the Cartesian "masculinization of thought" as "'the drama of parturition,'" the "'*re*-birthing and re-imaging of knowledge and the world as masculine,'" and an "'intellectual flight from the feminine.'" There is something about this characterization that leaves me cold, mainly because it covers more than it explains under a coating of tired Freudianisms. It is as arbitrary as characterizing the work of well-known female philosophers being due to penis envy. I do not believe such assertions will hold water.

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Certainly, Descartes casts a long shadow over Western philosophy, but has the Cartesian cogito--which, it is claimed, is a decidedly masculine development--made all subsequent philosophy masculine as a result? I think not, because it is possible to find other influential masculine philosophers who do not elevate the isolated thinking self as the primal origin of rational thought.

For example, there is John Dewey. It may be argued that if Cartesianism so thoroughly infected Western philosophy with masculinity, then it stands to reason that Dewey, who was most certainly spawned within the Western tradition, would likewise be infected. Furthermore, if masculine thought is characterized by isolation and disconnection from others, then Dewey should also demonstrate isolation and disconnection. However, such arguments will not hold. In fact, refutation of the claim of unconnected and isolated masculine reason as the hallmark of Western thought can be easily made in Dewey's case. For purposes of time and space, I will only cite three examples: In Democracy and Education, he criticized the Cartesian tradition as follows:

> Its formal and empty nature, due to conceiving reason as something complete in itself apart from subject matter, its hostile attitude toward historical institutions, its disregard of the influence of habit, instinct, and emotion, as operative factors in life, left it impotent in the suggestion of specific aims and methods.[1]

Of reason and connectedness, Dewey stated that,

> A person is reasonable in the degree in which he is habitually open to seeing an event....not as an isolated thing but in its connection with the common experience of mankind.[2]

In Human Nature and Conduct, he gave his view of the relation of reason and emotion:

> Rationality....is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires. 'Reason' as a noun signifies the happy cooperation of a multitude of dispositions....[3]

The point is not whether we agree or disagree with Dewey; rather, what do those of us who insist on gender-based thinking do with the Deweys of philosophical tradition who do not fit the mold? Are they somehow unmasculine, feminine, or neutral? Part of the situation, I suspect, is that the conversation has become stuck on the horns of an untenable dualism of the masculine and the feminine. For example, we have taken supposed masculine characteristics, such as "masculinity is unemotional, detached, rational, and divorced from the body," have elevated them into an arbitrary definition of an entirely abstract notion, and now the attempt is being made to shoehorn people into them on the basis of the defined gender identity. (The same may be said of femininity). I have never met such a masculine person in concrete experience, at least as far as I know. On the contrary, my experience with masculinity is that it has a depressing capacity to become too emotional and irrational.

This does not mean that we should ignore gender; rather, we should face it, try to learn from it, and mend our ways where we have been callous or indifferent to it. But this does not mean that we should accept the assertion that thinking must be separated into necessary modes labeled "masculine" and "feminine." Such a development bodes ill for both women and men, a prospect recognized by Betty Sichel and Debra Shogan. Addressing the relation of gender and ethics, Sichel explores the proposition that there is a distinctive feminine voice in the discourse on ethics. She questions the wisdom of introducing a hard dichotomy between masculine and feminine moral language, and suggests that the feminine voice should be viewed as a healthy questioning of the adequacy of contemporary moral reasoning. In effect, the direction of the conversation may lead to a paradigmatic shift that revitalizes the ways we look at moral reasoning and moral judgments in general.[4] In a like vein, Debra Shogan suggests that we must go beyond ascribing what members of a gender group may do as morality for that group. Shogan notes at the same time, however,

> we must not ignore that women and men do experience their moral agency differently. We must account for this in order to better understand the ways in which and why experiences are often genderized.[5]

These directions, I maintain, are preferable to that of driving a wedge between masculine and feminine thinking. They help move us away from viewing the statement "Women are equal, and women are different" as a contradiction.

Why? Here we are led to the second phase of the paper by Garrison and Pappas. They want to avoid "the darkest form of indoctrination" that comes from one linguistic structure holding hegemonic sway. They seek to highlight another voice in the philosophical conversation of culture, that of dramatic narrative, in order to avoid the epistemological crises of linguistic singularity, such as the Cartesian tradition imposed on so much of Western philosophy. I say more power to them. Let the conversation include as many voices as it can carry. But let us not forget that much of that linguistic singularity came about by setting up the isolated cogito as the instrument of reason separate from the external world. It aggravated and hindered the conversation by creating perhaps the biggest "dualism" of all, that is, not an older dualism of mind in opposition to the external world, but a mind which, when driven to its indubitable base, needed no connection at all. Thus, cold reason was set upon its abstract pedestal. Therefore, let us not further complicate in its early stages the conversation on gender with a dualism of masculine and feminine thinking as two separate modes. Rather, start the conversation with the assumption of connection and continuity as a primal datum which is neither masculine nor feminine, but of a single piece of cloth. Thinking is, after all, a distinguishing trait of our species. Distinctions of what is masculine and feminine are secondary to this primary fact: we are all connected and continuous by our membership in the human race.

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1. John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, (New York: MacMillan Paperbacks Edition, 1961), 299.
2. Ibid., 343.
3. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, (New York: Modern Library, 1957), 184.
4. Betty A. Sichel, "Beyond Genderized Ethics," in Philosophy of Education, 1987, Proceedings of the Forty-third Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, (Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1988), 191-192.
5. Debra Shogan, "Genderized Ethics: Here and Beyond," in Philosophy of Education, 1987, 198.

CURRICULAR EPISTEMOLOGY

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1. The Wholistic View of Education

The continuing argument which the present author has been making, both by preachment and performance, for the better part of his professional career, is that educational theory is an inherent and inescapable component of educational practice, such that the conduct of educational affairs one without the other is foreordained to failure by virtue of the division of a "natural" phenomenon into parts neither of which can be independently sufficient. Philosophers like John Dewey, Alfred North Whitehead and a fair number of contemporary theorists, who hold that, though socially constructed, initiatives toward the education of youth are an embodiment of a wholistic entity bound by this logic, appear to this observer to make a more compelling case than do theorists representing segmental approaches to the phenomenon or reductionistic views (monistic) which often scarcely acknowledge the issue. The analysis of contemporary educational literature, both that of a practical or pragmatic genre and that of an avowedly philosophic stripe, pervasively bent (and once again) in these unsettled times toward the dire need for school reform, seems abundantly to reinforce the reality and the consequentiality of the wholistic perception.

Whereas larger aspects of a wholistic view of contemporary education among free men in free societies have been addressed elsewhere (including previous papers presented before this Society) in the writer's gradually evolving "Lifetime Education: Theory and System,"[1] the title here is purposefully restricted to the ostensibly more narrow concern for *curricular emphases* within educational epistemology. By this device I shall attempt to portray that this restricted but central consideration generalizes systemically (i.e., part to whole and whole to part internally; and externally to the larger surround) throughout the whole of the *educational* experience within the *life* experience of men and women today -- and of their nations -- as the coming century nears.

Beyond summary references to the background theory as such, the topical focus proposed and developed here provides occasion for two advances in thought, both inclined toward shoring up the implementation end of the theory-practice continuum. First, though belabored least in that the language itself is largely self-explanatory, are certain organizational and administrative arrangements through which special educational programs are accommodated, including those likely to be perceived as avowedly extreme in departure from conventional ways of doing things; and second, is a sequentially ordered hierarchy of epistemological studies through which an acknowledged superficiality concerning the knowledge bases underlying established curricula in general education, may be brought to more profound levels of understanding and mastery.

Certain closely related purposes have prompted me to propose and work out the present paper for this occasion. Good criticism, which is the life blood of any developing theoretic position, is in general quite hard to come by, and the intensive exchanges between main papers and responses thereto, as reported in previous

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SAPES Proceedings, are impressive in this vein. More helpful for the presenter himself however, are the substantive leads which may ensue from offering the work at hand for review and critical commentary. Whether given reactions can or cannot be adequately rebutted by the writer, the process almost invariably leads to additional refinements and shoring up of original positions. And finally, whereas any progenitor of a sustained work is likely (like a fond parent) to hope that it bears up well under criticism, the more important objective consideration is that in the negative instance, other theorists may be persuaded to take up a similar initiative and thus to contribute in their own way to the advancement of educational science and theory development.

2. Knowledge and Education: A Deviant View

My express interest in the epistemological undergirdings of the school curriculum began about a quarter of a centory ago (1962) with the presentation of a paper before the Jefferson Society of the University of Virginia, under the same rubric as this section title, which paper was subsequently published under the heading, "Toward a Theory of Education for These Times."[2] In this initial statement the main explorations were to the effect that (a) all knowledge is the proper province of education, and that (b) knowledge about knowledge, i.e., epistemological studies, is more fitting as a developmental objective of the contemporary school than currently standard subject matter such as language arts and nature study in the elementary school, and biology, history, physics and the like, in secondary phases of our customary institutional organization.

Over the ensuing years, 1962-71, though this urge toward theorizing about general education remained secondary for circumstantial reasons (a rise in the demand for institutional services in Differential Education for the Gifted, a research and development interest already established), some eleven studies in the nature of published articles, conference papers, supervised theses and dissertations had been accomplished in a more or less systematic way, and two summary representations of the theory thus far advanced had been made (Note 1, below) in the nature of: (a) a chronology of the eleven studies, and an annotated classification under the three headings, (1) theory, (2) research and (3) application; and (b) a prospectus of the theory and system, which integral account was intended as an interim basis for further promotion and development of the anticipated work itself. Beyond this date, only an occasional, segmental study has been achieved such that further classification and annotation might be indicated. The present paper, comprising the latest such occasional opportunity, is one in which certain further advancements are projected, toward the end that, if it appears tenable critically, the main writing envisioned these many years earlier can be brought to completion during the near future, under more favorable post-retirement conditions.

A single passage from the abstract of the 1971 prospectus is useful here by way of indicating de facto the nature of the author's earlier "deviant views" and the intent to try to reconceptualize the quest after a wholistic scheme of general education "for these times":

> The transformed educational system is centered in theory that: (a) proposes human nature and the social order as 'the proper study of mankind...'; (b) elevates the person to central position in role and responsibility; (c) concentrates institutional resources on the structural and instrumental development of human potentiality; (d) relates the educative process functionally to the full repertoire of experiential and behavioral capability,

and to the full range of epistemological problems and substance; (e) provides for outcomes in philosophic mindedness and scientific disposition, as distinct from a store of specific information; and (f) requires for the full course of education the continued development of the person through distinguishable, sequential and cumulative qualities of experience at successive phases of the life span from infancy to the elderly years.

Over the third quarter of this century, and to date in the years now moving rapidly toward the next, many brilliant advances in educational thought have transpired. Individual writings (Bruner, Chomsky); organizational committees producing topical monographs, conference proceedings and yearbooks (AERA, ASCD, Educational Theory, NSSE); extensive study and reports by corporate foundations and their subsidiaries (Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller; and more recently the private MacArthur subsidies); and of course the literal rash of recent reports by nationally appointive groups (e.g., The National Commission on Excellence in Educational Administration, 1988) now in the daily news. But these insightful anslyses and interpretations appear not as yet to have brought forth significant over-arching studies which integrate the best from all such sectors into generic educational theories which extend into the practical domains. Hence, with some regularity, decade after decade as it were, schools continue to operate much as they have over much of the century; and cyclical calls for institutional reform follow pell-mell, one after another, each starting all over again without much apparent cumulative gain.

Given the notable and frequently remarked sociocultural fragmentations and breakdowns in sociomoral traditions such that the concept of cultural chaos is now emerging, it requires no great leap of imagination for the present observer to postulate simply, and yet with remarkable projected consequences, that today our deviations are so markedly off course (incomprehensible, uncontrollable) that educational reform of any conceivable nature is no longer likely to suffice, but that instead we face the deeper and more extensive problem of educational reconstruction--which entails back to the drawing board initiatives, reconceptualizing the character of education as a biosocial process through which potential human aptitudes and acquired understandings are brought to flower in a lifelong process of progressively advancing perception, learning, reflection, judgment and action.

3. Considerations Toward a Curricular Epistemology

The logical mandate thus established is for a concept and an integral (wholistic) system of general education which is as nearly as possible a reconstructed design, one different categorically or in kind, not merely in degree; which reconceptualization encapsulates all the principal facets of this admittedly bold statement of intentions (LE:TS, 1971) and orders them into cohesive and comprehensive manifestations of objective, instructional content and process, administrative organization and operation, and criterial referents for progressive achievement by the individual over the life span from infancy to seniority. The overall depiction must of course be driven by theory in the first instance; and equally as important, it must provide explicitly and sufficiently for consistent and feasible extensions, also wholistic, among patterns of institutional organization and administrative operation.

Nothing less, it is being argued, is sufficiently radical to be heralded as the new order that appears to be required for a new and more authentic start; and nothing less presages sufficient stability and, equally essential, nothing less provides sufficiently for *change* (flexibilities), albeit again differently ordered, promising for the future in a world that has compacted itself over the bulk of this century through economics, politics and the technologies of communication and transportation into a global community.

But a reflective reading of literature in two further genres of contemporary educational thought reveals that, however able and insightful the observers otherwise are, these demanding prerequisite formalities are substantially failed.

In the first genre of educational thought, that derived through sustained observations of the American educational scene, directly on-location, diverse and vigorous, falls the work of both Dr. Paul Woodring[3] of Western Washington University, in the generation following upon the second world war; and that a bit later and continuing to the present, of the (formerly) Canadian scholar and activist, Dr. John Goodlad,[4] who has worked over the years from a base as dean of the School of Education, University of California at Los Angeles. In each case, here only cursorily represented, the writing of these men reveals the common quality that they observe, reflect and write all at a uniform plane of logic, apparently considered appropriate to themselves, and also widely received among educators as the medium more than any other at which educational problems should be addressed. Despite a language which on the surface often sounds otherwise, however, neither in the final analysis transcends the immediate and reasons his way through, as theorists must, to the planes of abstraction, embedded in the supporting intellectual disciplines which provide the basic substance of education as a sociocultural "universal," and from that plane outward to the practicing scene.

It is the avowedly scholarly community in education, however, which by specific role and warrant for existence must assume responsibility most of all for the quality of theory and for the criterial referents for progress, including relatively esoteric notions such as "theory about theory" into which realm the contentions of the present paper belong. Again, only the briefest allusion to the work of three contemporary philosophers -- Philip H. Phenix, Mortimer J. Adler and Paul H. Hirst -- provides a basis for the claim made here that even this elevated class of thought fails in one way or another to bridge the gap between theoretic abstraction and the designs for practice which complement these, and thus make for a wholistic and authentic view of the phenomenon under discussion.

Phenix, an American philospher long associated with Teachers College, Columbia University, in his insightful work, *Realms of Meaning* (1964)[5]--sets out to develop "a philosophy of the curriculum for general education," as he of course has every right to do without hearkening to the requirement that he write an accompanying volume, as it were, indicating how his epistemological realms would translate into the instrumentalities of curriculum and instruction at given age-grade brackets in the conventional organization of public and private schools. Nor does he in a subsequent essay in 1982,[6] where he promises this kind of "practicality," get much closer to it; such that the question appears legitimate, *can* he in fact specify curricular applications of his superlative theory so that "school men," including the more reflective among them, can make the transfer.

Mortimer Adler, in another instance, whose commandingly brilliant intellectual work (with the late Robert M. Hutchins) at the University of Chicago, under the rubric, *The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World* (1952),[7] would have over the years since publication made marvelous sense for institutional programs based on a lifetime of reading, and also have served substantially to stand off the ensuing tides of behavioristic nonsense admissible enough in animal training but only among the severely handicapped human community, did in fact make this essential outreach to the schools only in his 1982 "manifesto," The Paidaeia Proposal;[8] and by then he writes and instructs so dogmatically that he repels thoughtful students and scholars alike, and demeans a potential contribution to the practice of education which may well be unparalleled in modern scholarship.

Paul Hirst,[9] the British philosopher, however, writing in a language and logic respecting his own able distinctions between knowledge and experience, talks convincingly of epistemological "disciplines" (similar to Phenix' "realms of meaning"), "fields" (practical embodiments of understanding and inquiry occurring among the realities of life experience), and even, albeit without specification, of "levels" within the respective frames or domains into which he subdivides the entirety of knowledge, among his discussions of the human potential for learning, thinking and performing. He fails, then, not in any inherent deficiency within the purview of his own elective range of concerns, but only in terms of what the present thesis requires, i.e., a wholistic depiction of the educational panorama which provides continuities from the theoretic abstraction to the earthy detail of administrative and teaching behaviors through which instruction is guided in home, school and community.

It is this singular and consequential deficit, then, which provides impetus for my own efforts to spell out, under the general descriptions and prescriptions of Lifetime Education: Theory and System certain concepts which attempt to round out and specify the practicing phases of the theory-practice continuum. I submit these necessary prescriptions in two forms: first, a set of concepts which translate my theoretic orientations directly into organizational adaptations and administrative operations; and second, a set of concepts in the nature of "knowledge about knowledge," postulated here in ad hoc, hypothetical fashion, by no means casually reasoned, but of course subject eventually to empirical testing, and proposed as structural hierarchies of understandings of knowledge as it exists, both in general and in particular embodiments.

Some ways (here selective and illustrative as must be) of accommodating life span learning to the established instructional regimen of a local school division, in school by school outreach, class by class, and through age-grade levels ranging from Kindergarten (or earlier, in infancy) through adolescence and into early adulthood as now conceived, and thus incorporating sequential learnings approximately through what is now set up as "general college," are respectfully submitted as follows:[10]

(a) An academic parallel through which conceptual device school authorities agree to provide curricular space and time for programs which they are forced by reason to admit as obligatory -- which focal arrangement obviates the customary evasions under any of hundreds of escape rationalizations, and forces the chief administrator to declare and justify his or her program priorities.

(b) A plan for program and curricular development, including professionally intelligent provisions for teacher selection, personnel preparation, and curricular organization in both form and substantive detail -- which prerequisite planning forces the chief school administrator and his staff to spell out strategic and tactical details, openly reasoned, which will withstand the scrutiny of competent external critics.

(c) an explicit and knowledgeable provision for school and program evaluation which encapsulates the best wisdom of this fairly recent and extremely powerful development in American education -- bent toward rendering the school system accountable both fiscally and in parallel terms of program allocation.

Through devices of this kind a disciplined involvement in the nature and progress of program development is urged upon the administrative and supervisory authorities of the division and school, with accountability strictly leveled at the inescapable (bottom line) role responsibilities which clearly obtain; and on the positive side, urging those patterns of competent administrative leadership which are pervasively noted as central to institutional success and educational effectiveness.

As to the second type of practical consideration in this exploration into ideas befitting the title "curricular epistemology," I undertake provisionally to formulate the hierarchical structure which was indicated just above. While explanation and argument are greatly due for each successive echelon of these epistemological identities, once again only a brief identification is possible in this space. The order of presentation is from the simpler forms of learning toward the higher, each area cumulative toward the next higher one and culminating in theoretical knowledge,[11] a construct intended to represent the highest form of attainable understanding and capability for practical judgment. At the outset it needs to be pointed out that here we place teacher education up front, and submit that the superficialities with which the infinitely broad range of human knowledge is reduced downward and inward in the conventional patterns of "school subjects" must be reckoned against these deeper and wider adventures into the knowledge base undergirding what we teach and how we prepare teachers and administrators for their quintessential place in both the lives of children and in the functional role which the school plays in free and developing societies.

(a) Exploratory Knowledge, i.e., heuristic, ad hoc, informal and wide ranging forays into any and all embodiments of knowledge, or domains of inquiry, more or less spontaneously carried on both by children and by adults in essentially new areas of understanding.

(b) Descriptive and Prescriptive Knowledge, i.e., cumulatively developed principles within the respective arts, sciences and technologies, comprehensive or inclusive as to main conceptual approaches, issues and problems; coupled with point by point inferences for practical action by the individual in home, school and community.

An intermediate interpretation: It is these two component classes of the full set which serve the general population, child and adult alike, for the most part through their life span. And it is knowledge of these kinds, regrettably, which through bureaucratic degeneracies that allow credit-garnering by way of in-service experience in week-end conferences and mini-courses to substitute for serious university level pursuits in the arts and sciences, and for the intrinsic and earnest pursuit of higher learning in one's chosen fields as an obligation to the teaching profession. The ensuing four levels of knowledge are considered as truly "adult" in that mature or maturing capabilities for perceptual grasp and reflective learning and doing are required.

(c) Methodological (Experimental) Knowledge, i.e., the treatments given by scientists (and artists) to knowledge of various sorts in their own processes of formative acquisition, all of which expands and intensifies the present learner's understanding.

(d) *Analytical Knowledge*, i.e., reliable and criterially defensible meta-observations upon the main streams of human understanding in art, science and technology as these prevailing (era-bound) perceptions exist in contemporary thought.

(e) *Historic Knowledge*, i.e., the search for those ideas stemming back through the emergence of given constructs out of which the field at hand has developed and taken shape in current thought; and finally,

(f) *Theoretic Knowledge*, i.e., the summative understandings of lifelong students in given epistemological domains -- Jacob Bronowski in math and physical science; Kenneth Clark in the fine arts, as stellar examples -- which as attained can be brought to bear upon practical judgments and decisions facing either the local or the global community. This highest form of human wisdom -- likely to be both as influential in shaping contemporary culture and as reliable as all but the most commanding accumulations of the empirical research to which we moderns have become addicted -- thus becomes an ideal, or an ultimate aim, progressively sought and realized according to individual talent and experiential opportunity.

Now obviously this ascending scale of heights in human understanding cannot reasonably be proposed as available to or functionally useful to all persons, aptitude, interest and present intent notwithstanding, or even to the majority of individuals within "normal" ranges of perceptual capability. Individual levels of attainment should neither be institutionally predicted far in advance, nor programming made preclusively to certain persons only, without fair and reasonable opportunities to prove functional fitness. Rather, it is enough that properly educated institutional personnel act in good conscience in monitoring the process, advising, when termination at any level appears indicated; and that the adult student in the process of becoming a professional educator respond with equal deliberation and good faith. In the end there is an institutional responsibility to society to be respected; and the occasional individual, not thus persuaded by reason and deliberation, is happily free to continue educating himself by alternative means, and as perceived ready, again to enter the institutional process of lifelong education.

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1. This paper is an attempt to summarize and advance main points in the longstanding development of a theory and system of general education (Lifetime Education: Theory and System) begun in 1962, developed over a period of several years through various studies (publications, supervised theses and dissertations, conference papers, and the like), and culminating in 1971 with two summary representations of the work as advanced to that date: (a) "A Chronology and Annotated Classification of Publications and Studies Related to the Theory and System of Lifetime Education (1962-71)"; and (b) "A Prospectus of the Theory and System." Though an occasional study was made thereafter, they were episodic, opportunistic and segmental, progress on the main work being aborted and abrogated through intra-institutional difficulties related to changes in administrative authority. All main papers in specific reference, published or unpublished, are available through correspondence with the author.

2. Virgil S. Ward, "Education and Knowledge: A Deviant View." A presentation to the Jefferson Society, University of Virginia, October, 1962. Subsequently expanded and published as "Toward a Theory of Education for These Times," *University of Virginia Education Review* 2 (1964): 3-11.

3. Paul Woodring, The Persistent Problems of Education (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1983).

4. John I. Goodlad, What Schools Are For (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1979).

5. Philip H. Phenix, Realms of Meaning: A Philosophy of the Curriculum for General Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

6. Philip H. Phenix, "Toward Realms of Meaning: Curricular Implications for the Gifted/Talented" in Selected Proceedings of the First National Conference on Curricula for the Gifted/Talented, (Ventura, California: National/State Leadership Training Institute, 1982): 21-25.

7. Mortimer J. Adler, Editor in Chief, The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952).

8. Mortimer J. Adler, The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1982).

9. Paul H. Hirst, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," In R. D. Archambault, ed., Philosophical Analysis and Education (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1965): 113-138.

10. Virgil S. Ward, "A Working Paper in re Differential Education for the Gifted." Unpublished Consultant's report (Ward: 5-22-80), Chesterfield County Public Schools, Virginia.

11. Virgil S. Ward, "Theoretic Knowledge," in Proceedings, South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society, Samuel M. Craver, Editor (Richmond, Virginia: Virginia Commonwealth University, 1987): 24-34. The concept used here was the subject of a full paper presented in 1987 under this title.

RESPONSE TO VIRGIL S. WARD: CURRICULAR EPISTEMOLOGY

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Professor Ward has called for a reconstructed design of education that will be wholistic in its content and that will encompass the whole life span. He views his proposal as radical or deviant. His call for bringing practice in line with theory and his emphasis on viewing education as a wholistic process are worthy of the attention of curriculum builders.

In his introductory section there is reference to organizational and administrative arrangements and to a "hierarchy of epistemological studies." He indicates later in his paper that his proposal is for a reconstructed design for education which is categorically different. There is, however, no indication in the paper of what his proposed organizational structure will be like. Similarly there is a need to know more about his sequentially ordered hierarchy of studies. It may be assumed from the rest of his paper that both of these statements relate to the notion of a "wholistic education" in which both the structure of the educational system and the curriculum to be pursued will in some way be altered to provide for each student more interrelatedness of subject matter and experience. If so, it would be helpful for him to indicate how the fact of a wholistic view of the individual, society, and knowledge will be reflected in reorganization of the schools or of other social provisions for education. Is he willing to settle for the current divisions of responsibility between the home, the school, the church, the media, etc.? Or does he see responsibility assigned to only one of these? Is he intending to retain the traditional K-12 organization of the public school? Does he have some institutional arrangement for the education of older adults? Are his "epistemological studies" to be organized as distinct disciplines? If so what does he mean by a wholistic education?

In the section headed "Knowledge and Education: A Deviant View", Ward cites an earlier statement (1971) which indicates that he wishes to suggest a "transformed educational system centered in theory that (a) proposes human nature and the social order as 'the proper study of mankind'; (b) elevates the person to a central position in role and responsibility; (c) concentrates institutional resources on the structural and instrumental development of human potentiality; (d) relates the educative process functionally to the full repertoire of experiential and behavioral capability, and to the full range of epistemological problems and substance; (e) provides for outcomes in philosophic mindedness and scientific disposition as distinct from a store of specific information; and (f) requires for the full course of education the continued development of the person through distinguishable, sequential and cumulative qualities of experience at successive phases of the life span from infancy to the elderly years."

This paragraph is the best description that Professor Ward gives us of his proposed reorganization of education. It is a little curious as to why this is labeled "a deviant view". Each of the suggestions is in the mainstream of educational thought. While practice may fall short of these goals, they are reasonable objectives for the current educative institutions. They are clear and provide a basis for judging practice. They do not however describe for us the specifics of the reorganization which is being promised. They were part of another paper. Presumably all of the things suggested could be carried out under our current curricular and organizational arrangements. The items listed deal with results rather than with procedure.

In his review of the literature Professor Ward considers the work of Woodring, Goodlad, Phenix, Adler, and Hirst and concludes that each fails to provide a sufficiently wholistic picture of the kind of education which is needed. The author is probably correct in his view that the many studies published in the current third of a century have not produced any significantly new generic theory. He was overly generous, perhaps, in his statement that there have been "many brilliant advances in educational thought."

Ward identifies three "suggestions for adjusting his life span learning to the current administrative structure". There is to be what he identifies as an academic parallel, a plan for program and curricular development, and provision for school and program evaluation. The first of these is not clearly defined. The second and third are calls for planning and evaluation but give us no description of possible modification of the existing school structure.

The need to provide more specifics with regard to the nature of the studies making up the hierarchy of studies to be pursued is approached by listing types or categories of knowledge. There will be provision for exploratory knowledge, descriptive and prescriptive knowledge, methodological knowledge, analytical knowledge, historic knowledge, and theoretic knowledge. There is no sufficient elaboration of what the specific content of each of these might be. The brief comment provided for each of these suggest that perhaps the current subject matter of the school curriculum would be retained.

Professor Ward has piqued our imagination, but the important question remains unanswered. The major problem is not the lack of a theoretical view of what constitutes an education, although that is still a consideration. It is instead a problem of how to translate our theories of the good education into practice. We should commend him for his concern for the problem.

TEACHING AS THREAT

J. Gordon Chamberlin

Education and religion have had problems with each other for centuries. Those problems have been obvious features of the intellectual landscape on this continent, and are taking new forms at the present. The assumption of this paper is that the relationship deserves reexamination.

To suggest that teaching can be a threat reminds us of the Portman-Weingartner book Teaching as a Subversive Activity. That work was primarily an attack on schools which "create eager consumers . . transmit dead issues, values and metaphors . . create smoothly functioning bureaucrats." It is schools, according to the authors that "are truly subversive since they undermine our chances of surviving as a viable, democratic society."[1] From the perspective of the authors, schools ought to be training centers to subvert the numerous corruptions of our culture.

That book appeared 19 years ago. Prescient as they were, its authors could not have anticipated the surge of religiosity of the past two decades. I will contend in this paper that religion is a more profound threat to an open society than venality, pride, greed or ignorance. Religion can be guilty of those sins, but its corrupting influence is of another order. Our problem with the blight of religion is protectionism by people who emphasize only its potential blessings. By focusing on divinity the devout neglect (or fail to understand) that religion is a basic human process and its expressions are human constructs. Thus its fundamental corruption is its claim of divine sanction, that is, its claim to "know God's will." That claim is the key to the problem between education and religion.

Religion as a basic human process can be described in different ways, whether by Rudolf Otto's idea of the "holy," or Friedrich Schleiermacher's awareness of "absolute dependence," or Paul Tillich's emphasis on "ultimate concern." These aspects of humanness have led to myriads of outward forms of religious movements, organizations, rituals, traditions and sacred places. Central to the problem about which we are concerned is the great variety of objects of devotion, fealty and worship.

Those objects can be a theological creed, a nation, race, icon, market system, political party, rule of behavior, set of values, mountain, tree or book. In the Bible of Christians and Jews, such objects of devotion are called idols. Jeremiah mocked those who take a piece of wood, carve it into a statue, then kneel down and worship it. Christians do this when they hire architects and contractors to design and construct a building which parishioners can then declare is "God's House," or when they designate a certain set of religious writings as the canon and then claim that it is divine, demanding unquestioning devotion and obedience.

Some people are not bothered by this great, interesting variety of ways in which humans have dealt with their religious propensity. For others the variety is not only offensive, it is all sacrilegious, because there is only one right way. It is the continuing impact of ardent religious fundamentalism on world events in the past few decades that poses the "problem" we need to reconsider.

Twenty years ago most of us were not very familiar with Islamic fundamentalism. We may have been aware of the bitter and endless feud between the Catholic and

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Protestant tribes in Ireland, and certainly the worship of the white race here and in other parts of the world. But the virulent religious conflict that flared during the recent Hegira to Mecca, and what goes on in Beirut, raises the question in a new way: Why now, in this kind of world, have religious wars erupted both within particular traditions and between traditions?

And what does all of this mean for the focus of this year's meeting theme -- Teaching?

To the ardently religious, whatever the object of their devotion or ultimate concern, teaching is a threat. Three recent events have prompted this reexamination of that contention.

First was an account in The New York Times about the CIA's good friend, strongman General Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama.

> "'Noriega was always difficult to teach,' said an officer with access to intelligence assessments. 'He never wanted to take anything from the United States. He knew it all . . . Over the last 40 years the United States has trained 67,000 Panamanian officers, including many serving today, yet they have shown little regard for the military and political values taught in the United State military schools.'"[2]

Second, was reading through North Carolina's new "Competency Based Curriculum" for ninth graders which outlines how they are to be led at excruciating length through all of the intricacies and terminology of the free enterprise system, including

> "opportunity cost, oligopoly, societal values, scarcity, negative incentives, supply and demand, command economy, reinvestment, economic initiatives, human capital, diagonal merger, conglomerates, preferred stocks, theories of Adam Smith, Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes, deflation, absolute tax, proportional tax, ad valorem tax, deregulation, securities, speculation"

with 31 objectives and 108 measures to carry out those objectives, but without so much as a glimmer of facts about any weaknesses in our own economic system, or even that there are other systems.

Third, has been the final triumph of the ultra conservative Baptists, reversing the whole tradition of Baptist emphasis on freedom. According to An Encyclopedia of Religion, "There are no binding general Baptist creeds or confessions of faith."[3] But that is changing. Now every professor in a Southern Baptist seminary must, if the new leadership has its way, ascribe to an orthodoxy that insists on literal plenary inspiration of the Bible.

For these and many other instances teaching poses a threat, even under circumstances of attempted control. The threat is that there is no way to control the consequences of teaching, try as one may. Consequences, always shaped by learners, may be soon, even before completing a course, or much later and under the influence of subsequent experiences and reflection. In a sense we could turn around Paulo Freire's attack on "banking" and recognize that teachers are always making deposits without assurance about how or when those deposits will be withdrawn for use. A teacher may have considerable control over the way he or she interprets subject matter and the process employed in presentations, but has little control over the cultural and intellectual environment which shapes the content and language usage. Furthermore, a teacher has almost no control over the impact of his or her personality on learners, on how one's personality traits intermingle with subject matter interpretation and process. Nor can a teacher help being "another" to a learner and as such being a threat because the "other" cannot be controlled by the learner. Otherness is inevitable in teaching and always portends difference, which troubles those anxious to determine what is seen and heard.

The irony here is that the threat is a myth. For the very reason that teachers cannot control what is learned, the devout should not fear since they are in control of the learning.

It may not be much of a mystery, in a rapidly changing world where nearly everyone is exposed to nearly everything going on, why many people seek the comfort of protective authority. Facing too many options can be scarry. It is easier if someone will designate the time and place where things were done right, and then we can all circle the wagons and forever defend "what ought to be." For many the right translation of the Bible was done in 1611. For others the only right language for the Mass is Latin. Such convictions are not mysterious.

What is interesting is the way a person with such devout convictions can try to make the world stand still religiously while at the same time be comfortable riding the currents of modernity. The manager of a pathology laboratory, whom I know, is highly skilled in all the complex technology of his science and keeps up-to-date with the latest developments, yet seems to have no trouble at all holding that every word of the Bible is literally (scientifically) true, and that he does not need to vote because everything happening is God's will.

A recent documentary by a British producer about First Baptist Church in Dallas pictured thousands of affluent people, who surely represent a wide spectrum of occupations and disciplines in which they must keep up-to-date, must deal with scientific realities, must employ practical reasoning, yet who let Criswell lead them to believe in a fixed literalistic fundamentalism that brooks no development or change. How come?

Eric Hoffer in The True Believer placed great emphasis on frustration as the main stimulus to the "followership" essential to leadership of mass movements. Whether to call what is happening among Southern Baptists a "mass movement" I will leave to others, but I have difficulty in seeing that the upper class members of First Baptist Church in Dallas follow Criswell because of frustration.

Whatever the psychological conditions which lead people to rigid doctrinal orthodoxy, seldom in our encounters with "true believers" do we meet men or women whose beliefs are the fruit of their own reasoning. True believers are usually disciples and the formulations of their beliefs are adopted rather than of their own conception. Discipleship may have several grounds -- intellectual or personal attraction, fear, or simply exposure only to a single protected doctrine. In consequence, teaching which presents alternative views can be seen as a threat not only to ideas but to the source of those ideas, the master.

Or to phrase it differently, encounter with a true believer is an encounter with that which exerts power over the believer's life.

Stated more directly, teaching threatens power. Many years ago I observed such a threat when the dairy farmers in Iowa rose in wrath because a professor at Iowa State University published a study contending that the nutritional value of margarine equalled that of butter. He was sacked, but he didn't suffer much. He was promptly employed by the University of Chicago. Teaching can threaten power in such domains as politics, economics and science, but in the religious domain, as we have pointed out, the claim of divine sanction for beliefs is particularly difficult to confront.

In a section on doctrine, Hoffer refers to "blind faith" and offers a dramatic quotation.

> "So tenaciously should we cling to the word revealed by the Gospel, that were I to see all the Angels of Heaven coming down to me to tell me something different, not only would I not be tempted to doubt a single syllable, but I would shut my eyes and stop my ears, for they would not deserve to be either seen or heard."[4]

That was none other than Martin Luther.

Hopper puts the conflict between faith and reason (or as others have put it, "what has Jerusalem to do with Athens?") this way:

> "The effectiveness of a doctrine does not come from its meaning but from its certitude. . . It is obvious, therefore, that in order to be effective a doctrine must not be understood, but has to be believed in. We can be absolutely certain only about things we do not understand. A doctrine that is understood is shorn of its strength."[5]

Divine mystery sustains religious fervor and teaching other ways to think about belief threatens. The community of certitude brings "deliverance " --

> "The exaltation of the true believer does not flow from reserves of strength and wisdom but from a sense of deliverance: He has been delivered from the meaningless burden of an autonomous existence."[6]

This review of persistent efforts in human history by true believers to shut their eyes and stop their ears to protect their faith, their idols or their masters, need not lead us to despair about our calling as philsophers and teachers. It is frustrating to discover how difficult it is to change the views of others. But so intent are we upon what we want accepted, believed or thought about, admired or desired, that we seldom appreciate the competing power of the multiple teaching pressures of the surrounding culture upon every learner. Nor do we give adequate attention to "incidental" or "unintended" learning. The profound intellectual earthquake of the 13th century was not the result of curriculum plans, nor were the changes of ideas, values and meanings resulting from the industrial and technological revolutions. All sorts of things teach us -- events around us and social developments never planned for their educational impacts.

Realizing this fact can assuage our frustrations but it should have a more profound influence upon our views of teaching. While teaching may involve a wide array of activities, for me its distinctive function has to do with understanding. Understanding is an a posteriori activity; the giving of meaning to what has happened. And a teacher's most significant relation to "true believers" comes after their doctrines turn dry, their idols are broken and they discover that their masters have feet of clay. Then there is an opening for teachers to help them understand themselves and their world, and find new meaning for life.

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1. Neil Postman & Charles Weingartner, Teaching as a Subversive Activity (New York, Delacorte Press, 1969), 15.
2. The New York Times, April 3, 1988, p. 8.
3. An Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York, Philosophical Library, 1945), 55
4. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York, Harper & Row, 1951), 78.
5. Ibid., 79.
6. Ibid., 124.

TEACHING AS THREAT: AN ETHICAL AIM OR A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE?

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To begin, let us summarize the major points made by Dr. Chamberlin: Education and Religion are often at odds with each other as social institutions and as institutions charged with socialization of the population. Today, we need to re-examine the relationship between Education and Religion because there has been a rise of "religiosity" in the United States. What is religiosity? It is a corrupt form of authentic religious expression which emphasizes the divine realm at the expense of the human; it is anti-intellectual; it involves an ultimate claim of divine sanction based on unquestionable knowledge of God's will and is therefore dogmatism; those who practice "religiosity" are ignorant of pluralistic reality and often reject toleration of cultural diversity as an educational goal; and, it is an "objectification" of religious faith into creeds, a single race, a specific political party, or one narrow set of moral values.

Dr. Chamberlin argues that for those who are ardently religious--as in this sense of "religiosity"--teaching is always threatening; this is true even when total control of the teaching and learning process is attempted. Why? There is no way to control the consequences of teaching, since consequences follow from the dynamic of interaction between teacher and student and then between the student and his/her environment. Ultimately, the student decides--a very "hope-full" belief based upon existential faith in the individual to free themselves from all social/"otherness" control. Chamberlin also points out that teachers' powers are limited by overall cultural environment, personality, and circumstance-in-general, but also by this sense of imposed authority: "the other." He asserts that "learners determine what is learned and how it affects their lives."

The irony is that learners have far more control over what they learn than they realize--a point also made by Paulo Freire (in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*), Jonathan Kozol (in *Illiterate America*), Illich (in *Deschooling Schooling Society*) and others who we sometimes label as either radical or existential--perhaps both. Chamberlin claims that teaching is a very weak reed in our 20th century world-wide experiment with pluralism. He concludes by asserting that if we believe in *openness to creativity* and *intellectual stimulation* as central education goals, then teaching is inevitably a threat.

To move to interpretation, let us outline what "teaching as threat" is *not* about; obviously it is *not* about introducing religion into a "secularized" curriculum, either as a content area or as a discipline or way-of-knowing. Neither is this paper an ethical or epistemological argument for religious education, nor an attack on religious education. It is doubtful that Dr. Chamberlin would object to teaching *about* religion in public or private schools, nor probably to the introduction of religious ways-of-knowing (so long as religious ways-of-knowing is very clearly and carefully defined), but again this is not his purpose. Finally, Chamberlin is not directly concerned with moral education although we are closer to the target. Why? Chamberlin implies that not only is teaching on logical, or even pragmatic, grounds a threatening activity but that teaching *should* be threatening.

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I believe that he really wishes to develop a normative, ethical argument that "teaching as threatening" should be an educational goal or practice. Chamberlin implies that in these days of ascendancy of the religious fundamentalists and dogmatists throughout the world, it is crucial that education serve as a counterforce.

Tellingly, Dr. Chamberlin harkens back to Postman & Weingartner's book of the 60's, Teaching as a Subversive Activity. He does not, however, remind us that Postman & Weingartner have shifted into the mood, the style of the 80's by again co-authoring a book, this time entitled Teaching as a Conserving Activity. So, which is it, "subverting" or "conserving"? Is it both? Neither? Are the most important goals, missions, and aims of educational organizations and institutions infinitely malleable? If this is the case, commentators such as Postman & Weingartner are on the "cutting edge," while Chamberlin remains settled in the 1960's with passe revolutionary ideals.

This is not the case. Chamberlin's reflections are a necessary reaffirmation that--at its best--teaching is not only a passing on of great ideas and values of the past, not only a process for social accommodation and professional training, not only instruction in intellectual skills, but also a human encounter with unexpected, unpredictable results. At its best, teaching results in change, and ultimately, no one knows for sure what kind or direction of change--either on an individual or social basis. Maxine Greene emphasizes this point in numerous essays in Landscapes of Learning.

There is, though, a difference between the logical assertion that teaching is inevitably a threatening process--presumably to both the learner and to the teacher and eventually to society--and the ethical argument that one important aim of education is, in a sense, to threaten society, to subvert the current order, to question authority and tradition. These are the positions of reconstructionists and revolutionaries--those who have a vision of a perfect or at least improved society and those who are simply, if vehemently, opposed to the existing order. No existing order or authority finds it easy to accept fundamental and persistent criticism. Ironically, it is only possible within an open democratic society to seriously propose such an aim. To establish the intellectual legitimacy of education and teaching specifically as threatening to the existing order, a philosopher would need to:

- describe how such an aim fits or matches one's overall assumptions about human nature.
- develop an epistemological rationale.
- identify how this aim integrates into either a hierarchy or network of such established educational aims as teaching of critical thinking, developing creativity and imagination, promoting tolerance and respect for cultural diversity, etc.
- explain how "teaching as threat" integrates with such ethical foundations to education as "equality of consideration," "respect for autonomy," and especially "respect for personhood."
- describe how "teaching as threat" as an educational aim can function without hypocrisy with the social controls of education: authority, tradition, punishment, discipline, and order-in-general.
- and, at least tentatively address some of the political and social challenges in seriously promoting such an aim. They would be formidable, of course.

Having said all this, if such an argument were developed, I would not choose the word "threaten," rather "intervention" or "challenge" . . . borrowing from Chamberlin (The Educating Act), himself, and William Perry (Intellectual and Ethical Forms of Development During the College Years). To threaten has the connotation of anger, lack of trust, and a relationship based exclusively on power. If I were living in Chile or Uganda or North Korea, a totalitarian state, it is very likely that I would be far more inclined to embrace the language of anger, disenfranchisement, and revolution. I live in 1988 U.S.A., by no means an egalitarian society nor a perfect democracy, but nevertheless a society in which change is possible without threat.

All this, however, is additional reflection prompted by Chamberlin's initial thesis. In closing, he is saying that Education, in order to really be education, must maintain itself as a separate social institution from religious institutions; that although it may seem futile to directly enter into a dialogue with religious fundamentalists, that if they are exposed to education, if they are taught, then eventually cracks will appear in their fixed, immutable intellectual and moral systems. Although Chamberlin does not phrase it this way, fixed, absolutist systems are both epistemologically and ethically unworkable. They result in intellectual confusion and moral harm. Finally, being threatened is an inevitable consequence of education. If we really do embrace critical thinking, openness, creativity, imagination as goals, then teaching will be a threat to dogmas and dogmatists anywhere in the world and a threat to those who wish to live in the falsely comfortable orthodoxies of those dogmas.